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Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [Lords]

I want to make it clear, as my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) did, that I stand here as a Liberal Democrat but not for the Liberal Democrats; I speak in a personal capacity. Although there is policy here, and although a former leader of the Liberals, Lord Steel, piloted the Abortion Act, the Committee will be aware that other prominent Liberals, such as Lord Alton, left the Liberal party over the Act. I personally believe that there is a Liberal case to be put for a review of current legislation. I should also point out that as a man, I necessarily speak on this issue with a degree of natural caution and reticence. I can have no clear idea at all what it is like to be pregnant. The most depressing thing that I read recently on this topic was in yesterday's edition of The Guardian. The usually sound journalist, Jackie Ashley, after contrasting opposing views and the very different beliefs behind them, wrote:"““There is no sensible conversation between the opposing views to be had.””" That is borne out by my own observation of the House so far in debating any abortion issue. Such debates are emotive; related ten-minute Bills, unusually, are voted down without consideration; slogans replace arguments; the absolute right to life is starkly set against the absolute right to choose; rhetorical assassination replaces reasoned arguments. It is to be regretted that in the run-up to this debate, personal remarks by Members about Members have served to disfigure and to some extent to inflame debate. Despite profound moral differences, there is some common ground: we all believe that the abortion rate in the UK is far too high; we would all prefer a world in which there was no abortion, nor demand for it; we all recognise that our laws are among the most permissive; and we all qualify the rights that we claim—even the Catholic Church sanctions therapeutic abortion, and even pro-choice charities object to some choices. Where we differ is over the grounds, and consequently the limits, of abortion. I argue that, irrespective of any religious view, the justification for abortion becomes enormously harder from the moment when the foetus becomes conscious or responsive to pain. I also argue that we cannot be completely certain when that moment occurs, but that a precautionary principle should apply, and, where consciousness may exist, we must act as though it does. Frankly, there is no basis for giving anything a right other than that it is conscious, and there is no more significant event in the life of any being than becoming conscious. I note, too, the long and undistinguished history of denying full consciousness, or degrees of sentience, to those whom we choose to exploit, whether it is animals, fellow primates—or slaves. I accept, however, that the area of foetal sentience is a grey one and that the Committee, sadly, does not want to build the law around it or to apply a precautionary principle. The issue for the Committee is independent viability. My hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon has made the point that breaking the link between viability and abortion limits would leave legislators groping around for another criterion on which to base limits. He is fundamentally right on that point, although viability is not to be understood here in the ordinary sense. Most babies, and some adults, are not capable of surviving without massive intervention from parents or carers. They are not independently viable. My one-year-old grandchild is not independently viable. Viability here is used in the technical sense:"““the capacity of the foetus to survive—even with assistance—outside the womb.””" Everyone agrees that such a definition self-evidently must cover different cases as medical technology improves, and need not be related—should not be related—to a fixed gestation period, which is why few rational people can object to a review of the law. Some people think that the dates should be changed, if some foetuses are viable at a given date, for example, 23 weeks—we are talking about a significant percentage in that regard. Some think that the dates should be changed if any foetuses are viable at a given date, and others, including, I believe, my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon, think that the dates should be changed if most or the gross average of foetuses are viable. People choose their own option, but anyone who thinks that the dates should be changed if, and only if, foetuses show themselves to be viable on average at a particular stage must also bear in mind the fact that the foetuses that nature delivers early—the research group that we have all been talking about—are most likely to have had clinically troubled pregnancies and individual problems, which is not the case with aborted babies or babies in general at that stage.