Proceeding contribution from Earl Attlee (Conservative) in the House of Lords on Thursday, 22 November 2007. It occurred during Debate on Armed Forces.
Armed Forces
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Park of Monmouth for introducing the debate. It is always a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, whose contributions I always enjoy. I am relieved that he did not fully accurately describe the A400M. I remind the House that I am a serving officer in the Territorial Army. I am also the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman on maritime and shipping matters, but I speak from the Back Benches today. I have a bit of good news. Our Armed Forces currently seek to maintain a comprehensive and balanced capability, and they do. Unlike many other countries, we do not have several hundred main battle tanks and a similar number of fighter aircraft, but no ISTAR or deployable logistics system. Only a few other countries—the United States, France and possibly Russia—can deploy at brigade strength far overseas. We also have the political will to use our military capability for the greater good. What a pity we are not yet using the comprehensive approach at the strategic level in Whitehall. Almost every problem that we have talked about today derives from operating far outside defence planning assumptions. The noble Lord, Lord Chidgey, mentioned the problem, as did many others, but he did it particularly well. To recap, our current defence planning assumptions allow us one medium-scale enduring operation and one small-scale operation that is possibly enduring. Medium-scale means a brigade; small-scale means a battalion. What we actually have is double medium-scale plus; the plus refers to such assets as ISTAR, special forces and everything else that we need to support two very difficult operations. This is not just about the tour intervals—the aspiration for 24 months between operational tours. At all levels, we are training for the war, not for war. We are becoming very good at fighting this counterinsurgency operation, while neglecting the capability of operating on a large scale—in other words, at divisional level—on a proper war-fighting operation. Essential battle training exercises in Canada are being cut back, and few are experiencing the Medicine Man exercises. A very senior officer explained to me in a presentation that combat power could be expressed as kit times personnel times leadership to the power of TEE—training, education and experience. We are developing an officer cadre with a gap in TEE. This is not just about training, however, but about the kit, the platforms, the tanks, the protective ability and the helicopters, which are all being worn out far faster than planned for because we are operating far outside the defence planning assumptions. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie, touched on his SF role. Only a small percentage of our Armed Forces have that innate incredible skill set that makes them suitable for service in the Special Forces. We cannot easily train more SF without diluting their capability, but we are using them far too much and we cannot go on like this. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, talked about robbing equipment. On the land side, the current euphemism is ““cross-servicing””. Again, this is just another symptom of operating far outside the defence planning assumptions. We are also extremely vulnerable to another military challenge appearing from nowhere—where else do they appear from? I take it that the Minister agrees that we cannot deploy on large-scale—division-level—exercises or operations. Until 2015, there is no possibility of engaging on Exercise Saif Sareea. We might have enough strategic aircraft to support one medium-scale operation, but we do not have for two. The aircraft that we have are the VC10 and TriStar aircraft. These are extremely unreliable, they are not used anywhere else in northern Europe, and they have a very serious effect on manpower when they disrupt rest and recuperation flights. We cannot continue to operate outside the defence planning assumptions for so long. As the noble Lord, Lord Chidgey, said, we can do so for a short while but we cannot do so for years. If we do, we must expect to have our posterior kicked at some stage. In a similar way, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, and the noble Viscount, Lord Slim, alluded to what could go wrong. We must either cut our commitments or increase our resources. Since the latter is unlikely and would take time to implement and take effect, we must cut our commitments. We have 4,000 troops in Iraq, a brigade plus, but the Americans have 160,000. We cannot affect the outcome in Iraq—only the Americans can do that. My noble friend Lord Marlesford said that the Iraq operation could sink or swim, but actually it is beginning to do rather better. We can affect the outcome in Afghanistan, and to a disproportionate extent. However, we are severely hampered by having to split our military power across two campaigns. It would make a huge difference if we were to get out of Iraq completely. It is obviously beyond my pay grade to say that we should, but if we did, it would not be because of the rights or wrongs of the situation or the prospects of success, which as I have said are getting better, but because of a strategy of concentrating the physical, conceptual and moral components of our fighting power on one operation for strategic reasons. Moreover, success in Afghanistan is essential to the future of NATO, as pointed out by many noble Lords. When the Minister comes to reply, she will no doubt pray in aid approximately £2 billion-worth of urgent operational requirements, but is it the case that there is no budget line for the support of these urgent operational requirements—a budget line for the maintenance of equipment? I refer to overhauls, spare major assemblies and new tyres to replace those already worn out. Of course, UORs will be supported and the funds will have to come from elsewhere, but I give notice that I may challenge the Minister if she boasts about UORs but does not state how they are going to be supported. The Minister may also use the ““jam tomorrow”” argument regarding the equipment programme, but is not the incidence of expenditure unsustainable because we have the carriers, the carrier aircraft system, the future rapid effect system and Trident all reaching their peak period of expenditure at more or less the same time? There has been much talk about the military covenant. I am extremely concerned about the delayed inquests into operational fatalities, a point raised by my noble friend Lord Selkirk, but I shall take a slightly different view. In many cases, there have been delays of over three years. It is partly a question of resources at home, not in theatre. This means that a bereaved family cannot achieve closure, and a bereaved wife cannot possibly consider starting a new relationship until the inquest is complete. Not surprisingly, the lawyers do nothing to speed the process up. A court martial tribunal is comprised of serving officers who can put the events described to the court in their proper context. I frequently hear coroners severely criticising experienced officers. It is easy to be wise after the event and to adhere to the fiction promoted by lawyers and the media that casualties and fatalities on operations can be almost entirely eliminated. Another difficulty is that, in some cases, deceased servicemen or immediate comrades may be partially responsible for the death. This is a sensitive issue and no one in the MoD or the chain of command would want to point it out in an individual case. But I have certainly been invited, along with my comrades, to do something on operations that was toe-curlingly stupid. We just got on and did it, and fortunately we got away with it. The coroners Bill will not make an appearance during this Session, and unfortunately there is insufficient time to pursue the point further today.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 696 c985-7
- Session
- 2007-08
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Lords chamber
- Subjects
- Armed forces Defence Deployment Coroners Defence equipment Health services Finance Families Iraq Pay Peacekeeping operations Procurement Staff Private rented housing Training Afghanistan Affordable housing Armed forces covenant
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
Librarians' tools
- Timestamp
- 2023-12-15 23:55:07 +0000
- URI
- http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_424040
- In Indexing
- http://indexing.parliament.uk/Content/Edit/1?uri=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_424040
- In Solr
- https://search.parliament.uk/claw/solr/?id=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_424040