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Defence Policy

Indeed, I just said that there was a lack of political will even to use the assets when they are available. Those serving in the armed forces of other countries joined their armed forces to be a part of a defensive fighting force, if necessary, and I think that they find it just as frustrating as we do to be tied with red tape, caveats and restrictions by their respective Governments. I hope that the debate in those countries will be a vigorous one. What should the roles of NATO and the EU be, in that case? If the EU is to have a constructive role, it needs to do what NATO cannot or does not do. The Opposition have always been happy with the EU acting as a delivery mechanism of NATO policy, especially in areas such as security sector reform, the rule of law missions and so on—areas where NATO has never been very well configured. There is certainly room for greater bilateral co-operation. I echo what the Secretary of State said about what is happening in France. I know that many people are sceptical about the motives of President Sarkozy, but we need to recognise that we must seize the moment. We have been encouraging France for a long time to return to the integrated command structure, to have a rapprochement with the US and to become much more involved in future planning. If we now say, ““Well, it's not real,”” we are in danger of failing to recognise that this is a potentially important time. We need to welcome the move, because if the moment is lost it might be some time before it comes back. Proof of that fact, it proof were required, can be found in the French defence White Paper, which saw a fundamental reshaping of French forces along lines much closer to the sort of expeditionary capability that we have long encouraged them to try to have. There are positive developments along those lines. But—there has to be a ““but””—a greater role for the EU in soft power cannot be used as an excuse to avoid basic NATO military obligations. Frankly, the duplication of NATO structures—double-hatting—does not improve increased capability. Action needs assets and we cannot have competition for scarce resources. In the US in particular, we hear politicians saying that Europe must do more for its own defence and for the defence of the alliance. I think that most of us would echo that. It cannot just be a short-term pragmatic approach; the structural relationship between NATO and the EU needs to be properly thought out. Let me give a single example. Piracy is a major scourge of our sea lanes. Combined Task Force 150, which is part of Operation Enduring Freedom, is off the horn of Africa with 14 or 15 ships. It is working under the US fifth fleet. NATO is there with Standing NATO Maritime Group 2; that is another seven ships or so. Now we are to have an EU mission. Why? Other than flying the EU flag, what can that achieve that we could not achieve by augmenting one of the two existing missions? What will the command relationship be? Who is in charge of the area of operations? When we asked those questions, we were told that there would be close co-operation, but that is not really a sufficient answer. We need to know why the EU felt it necessary to become involved in something that was already being done by United States and NATO missions. We are not getting particularly good answers.