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Proceeding contribution from Lord Boyce (Crossbench) in the House of Lords on Thursday, 15 March 2007. It occurred during Debate on Armed Forces.


Armed Forces

My Lords, this is a scary time for our Armed Forces, and I am not talking about the threat posed by the Taliban, al-Qaeda or any others bent on doing our soldiers, sailors or airmen harm; I am talking about the threat that looms from the Treasury in the shape of the Comprehensive Spending Review. Unshakeable in its belief that the MoD cannot spend its money wisely or efficiently—although compared with the ineptitude of some other government departments in using their cash to best effect, the MoD is a positive paragon of financial efficiency—the Treasury is showing every sign of keeping the purse strings tightly drawn and not allowing the release of what is required to fund adequately this Government’s aspirations for, and real-time use of, a global expeditionary force. It is no good the Minister claiming that the defence budget has had it good with year-on-year increases over the past few years without acknowledging that the Strategic Defence Review baseline was never properly resourced in the first place. The annual increases have never closed that gap, which has been exacerbated by the huge increase in defence activity over the same timeframe and a concomitant falling-away of the percentage of GDP spent on the Armed Forces, while defence equipment costs have outstripped inflation by a factor of six or seven. I am afraid that, in the search for cash to give those departments that are perceived to be the ones that will catch more votes, it has been obvious that defence is all too easy to ignore. The Government still have a peacetime mentality as we engage in full-on war fighting. Our Armed Forces find themselves unable to afford what they need to run themselves properly today. The future prospects for the full equipment programme that they need also looks bleak. On the latter, I would be entirely content to hear the Minister tell me that I am wrong and that there will be room in the programme for such major projects as the future carrier and the Army’s future rapid effects system, both of which are vital if the UK’s defence policy is to be deliverable. I hope that the Minister will confirm that such programmes will remain intact and safe, not least from being raided to pay for the replacement deterrent. On that, I remind the Minister that we shall be watching carefully to see that the Prime Minister’s promise—that the cost of the deterrent will not be at the expense of the conventional forces—is kept and that there will not be the expected Treasury sleight of hand to make the MoD pay by some other means, such as through swingeing efficiency targets or by cutting the number of Astute-class submarines being built. But I am not holding my breath. Let us move from the future back to today. The corrosive effect of under-resourcing the present is very plain to see in the cuts that have been visited on what some perceive is the second line and the support area. For example, will the Minister confirm that the fleet remains unable to meet all its required levels of readiness following the damage done by the policy of reduced fleet support that was inflicted because of shortage of in-year cash between 2004 and 2006? That policy has led to mass cannibalisation and store robbing, which has left the majority of ships operationally impoverished in order to keep the few on deployment competent to do their duty, with all the fall-out effects that that had on training and morale. Will he comment on the study that is being conducted into cutting one of our three naval bases? That was initiated not for strategic reasons—such a move could not possibly weather any strategic logic—but to find more cash to prop up inadequate funding of running costs or suffer the penalty of having more ships axed. What about training? Is the Minister satisfied that the criteria for the tiers of training that our Army brigades need to undergo to be at full war-fighting effectiveness are in accordance with their defence planning assumptions? There are appalling stories about how some of the families are being treated in their service accommodation. The fact is that the rear line—especially the domestic conditions for our service people—is impoverished. As the Public Accounts Committee has identified, about a third of the Armed Forces are not able to meet their war-readiness states. To use a well worn phrase, they are not fit for purpose. That is down to money, not to the people, who do brilliantly with their can-do attitude at managing their shortfalls manfully and at doing the best with what they have got. Will the Minister acknowledge that the treatment of the so-called second line is second class because there are not the funds to keep those people at the level of training and thus the readiness that they should be at to take their turn on the front? I believe that that is at the heart of the concern expressed last week by the Chief of the Defence Staff about the Armed Forces’ ability to maintain the current tempo of operations within existing resources. In the other place, the Secretary of State for Defence said of the operational tempo that, "““we cannot sustain it in the long term without doing damage to the core of our troops””.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/2/07; col. 625.]" That statement is myopic. Such damage is being inflicted now. Incidentally, while I was derided some four years ago for saying that it would take us at least two years to recover from the operational tempo at that time, I would put that figure significantly higher now. I also say, en passant, that we are hardly helped here by our so-called allies. I reflect wryly on the number of times that I was told in the Ministry of Defence by Ministers and their bean-counting advisers, as well as by the Treasury, that we could afford to take risks with holes in our capabilities because those holes would be filled by our allies with whom we would always go to war. That is fine as long as no fighting is required, as the pathetic performance in Afghanistan of some of these allies of ostensible strength shows. Lest your Lordships think that I am being unduly pejorative about some of our European partners, let me quote the Secretary of State for Defence, who said of them a couple or so weeks ago: "““The sooner people remove those caveats””—" that is, restricting foreign commanders’ ability to deploy troops appropriately— "““and allow their troops to be deployed where they are most needed, the better it will be for all of us””.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/2/07; col. 624.]" Your Lordships will not be surprised that I find irresponsible the reduction in our destroyer and frigate numbers over the past three years, in part because of that assumption that we would always be part of a multinational fleet that would give us the benefit of working alongside our allies. That philosophy was recently paraded once again by the Minister for the Armed Forces in the context of fleet air defence. It is all very well to say such things, but it rather makes the courageous assumption that our allies will fight. Speaking of escort numbers, I trust that the Minister can reassure the House that the force level of destroyers and frigates will not fall below 25—already a dangerously low number, as I guarantee the country will find to its regret in years to come. We should not forget that the Strategic Defence Review set the number at 32, and the expeditionary fundamentals of that review have not changed. Will the Minister also say whether the seventh and eighth Type 45 destroyers will be ordered and that sensible provision will be made in the defence budget for the future surface combatant? I hope that if the Minister responds to the point about escort numbers he will not trot out the argument that the modern ship is a force multiplier and that we can therefore do with fewer. As I have said in this House many times, unless teleportation has been invented, a ship cannot be in two places at the same time. Our defence policy demands a Navy that can be globally deployed; indeed, our Navy currently contributes to eight out of 10 Foreign Office objectives. The Government have set a global strategy and a policy for our security that I totally endorse. The world in which we now live means that the defence of our homeland starts not in our territorial limits but well beyond, wherever across the globe our interests are threatened. That requires the expeditionary policy of the Strategic Defence Review. I regret that the hollowing-out of our Armed Forces occasioned by their continued underfunding has put that policy at serious risk of being undeliverable. It certainly puts those trying to deliver it at the cutting edge under huge strain. It is time that the Government treated honourably those who sacrifice themselves for their country and delivered their side of the covenant.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
690 c858-61 
Session
2006-07
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Subjects
Armed forces Armed conflict Deployment Defence equipment Housing Health services Finance Iraq Recruitment Peacekeeping operations Procurement Staff Standards Training Reserve forces Afghanistan Iraq conflict Job satisfaction Labour turnover Military intelligence
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk