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Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [HL]

My Lords, my respectful view is that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, is approaching the matter from an entirely mistaken perspective. I think that everyone would agree that there must be conditions restraining the circumstances in which embryos and—let me get the language right—human admixed embryos can be used. This amendment seeks to include in the Bill some of the most pre-eminently important conditions that would have to be satisfied. I wish that the House would listen to the point—perhaps it is already listening—that people outside are listening to and watching what we are doing. In the light of the last vote, it is extremely important that we should say, ““Yes, these embryos can be used, but we are specifying what strict conditions have to be met””. I say with great respect to those who sit on the authority that what they do in their routine business is completely unknown to the outside world. I do not suggest that it is not knowable; I am simply saying that it is not known. Why should we not state these conditions? The first one comes straight out of the provision in the 1990 Act, at paragraph 3(6) of Schedule 2. It uses the same language, saying that, "““any proposed use of embryos or inter-species embryos is necessary for the purposes of research””." The only addition is the words ““inter-species embryos””, now to be ““human admixed embryos””. Amendment No. 41, as noble Lords who have their Marshalled Lists to hand can see, uses exactly the same words as those used since 1990 with the exception of the new term. So it is hard to see that there could be any conceivable objection in principle. Proposed paragraph (6)(b) goes on to demand, "““cogent evidence, which must include published, peer-reviewed scientific data””." I was heartened by the reference to this made by the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, when talking about peer-reviewed financial grants in aid of research proposals. That is what goes on, but to the lay man it is significant to be told that there will be peer-reviewed research available for other scientists, supporting the matters that I will now enumerate. The first is that the research has been undertaken successfully in animal embryos of one or more species. Again I admit to my own lack of knowledge in this field, but my understanding is that, almost invariably, animal work will have been carried out and it will have been successful. The only suggestion that I picked up on the first day in Committee indicating a difficulty to the contrary is that there may be some diseases on which there is a wish to carry out research but where it is not possible to make use of animal testing. If that is correct, one can either read paragraph (6)(b)(i) as not extending to a case of impossibility—evidence would not be required on a point where it was impossible to produce it—or, if necessary, one could add qualifying words such as, ““save where it can be demonstrated that relevant animal testing is impossible””. I should have thought in any event that that was implicit. Proposed paragraph (6)(b)(ii) requires that, "““the research proposed on human or inter-species embryos is likely to achieve its specified purposes””." That is a moderated version of a condition proposed by my noble friend Lord Alton in his Amendment No. 7 in Committee. The language used then was that, "““the research method proposed is most likely to produce satisfactory results””." That amendment was criticised on the basis that it set the bar too high and was unnecessarily and impossibly rigid. Here the language has been moderated to, "““likely to achieve its specified purposes””." Perhaps I may remind those noble Lords who have had to deal with inventions in universities or at places of work of the problem of whether the invention belongs to the institution or employer or to the man who made it. The relevant provision of the Patents Act 1977, Section 39(1)(a), states, "““the circumstances … were such that an invention might reasonably be expected to result from the carrying out of his duties””," where ““his”” means the employee’s. We have contemplated in legislation that circumstances could arise where an invention could reasonably be expected to result. It seems no more than a parallel case to someone forming a judgment, here the authority, that the proposal is likely to achieve its specified purposes, in all the circumstances of which the authority would have full knowledge. I commend this condition as well. Finally, and I think that this is probably inherent in that everyone has mentioned it, the third condition, in paragraph (6)(b)(iii), is that, "““it is not reasonably practicable to achieve the specified purposes of the research without using human embryos or inter-species embryos””." The authority would expect to be told that resort was being made to embryos because the research team could not see a way of using any other form of material. Indeed, we discussed earlier today the other types of material that can be used for experiments that do not involve an embryo. The condition ensures that researchers would have to demonstrate that the use of another material was not possible. In following the noble Baroness, I ask noble Lords to accept the amendment and to take the view that it is perfectly reasonable, in the situation in which we find ourselves, to put in the Bill these conditions to apply whenever permission is sought to use one of these embryos.