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House of Lords: Reform

rose to move, That this House takes note of the White Paper The House of Lords: Reform (Cm 7027). The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this is an historic debate. We debate this issue after the other place voted in favour of a 80 per cent elected and20 per cent appointed second Chamber by a majority of 38, and for a 100 per cent elected second Chamber by a majority of 113. On an issue of this constitutional significance, it is right that the lead in the national debate should bein both Houses of Parliament. The views of both Houses must contribute to this debate. We in this House have an obligation to express our views and to contribute to and lead, with the other place, that national debate. This is not the time to say that because the other House has voted in a particular way, that should determine how we vote or debate. The votes in the Commons do not determine how we vote. Their votes were important, but we, too, must express our views and put our arguments. The views of both Houses are entitled to respect. I welcome the extensive participation in the debate in your Lordships’ House. I anticipate that the quality of the debate today and tomorrow, and the votes, will influence the path of reform. We may express different views and reach different conclusions from the views and conclusions reached in the other place. After all, our purpose and our effectiveness come from the fact that we are different from the other place, but the current strength of our Parliament is that both Houses work together and produce solutions. It is not for me to anticipate the views and votes in this House, but after our debate, we all—Government, Lords and Commons—need to consider whether a basis for progress emerges from the debates in both Houses. I believe that the opportunity is there for a consensus to emerge. It requires us all to be prepared to identify those things on which we agree, to be swayed by debate and to put the interests of our country and its constitution first. This is an issue beyond party politics. We will, after Questions on Wednesday afternoon, have the opportunity to vote on seven Motions put down in my name and on a separate Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, which is that there should be no change to the current composition of this House. The first Motion in my name proposes a fully appointed House, the second supports 20 per cent elected, the third 40 per cent, the fourth 50 per cent, the fifth 60 per cent, the sixth 80 per cent, and the seventh an all-elected House. While all these are votes on principle, I invite the House to vote on each Motion in my name on the broad basis set out in the White Paper. So, for example, voting for an all-appointed House means a fully appointed House without any hereditary Peers, adopting some form of statutory Appointments Commission. I say ““broad basis””, because all the details would need to be discussed and agreed subsequently. The Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, allows noble Lords to vote for the preservation of the hereditaries. The House will have the opportunity to vote for his Motion last in the list of Motions. In the debate on Lords reform, powers and composition cannot be considered in isolation from each other. Only when we know what we want the second Chamber to do can we address the issue of composition. There is no disagreement about the desire to preserve the primacy of the Commons and there is no disagreement on the current powers of this House and the extent to which those powers are exercised in accordance with conventions that govern the relationship between the two Houses. There are, from time to time, significant disagreements between the two Houses on particular issues of legislation. The Joint Committee of both Houses, chaired by my noble friend Lord Cunningham of Felling, described the conventions on how the disagreements are resolved. The relationship between the two Houses has changed because the composition of the House has changed since the removal of 90 per cent of the hereditary Peers by the 1999 Act. The House has moved from being one where the Tories were the dominant party and exercised restraint in challenging the Commons—less restraint when a Labour Government were in power compared with when there was a Tory Government, for reasons that are obvious—to one where no party has a dominant position and the Government are vulnerable to being defeated where the two other parties coalesce against them on an issue. In the context of this newly configured House, the Government sustain regular defeats or opposition amendments to government Bills are passed. It is right that this should continue, whatever party forms a Government in the future. Sometimes the other place will agree to the changes because they are uncontroversial and improve the Bill; sometimes, even though the changes are controversial, the other place will accept them in whole or in part; or the other place will hold out. Normally this place will give way. The consequence is that the Government get their business but sometimes in a form that they had not initially envisaged. This process of scrutiny and change is effected in the main without significant delay and without gridlock between the two Houses. It is a beneficial part of our constitution. From time to time, the process is attended by tensions between the two Houses, but the conventions are observed. Legislation is amended by your Lordships’ House and the Government get their business. The tensions make us unpopular with the other place from time to time, but the process works; the conventions hold. The Joint Committee described in a unanimous cross-party, cross-House report a relationship that has widespread support among those charged with making our system work. This broad relationship between the two Houses is one that I would wish to see continue, and there is widespread support for this relationship with the other place and for the role for the House of Lords that I have described. The debate on composition should, I believe, be conducted on the basis that there is a consensus in support of a House with the role and powers described by the Joint Committee. The White Paper and the Motions that we are debating give this place three broad choices on composition: all appointed, all elected or a hybrid House. All three options, including an all-appointed House, will see the end of the hereditary legislators. If this House votes for an appointed House in accordance with the first Motion in my name, it will be doing so on the basis that the hereditaries are removed and that there is a statutory Appointments Commission. At this point, I want to refer to the undertaking that my noble and learned friend Lord Irvine of Lairg gave to this House when he said that the hereditary Peers would remain until stage two of reform took place. There have been suggestions—and there may well be again today—that this meant a pledge to introduce an elected element into the House. It did not. Any of the seven propositions in my name would be sufficient to fulfil the terms of the pledge because any of them would constitute stage two of the reform. The all-appointed option set out in the Motion in my name would not, I anticipate, materially change the conventions that the Joint Committee has described, so this option would achieve a more modern basis for an all-appointed House. It would allow for the process of appointment to produce a more representative House without threatening the current working of the House, but it would still leave the House with no democratic element. Our House is able to make the substantial changes to legislation that I have described. We are a partner with the other place in passing legislation in a substantive and real way. In the context of our democracy, because no one would deny that legislation must be approved in a democratic way, is it sufficient that the democratic element comes from approval by the Commons of the final form of the Bill? The Government’s view is that it is not sufficient. As we said in the White Paper at paragraph 1.4: ““In the Government’s view, it is difficult, in a modern democracy, to justify a second chamber where there is no elected element and in which the public has no direct input into who sits in it””. We are utterly different from the civil servants who draft Bills, or pressure groups that propose amendments. We are also completely different from the judiciary, which has its own functions in the constitution. Elections for the judiciary would be inappropriate; its legal conclusions can always be changed by legislation. We, in this House, are partners in making legislation. Our role in scrutiny is vital, effective and far-reaching. We are not a quango; we are a legislative Chamber. We need democratic connection. If that is right, should that democratic element take the form of a wholly elected House or a hybrid House? If the reform adopted is for an all-elected House, we will be embarking on a wholly new sort of Chamber. There will be no ambiguity about its democratic connection. It will not run into the complications of hybridity, which are real, although I believe surmountable. While there would no doubt be a long transitional period and current Members—or at least some of them—would be able to stay until the last of what would be the waves of introductions of a wholly elected House, first and foremost the question would be raised on the extent to which the new all-elected House would operate in the context of the current conventions. There is no appetite for a House that seeks parity with the other place. In the context of a wholly elected House, the primacy of the Commons could be preserved only with a detailed and accepted definition of the relationship between the two Houses. I say that for two reasons. First, an all-elected House is,by its nature, a complete break with the current arrangements, so the institutional acceptance of the existing arrangements would be lost. Secondly, the basis on which the elected second Chamber was compelled to accept that its election gave it less validity than the first Chamber would need to be spelt out to give the first Chamber confidence that its primacy was sustainable. Written-down arrangements can, no doubt, be devised, but they would involve a very significant change to our constitutional arrangements. That would be produced by a big bang, with inevitable effects on how the other place did its business. A big bang would have two further effects. The first would be the removal of the appointed Cross-Bench element; we would lose expertise that has marked us out as different from the other place. The second would be that the right reverend Prelates would leave; the relationship with the church would go and it could not be replaced by an arrangement whereby the established church stayed in some form but other faiths had representation as well, through appointment, because there would be no appointments. The proposal for an all-elected House is the one that achieved the biggest majority in the other place—a very substantial majority. We must take that vote at face value. It will be on the record for generations to come. The ramifications of adopting that course need to be identified and considered. I have identified the more obvious consequences. There will no doubt be others and, beyond that, the unforeseen consequences, but they would all need to be considered. They would go beyond reform simply of your Lordships’ House. Maybe the nation is ready for that, but we cannot assume that to be the case, and certainly not without the most careful consideration of the consequences. The other alternative is a hybrid House. There would be two types of Peer: elected and unelected. Hybridity produces both democratic connection and connection with the existing institution. The transitional arrangements identified in the White Paper can play a significant part in ensuring continuity, which has always been an important part of our constitution, so that the conventions of the existing institution, with proper support, have more prospect of survival. Parliamentarians have, in the main, no appetite for confrontation between the two Houses. Nor, I believe, do the public; they want the constructive approach that comes from working together. A part-elected House is a much more fertile landscape within which, if there is good will and active support from all three political parties, the conventions could be preserved in a way that does not require the black-letter changes to the constitution that a fully elected House would require. What percentage should be elected? The more who are elected, the greater the democratic connection, but the greater the threat to the conventions on legislation and probably the greater the use of the Parliament Acts. Those are the three main choices. There is also the choice given by the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne. At the conclusion of this debate, we will need to consider what has been said in both Houses of Parliament. We will reconvene the cross-party group, to which we will present working papers. We will consider a further White Paper. In accordance with the promise given in paragraph 4.17 of the current White Paper, we will evaluate, in the light of the debates, the extent to which the various options that emerge from these debates affect the conventions, and we need to make proposals for how the preservation of those conventions may be promoted and achieved. We may decide to publish a further White Paper. We will then publish a draft Bill. I await the debate today and tomorrow with real anticipation. We will have different views, one from the other, but from this debate I have no doubt will emerge a quality and a clarity that will assist in identifying the way forward. I beg to move. Moved, That this House takes note of the White Paper The House of Lords: Reform (Cm 7072).—(Lord Falconer of Thoroton.)