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Health and Social Care Bill

New Section 45L(3) of Clause 123 sets the maximum time for which a justice of the peace can order initial detention, isolation or quarantine of an individual. The maximum period is 28 days. Amendments Nos. 185 and 186 seek to reduce that period to seven days and 14 days respectively, and Amendments Nos. 190 and 184 seek to reduce any further extension of the period to intervals of seven days. I understand the need to ensure that these powers are not wider than necessary, but 28 days was not an arbitrary choice. It was chosen because it covers the maximum incubation period for most known diseases that are highly transmissible. Lassa fever has an incubation period of up to 21 days and is highly contagious as soon as symptoms appear. Therefore, if the maximum initial period was less than 22 days an individual might not be showing symptoms at the point when the order ran out. A 28-day maximum allows for symptoms to show and supportive treatment to begin, at which point an individual may decide to co-operate voluntarily, thereby removing the need to seek an extension to the order. A period of seven or 14 days would not cover the incubation period of some diseases. Twenty-eight days is the maximum period available for detention, isolation or quarantine orders. That does not mean that a justice of the peace is obliged to order that an individual be detained for that period. The justice of the peace, by virtue of new Section 45G, may make an order only if he believes that it is necessary to do so in order to remove or reduce the risk to others. Therefore, if the incubation period for a particular disease was known to be only a few days, it would not be necessary to make an order extending for 28 days. This system gives the justice of the peace the flexibility to make a decision on a case-by-case basis and to set the period most effective for removing or reducing the risk while ensuring rigorous attention to the necessity and proportionality of the measures taken. I understand noble Lords’ concerns, and one thing I can look at again is whether we should ensure that extensions to orders allowing detention, isolation and quarantine should also be restricted to periods no longer than 28 days. Amendments Nos. 187 and 188 aim to restrict the period of an order for less intrusive measures to 28 days. That is not practical. For example, if an individual who works with food is found to be infected with typhoid or e-coli, an order can be made requiring him to stay off work. The length of the order will normally be related to the length of time it takes, following treatment, to produce two clear stool samples. Samples will be checked regularly. However, producing two clear samples may take longer than 28 days. It would be unnecessary, if the individual is still found to be infectious, to require a review by a justice of the peace at 28 days. Amendment No. 191 seeks to ensure that where an application is made to vary or revoke an order made by a justice of the peace under new Sections 45G, 45H or 45I, the application is heard within two working days of it being made. I sympathise with this amendment. It is right that a hearing should be speedy, especially where the order will involve the detention or isolation of an individual. However, Amendment No. 191 is very rigid. It would require a hearing to take place even where it would not be sensible to do so within the given timeframe. For example, if an individual has been quarantined under an order from a justice of the peace and doctors are carrying out tests to determine whether the individual is suffering from a particular disease, it would not be sensible to require a hearing before the test results had been obtained, which might take longer than two working days. Requiring the hearing to take place regardless of whether the relevant evidence is available would be a waste of everybody’s time and valuable resources. Amendment No. 168 seeks to ensure that where a review of an ongoing special restriction or requirement is necessary, it can be conducted only by a magistrates’ court. We do not specify in the legislation who should carry out the review. The appropriate individual to carry out the review will vary depending on the situation. It will not always be appropriate or necessary for regulations to require the involvement of a justice of the peace. For example, the Secretary of State could make a requirement that, following incidents involving a particular contaminant, property involved should be closed until repeat disinfection measures can be carried out. The best individual to carry out a review of whether the premises had been successfully disinfected to a standard that no longer posed a public health risk would most likely be a scientist who could take a sample and test it. If the sample was clear, the restrictions on the premises could be lifted. There would be no need to involve the magistrates. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, raised the issue of risk. We will discuss with the Justices’ Clerks’ Society and magistrates how best to ensure prompt appeals. The noble Baroness, Lady Stern, raised the issue of how the review process will work in regulations and whether there will be an independent appeal process. The review process will always be independent because the appeal is always made to a magistrates’ court. New Section 45L extensions are repeat extensions, but we will be putting time limits on each renewal. Amendment No.195, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, referred, would require that regulations regarding the length of an order or an extension of it follows the affirmative process. The Delegated Powers Committee did not recommend that these regulations were made using the affirmative process. The Government have accepted the recommendations of the Delegated Powers Committee in full, but I can look again at whether a compromise can be found, whereby new Section 45L(4) is brought into line with the recommendation from the DPC regarding new Section 45N, which is that the first version of the regulations would follow the affirmative procedure. I hope that in the light of the reasons I have given on why the Bill is drafted is this way, and the promises I have made to look at certain parts of it, that the noble Baroness will withdraw the amendment.