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Convicting Rapists/Protecting Victims

It is a shame that there is so little time for this important debate, especially given the wide interest in the House. I should say at the outset that I welcome the Government's decisions on the consultation. They have made the right choices. I have one small quibble on the matter of expert evidence, but I have a suggestion that I hope might be helpful. The high 95 per cent. attrition rate in rape cases is a matter of deep concern. Other crimes have similar attrition rates, but they are not as serious as rape. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) is right that there are inherent difficulties involving evidence in the vast majority of rape cases—some 80 per cent.—in which the victim knows the defendant. However, such a high attrition rate requires not just an explanation, but correction. The attrition rate itself must be seen in the light of the whole process, not just the events at trial, although there is, of course, feedback between several parts of the system. There are at least seven points determining when cases drop out of the system: whether they are reported by the victim in the first place; whether they are recorded by the police; whether they are pressed by the victim; whether the Crown Prosecution Service charges; whether evidence is offered by the prosecution in court; whether the case is put to the jury by the judge; and whether the jury finds the defendant guilty. There are problems at each stage, although I do not have time to go into all of them. There are worrying aspects of what happens in rape cases, which justify further action. The hon. Gentleman pointed out that a sixth of cases drop out because they are not recorded by the police as rapes. ““Without Consent””, a report by Her Majesty's Crown Prosecution inspectorate and Her Majesty's inspectorate of constabulary that was published in January, shows that a third of those cases have been ““no crimed””, to use the jargon, mistakenly. The fact that the Home Office's counting rules are not being complied with in one third of those cases is a matter of deep concern. The vast bulk of cases drop out of the system at the CPS charging stage. Why is that going on? For the most part, the CPS says that there is insufficient evidence, but that covers a vast variety of circumstances. The key is case building and co-operation between the police and the CPS—and bringing in the victim as well—to ensure that cases are as strong as possible. There are several purely practical problems at that stage: the quality of the interview; who is doing the interview; what they know about the law; and what they know about what will be required at trial. The question of the quality of videos often comes up when one speaks to practitioners on the bench and at the Bar. Expanding the use and availability of video evidence is a good idea, but a video makes little difference—in fact, it can harm a case—if it shows the tops of people's heads and if what they are saying cannot be heard. Moving on to the central point—jury acquittals in cases in which it is suspected that the jury has borne in mind myths and stereotypes about rape—research indicates that, unfortunately, it is not just juries who hold incorrect or objectionable views. Such views can also be held by the police and, dare I say it, prosecutors and even judges. The only comment that I shall make about the myths is that there is a difference between the factual errors to which people are prone, and the attitudinal problems. There are factual errors about what rape is—about whether it has to do with strangers or acquaintances, whether there is resistance, whether the person who is raped has reported it early, and even the extent of false allegation. There is very little objective evidence that there are significantly more false allegations of rape than false allegations of other crimes. One need only think of thefts reported for the purposes of insurance to see how the usually suspected differences are not always accurate. There is a distinction between factual errors and attitudinal problems such as the belief that there is such a thing as contributory negligence—that is, that victims are to blame for the crimes committed against them. It will be easier to overcome the factual errors than to overcome the attitudinal errors. I differ slightly from the Government on one point—the question of expert evidence, and how one gets across the point about myths and stereotypes. I urge the Government to leave open the possibility of using expert evidence. The document seems to rule that out, but I urge them not to do so.