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House of Lords: Reform

My Lords, there have been moments in this debate when the words of Edmund in ““King Lear”” rang in my ears: "““Fine word ‘legitimate’ … Now, gods, stand up for bastards””." This debate has to be about how to improve government in Britain. It cannot be a rearguard action in defence of the House of Lords as it is. That would be an irrelevant response to the House of Commons’ strongly expressed preference for an all-elected second Chamber. It should be seen as an opportunity to construct a second Chamber that is a strong, secure and indispensable buttress of democracy and accountability in the 21st century. The background to this debate, and to all the debates that we have had about constitutional reform in the past decade, is the central problem of the need to strengthen the capability of our constitutional provisions and for Parliament, in particular, to check the power of the Executive. That process began in 1997 with devolution, with the entrenchment of human rights powers and bringing the courts into their safeguard, and with the opening up of government provided for by freedom of information. Today, we are discussing where the next steps lead. We have to acknowledge that the principal defect in our parliamentary democracy is the unchecked power of the Prime Minister, who, with the slightest dexterity, is capable through his use of patronage of holding the House of Commons in his hand. That cannot be the sole repository of authority to check our Executive, which is why this provides a real opportunity to construct a role for a second Chamber—a Senate—that has the authority of direct election and is not the creature of the Government, particularly the Prime Minister. Reform of this House will in my judgment not be achieved by a mere tinkering with its composition. It needs more than reconstruction and making a bow in the direction of the electorate. This Chamber requires the full authority and the right, which flows from having been elected, to say no to the Prime Minister. As it stands, this House is seen as part of the problem of patronage, not as part of the solution. I was much impressed by the arguments put forward by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Irvine of Lairg and Lord Howe of Aberavon, about the excellence of this House today in the discharge of its duties. Few who know anything about the way in which this House works would quarrel with the idea that wisdom, experience, tenacity and devotion to duty ameliorate our legislation. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe, spoke of how 40 per cent of the amendments produced by this House are accepted by the Government. That is a true achievement but, alas, it is not enough. Last week, we heard a magnificent debate in the Chamber in which the renewal of control orders made under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was considered. Some 10 powerful and cumulatively effective speeches, made without repetition, demolished the Government’s case, but the sadness is that, at the end of the debate, the Government marched on. We heard a feeble speech from the Front Bench on behalf of the Government, while the eloquence, perception and experience of the House did nothing to redirect their policy. That is the challenge that we must face. There is no serious objection of principle to a second elected House having true authority. The primacy of one elected House over the other is not obvious in any constitution that I have observed. The business of government is so complex, the layers so deep and the extent so wide that surely it makes sense to consider the differentiation of roles and the possibility that this House could take on the task of holding the Government to account using some of the powers that the Commons does not exercise. I am talking about the use of the prerogative, appointments, treaty making and so forth—matters that neither House tackles in an effective way today. My consideration about what is required to effect this change is that a reformed House should have real power; that Ministers should not be drawn from it, but should be accountable to it; that it should be small and therefore by its nature distinguished, a place for which there is a competition to serve; and that re-election should certainly be possible to hold the Members of the elected second Chamber to periodic account. I advocate some consideration being given to the issue that properly exercises many of those who have contributed to this debate: how to import into the deliberations the expertise and knowledge that come from high-level experience. It would be open to an elected House with the powers that I have described to establish an advisory council of state with just such members serving on a continuing basis. That might complement the input from citizens’ panels, which people have considered, into the decision-making process of government. This process of change will not be comfortable. If it is honestly conducted, it will not be comfortable for either House. There is much to be said for the contribution made by my noble friend Lord McNally in opening the debate from these Benches, asking for a ““glide path to reform”” to enable wider considerations than the mere question of percentages of election to be debated. But what is clear is that the Commons vote has compelled us not to tinker with the structure of Parliament, but to rethink its powers and its purpose.