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Proceeding contribution from Andrew Mackinlay (Labour) in the House of Commons on Thursday, 3 April 2008. It occurred during Adjournment debate on Global Security (Russia).


Global Security (Russia)

I am not sure that I follow the hon. Gentleman, but the fact is that there are other conflicts. One is in Transnistria and Moldova, where there is a Russian minority who could say, on the basis of Kosovo, that it, too, is a one-off case. There is a degree of agreement between the hon. Gentleman and me that that is a danger. We can say that it is a one-off, but other states, communities and ethnic groups might say, ““Oh no it's not.”” That is why I think the British Government and the Foreign Office have been blind. The hon. Gentleman says that I have not changed. I am not going to change, but one thing that I have learned in the many years in which he has known me is that some things I say that are scoffed at become fact. I was prophetic, I believe, during the preparation of the report. On the enlargement of NATO, to which my friend, the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir John Stanley), referred, the report makes it clear that in our view, if Georgia's application to NATO is to be advanced, Georgia should resolve its conflicts with national minorities. I moved an amendment, which was defeated—in fact, I think that I was the only person who voted for it—saying that Georgia's resolution of such conflicts should be a precondition for its NATO membership. I claim some skill in prophecy because it would appear that our Prime Minister has taken note of what I said. I believe that in his discussions this week with President Sarkozy—the Prime Minister is in Bucharest as we speak—he is following the line that there is no sensible prospect of Georgia entering NATO unless and until its conflicts are resolved. That is why I disagree with the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir John Stanley), with whom I agree strongly on many matters: bringing Georgia in as it is, with its Russian minorities and frozen conflicts, would almost mark the end of NATO. Article 5 says that aggression towards one is aggression towards the whole, and that there should be an appropriate response. One does not invite into one's club people who have a territorial conflict with their next-door neighbour. It is stark staring bonkers. We would not, of course, go to war over the frozen conflict in Georgia, but it would mean that article 5, a NATO cornerstone, could never be used as an implied threat. It would be a devalued currency. That is why we should not let Georgia in. It would provoke Russia, create areas of conflict in other states and set unwelcome precedents. Sometimes, even things that I say eventually come to pass, and that is one such thing. I believe that the Prime Minister and President Sarkozy have concluded that Georgia's membership of NATO would not be appropriate unless and until it has resolved its frozen conflict. I am also concerned about our double standards. To listen to Foreign Office diplomats, Ministers and indeed Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservative spokespersons, it is as though United Kingdom diplomats and our security and intelligence services were like the archangel Gabriel. It is as though we did not spy or engage in espionage. Paragraph 94 of the report draws attention to the accusations by"““the FSB, in January 2006 that diplomats in the British Embassy in Moscow were engaging in espionage via the use of an imitation rock which allegedly hid electronic equipment. The FSB further accused the Embassy of using NGOs to which it was providing financial support for espionage purposes.””" We put that in our report, and I was happy for it to be there, but I moved an amendment—it is in an appendix to the report—to add the words,"““This is of course a preposterous suggestion””," but nobody supported it. I wanted to add that sarcastic comment, because clearly that rock was planted clumsily by our security and intelligence services. In my view, the suggestion that that was not the case is breathtaking nonsense, and we should not play such games. If we conduct such work, which is probably necessary, we should not pretend otherwise. We should acknowledge what is going on, because sometimes it is clumsy, our security and intelligence services do not work in consort with the mainstream Foreign and Commonwealth Office and, often, it can aggravate a situation, resulting in absurd tit for tats and the expulsion of diplomats. I think that that is a big mistake. On prosecutions and extraditions, I can understand the United Kingdom Government requesting that the Russian Federation return to this country somebody whom they want to put on trial, but we must acknowledge that our Government have also received requests from the Russian Federation for the return of people from London to Russia. We say, ““This is a matter for our courts and certain criteria must be met””, but that is precisely what the Russians say. They, too, must act in accordance with their laws. Absurdly, we try and tell Russians what their laws are and why their legal judgment is flawed. To suggest that the traffic is one-way is insulting nonsense. I have some sympathy with the Russian Federation, because I believe that we have allowed certain people to enter this country, and have given them asylum or citizenship when that was not always in the best interests of the United Kingdom. Arguably, some of them have entered not with their own money, but with Russia's money, and now the Russian authorities are catching up with them. There are legitimate criticisms to be made of the UK's financial regulatory services and oversight of money coming in—I believe that money is being laundered through London from Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union, and we are not on top of that problem. If we are aware of it, that is even more disgraceful, because we are not facilitating the return of those people to answer in the courts of their land of origin for their stewardship and extraordinary wealth, which it is almost impossible to believe could have been obtained legitimately. We allow those people to come to this country and then, from London, they wage a war against President Putin and the Russian Federation. That is crazy, illegitimate and foolhardy in the extreme. In the long term, we will lose as a result, and it is time that we examined much more rigorously people who come to this country and claim asylum, although some of those claims may be wholly justified. I intervened on my friend, the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling, who explained why a recent applicant had been granted political asylum. However, if I ask the Foreign Office, as I have done in the past, to explain why certain people are granted asylum, it resorts to its stock answer: ““We never discuss the reasons for granting asylum.”” Parliament is therefore unable to scrutinise the stewardship of Foreign Ministers or of the Home Office and ask why they judged a certain person to be fit and proper to receive political asylum. In the vast majority of cases of political asylum, nobody would ask any questions, but clearly some cases, personalities or relationships with certain states justify full, or at least partial, disclosure of the reasons for granting asylum, but the British Government refuse to make such a disclosure. They have therefore failed in their obligations to Parliament and the British people. On the basis of available evidence, I think that their judgments are far too often flawed, wrong and to our long-term disadvantage. Flowing from this debate, and with the coming of the new Russian President, I hope that there will be a reassessment of what has gone on in the past. The Russian Federation has indicated, both publicly and—I understand—informally, that it would welcome some rapprochement and thawing of this ice-cold situation, which would require the British Government to respond in kind. If Ministers can acknowledge that, we will have an opportunity to draw a line under the Litvinenko case, for the time being at least—not permanently, but we need to agree to disagree—and to move forward. If at this critical moment we make the right signs, signals and responses, I am hopeful about the prospects of a restoration of many of the services of the British Council, in St. Petersburg and elsewhere, and of other things to our mutual benefit over the next 12 months. That would be to the good of both Russia and the United Kingdom.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
474 c324-6WH 
Session
2007-08
Chamber / Committee
Westminster Hall
Subjects
Diplomatic service Investment International relations Energy supply EU action Politics and government Terrorism Security NATO Russia British Council
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk