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Proceeding contribution from Derek Twigg (Labour) in the House of Commons on Thursday, 6 March 2008. It occurred during Adjournment debate on RAF Welford (Security).


RAF Welford (Security)

I thank the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. Benyon) for his kind comments at the beginning of his speech. He has always been courteous in his dealings with me and assiduous in pursuing his constituents' interests. We have met about various issues on a number of occasions, and I am sure that we will meet on others. I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this debate on the review of security at RAF Welford. I know that he has already raised the matter personally with the Secretary of State for Defence, and I am happy to confirm the assurance that he has already been given in the House today. RAF Welford is made available to the United States visiting force under the NATO status of forces agreement of 1951 and other arrangements, which are appropriate to the relationship between the UK and the US for the purpose of our common defence. The United States visiting force is present in the UK at the invitation of the UK Government, and demonstrates the special relationship that exists between our two Governments. Although considerably reduced since the end of the cold war, the USVF forms an important part of the continuing US commitment to NATO and the security of this country. That importance is much more than just symbolic; direct support is provided to NATO forces and coalition forces—including, of course, UK forces. The UK welcomes that commitment and the contribution that the US forces provide to NATO, which remains the cornerstone of Europe's security policy and the only organisation guaranteeing its members' collective defence. Under the 1951 agreement, the Secretary of State for Defence retains legal possession and control over all sites made available to the USVF, including RAF Welford. The sites continue to be known as RAF stations for the simple reason that they are RAF stations playing host to units from the US armed forces stationed in this country. The USVF units remain responsible for administering their own routine, day-to-day activities. They use the RAF stations on licence technically as a matter of comity between sovereign powers and rather than as a matter of landlord and tenant. But article 2 of the NATO status of forces agreement is clear in its statement that:"““It is the duty of a [visiting] force and its civilian component and the members thereof as well as their dependents to respect the law of the receiving State.””" We play host to a significant population of US service personnel, their civilian support personnel and their families. There are currently approximately 12,000 members of the USVF stationed at the 10 USVF bases in the United Kingdom, making a valuable contribution to our collective defence. In addition, there are a similar number of dependants, making a total USVF plus dependants of some 24,000. We should not forget that we have a responsibility to provide those personnel with a safe and secure environment and to support the important work they do, so that it is not disrupted or undermined. As the hon. Gentleman has highlighted by initiating this debate, any armed forces establishment is likely to contain dangerous materials. This is certainly true of RAF Welford. In those circumstances, safety is paramount, and any unauthorised incursions into military establishments may present a risk. The various warning signs around the base are there for the safety of the public as well as for the security of the base. Of course signs are not enough and it may be of value if I outline to the House the arrangements in place for the security of USVF bases. The degree of protection at Ministry of Defence establishments and sites used by the USVF will vary from site to site according to the location, the nature of the establishment and the risk to the site. Security measures are informed by threat assessments, which are derived from available intelligence. That involves risk management decisions, taking into account the effectiveness and proportionality of countermeasures. It is the UK's responsibility as the host nation to provide and fund the appropriate level of external security to RAF bases made available to the USVF in the same way as support would be provided to any MOD establishment with a similar role. In addition, the host nation will take into account legal and policy restrictions placed on the USVF and acknowledged sensitivities and concerns associated with conducting global operations while based in an overseas environment. There are several options that may be considered for the protection of defence establishments. The first is unarmed guarding, the core of which is provided by the MOD guard service and comprises access control measures that can include personnel and vehicle searches and patrolling, where an unarmed guard provides a limited visual deterrent but may be limited in his or her ability to respond to an incident. The second option is defensive armed security. An armed guard at the entrance to a military establishment provides an important visual deterrent. An armed guard is also better placed to respond in the event of a terrorist incident if a suspect is armed, and is able to react quickly to an incident. Armed guarding at UK armed forces locations is provided by UK service personnel from the unit stationed at those locations or by the Military Provost Guard Service, a specialist unit designed for that purpose. Beyond that, however, the MOD has the option of deploying the MOD police to any location owned or run by the MOD. They bring with them the full range of constabulary powers. In addition, police officers possess the skills to interact with personnel and the general public with a view to gathering intelligence, maintaining the peace, detecting and preventing crime and prosecuting offenders. With the agreement of the local police force they can work both inside and outside establishments. There are currently close to 4,000 personnel serving in the MOD guard service, around 2,000 personnel in the Military Provost Guard Service and some 3,500 MOD police officers. They work at more than 200 locations across the country. May I take this opportunity to make clear my appreciation, and I am sure that of all hon. Members, for the work they do in maintaining the safety and security of the armed forces and the public? When it comes to the USVF sites, there are some variations in this pattern. The status of forces agreement places a responsibility on the visiting forces to maintain internal security at any location provided for them. That duty is also fair and reasonable. We would not invite forces to this country who did not recognise or understand such a duty. Those responsibilities and duties are fully recognised by the USVF. It maintains a security force that has jurisdiction over US service personnel and which can provide both armed and unarmed guards for these locations. The security force does not, however, have constabulary powers. For that they must draw on either the local police force or the MOD police. Discussions are taking place with the USVF on future arrangements as part of a wider review of security at its bases, including RAF Welford. It is too early to predict the outcome, as the hon. Gentleman will understand, having made a number of important points about that. I assure the hon. Gentleman that the MOD continues to strive to adapt and improve the security measures already in place so that they meet the evolving threat, with priority given to the protection of life and those assets critical to the delivery of our defence capability. Our security policy and standards must be proportionate to the threat, effective, consistent and cost-effective. In attempting to gain efficient and cost- effective security, it is important to ensure that appropriate physical security measures are in place and to identify the right balance and number of personnel required to perform the task. In closing, I should like to assure the hon. Gentleman that the security arrangements at all bases, including RAF Welford, remain an important priority to both the MOD and the USVF. I further assure him that any changes that take place will occur only if they are suitable and appropriate and do not compromise the overall level of security. Question put and agreed to.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
472 c2025-8;472 c2023-6 
Session
2007-08
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Civilians Air force Military bases Security Storage Weapons RAF Welford
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk