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House of Lords Bill [HL]

My Lords, I know that the noble Lord used the word ““incrementalism””, but that does not destroy the point that I was making. The fact is that this Bill is grossly premature. It is inevitably and unpleasantly pre-emptive. The White Paper is forthcoming, as we know. The arguments on composition should take place in that White Paper and not in a Back-Bench Bill introduced into this House. I have three points to make against the Bill: the first is that of pre-emption, which I will not labour any further; the second relates to the principles on which the Appointments Commission is supposed to operate; and the third is about the overall context and timing of the Bill. The creation of an Appointments Commission to recommend all new Members—and the noble Lord, Lord Steel, emphasised that it would do so—is frankly and obviously inconsistent with the views of the House of Commons. Indeed, it is inconsistent with the Government's policy in favour of a wholly or largely elected second Chamber. It is also inconsistent with the policy of the Opposition and the Liberal Democrats. We have heard the argument that the commission will be created to recommend only life peerages and that that would not preclude the introduction of another basis of membership; namely, election. I do not accept that: it is not the case. The broad political impact of moving at this stage to a more permanently appointed House would cut across the direction toward an elected second Chamber. More particularly, the detailed provisions of the Bill are based on the assumption of a 100 per cent appointed House. Moreover, several provisions are directly inconsistent with an 80 per cent or 100 per cent elected model. Clause 8 goes some way to setting out rules for the party balance between the Government and the Official Opposition in an appointed House. Clause 8(2)(b) expresses the principle that, "““no one party shall have a majority of members in the House””." Clause 8 (2) (c) states that, "““the Government of the day shall be entitled to””""a majority over the Official Opposition but that this,""““shall normally be … [limited to] … three per cent of the total membership of the House””." Whatever the merits of the latter proposal, it is plainly inconsistent with a Chamber that is wholly or substantially elected; where the majority of one party over another inevitably cannot be predetermined. find Clause 8(4) an extraordinary proposition. It would give the Appointments Commission discretion to phase in the majority for the Government over the Opposition over a period of up to eight years. That is extraordinary. If there is to be a change in the relationship between the Government and the Opposition, this House should not take eight years in order to produce it. Finally, this is a point that I really want to emphasise: the Bill grossly underestimates the votes and the implications of the votes in the House of Commons on 20 July this year. The Commons, by a large majority, committed itself to a wholly or mainly elected House. If this Bill were passed, it would put the House of Lords on a direct collision course with the House of Commons. I cannot believe that that is what most noble Lords would wish. One of the main arguments used over the years against elections is that it would confront the House of Commons and that there is a danger of encroachment by the Lords on the powers of competence of the other place. If anything were in that argument, I would have expected that the Commons would have been anxious to guard the competence and the powers of the House of Commons against the possibility of encroachment by the House of Lords. Not a bit of it. What do we have? We have the House of Commons saying—