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Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill [Lords]

The hon. Gentleman appositely points out that this is a sort of barrister-fest, given the background of the three Front-Bench spokespeople. I had not really digested that point, but I assert that our proceedings are none the worse for that. I have never come across partisanship in a judge; let me make that totally clear. Not every county court judge will have the responsibility that we are discussing, and there are county court judges who have those responsibilities now. It makes obvious sense that if there is a major firm of bailiffs in an area, the local county court judge becomes much more experienced. They are exposed to the risks and difficulties of the process, and therefore become masters, or mistresses, of dealing with them. I say mistresses, as one or two of the county courts judges are women. It is our intention to build on that expertise. We intend the county court regime to be imposed with considerable rigour. As I say, we intend to put the requirements of schedule 12 forward as part of the certification process. As hon. Members will remember from Committee, bailiffs will have to be trained before they qualify for the certification process. They will also have to put up a bond, and the judge can order the forfeiture of that bond, or part of it, if the bailiff is in breach of the terms of their certification. As hon. Members will remember, there is a regime in schedule 12 for bringing actions, whether for damages and related loss, or abuse of power. Pretty well every remedy that one could wish for against an enforcement agent is listed in schedule 12. As I have said, we intend those remedies to carry across the enforcement industry, but they can be applied to the county court. I hope that we have a reasonably foolproof framework, because that is certainly our intention, notwithstanding the slightly uncomfortable transitional phase that must take place. I hope that we have a satisfactory framework in place. The SIA supports the penalties principle and the characteristics for enforcing regulations that are featured in Professor Macrory’s work. Over the next few months, the SIA will consider how the Macrory toolkit of new regulatory sanctions can be integrated with its existing approach, which is largely based on compliance. In partnership with the Home Office, the SIA will consider what steps it needs to take to access those new tools. In particular, the SIA will look at how the additional sanctions could help to support its compliance activity and its overall aim of protecting the public. Paragraph 66 of schedule 12, to which I have already made free reference, sets out new remedies that will be available to the debtor against an enforcement agent who breaches the provisions of the new law. As I have said, the remedies include damages for loss. There is a procedure that will enable the court to deal with complaints such as those relating to the overcharging of fees. The enforcement agent would be liable if anyone whom he takes on to premises to assist him breaches any of the provisions in schedule 12. The assistant, and of course the enforcement agent, will be personally liable if they commit an offence under ordinary criminal law. Under clause 58, an offence is committed if a person purports to act as an enforcement agent without being authorised to do so. The maximum penalty—and it is not a penny too much, in my view—is £5,000. Additionally, there are other avenues of redress, for example through the local authority ombudsman, if the enforcement agent is sent by the local authority. Obviously, we will have to develop appropriate complaints handling procedures with the SIA, the Home Office and all stakeholders, so that the SIA is always informed of complaints that require targeted intervention and investigation, however they fit into the framework. It is primarily through regulation that we will drive up standards across the industry. In particular, as I have said, strict competences and conditions will be set for individuals who apply for a licence. That is all that I wanted to say about new clause 6, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby. I hope that I have allayed his concerns through my best endeavours. My officials have worked very hard to make sure that I am in a position to use those best endeavours to try to deal with his complaints. I have said, and will say again, that the will of the Government is that there should be proper licensing, proper regulation and proper complaints procedures to ensure that the enforcement agency sector no longer produces the kind of horrors of which we have heard. Amendments Nos. 33 to 35 concern certification, and as the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk said, they effectively replicate amendments tabled by the Conservatives in Committee in the Commons, and in Grand Committee in the other place. Our position on the certification of Crown employees has already been made clear, but let me restate it: I do not believe that it is necessary for them to fall within the new regime. The Government have little or no control over the training, conduct and discipline of enforcement agents. In contrast, Her Majesty’s Courts Service has a large degree of control over agents such as county court bailiffs. Other departments, such as Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, have similarly high levels of control over their own enforcement staff. County court bailiffs and civilian enforcement officers in the magistrates courts are subject to civil service recruitment procedures, and the civil service code governs their behaviour. They are subject to strict controls relating to conduct and discipline under civil service disciplinary procedures, and complaints against them can be made to the appropriate court manager. They are also subject to continuous training and development, which is provided by their departments, and of course they are subject to compulsory criminal record checks. Although we can insist that such standards be adhered to within our own departments, we have no such power outside our departments, hence the need for certification. However, it is not needed for our own employees. It is widely acknowledged that the problem is private sector bailiffs; they are the source of most of the complaints about the activities of enforcement agents. Figures provided by Citizens Advice show that well over 90 per cent. of the complaints that it receives on the subject relate to that sector. It is at that sector that we must target the comprehensive system of regulation. I want to reiterate what my noble Friend Baroness Ashton said on Third Reading in the other place, and what I said in Committee about Crown employees: the Government are committed to ensuring a common set of standards and a common appearance—that gives an indication of the subject that I shall move on to next—across the enforcement industry, built around a high standard of training and professionalism across the public and private sectors. We are considering what we can do on the subject of common information and a central register of enforcement agents, so that debtors can verify that the person on the doorstep has the necessary authority. Amendments Nos. 21 and 24 are unnecessary. Amendment No. 21 would mean that enforcement functions could not be carried out by those who assist the enforcement agent in his presence and under his direction. Enforcement agents need to take other persons on to premises with them for practical reasons, for example when they are dealing with large-scale business or industrial premises. They may need assistance in taking an inventory or removing goods that need packaging and safeguarding; for those tasks, expertise is essential. Frequently, of course, they require the assistance of a locksmith. If we insist that those functions cannot be carried out by someone assisting the enforcement officer under his direction and in his presence—that is what is required—it will make the whole process of taking control of goods so lengthy and complex that it is virtually unworkable. Amendment No. 24 would have far-reaching consequences that, I guess, were not intended. For many statutory debts, such as debts owed to national or local government bodies, the statutory power to enforce, using certain methods, is placed in the hands of the relevant Secretary of State. The Secretary of State then confers that power on another person working on his behalf. He may confer it on a member of staff in the relevant organisation, or on a company that provides the relevant services, by means of a contract. If the amendment were made, the effect would be that only those on whom the relevant statutory enforcement power was conferred could carry out the function of enforcement. I am sure that is not what my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby intends, and I shall go on to explain how catastrophic it would be if the Secretary of State alone could carry out those functions.