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Gaza

My Lords, like other noble Lords, I start by welcoming President Obama’s decision to appoint former Senator George Mitchell as Middle East peace envoy. I, like the noble Lords, Lord Alderdice and Lord Dubs, have experience of Senator Mitchell’s work in the talks leading to the successful negotiations of the Good Friday agreement in 1998 and, indeed, for the past several years he has been the Chancellor of my own university in Belfast. It is important to note that not only does Senator Mitchell have the quality of enormous patience—and patience is required when one is dealing with these difficult problems of ethno-religious national sectarian rage—but he also has the quality of enormous political judgment. For example, in the last week of those talks, he was effectively a party to telling Presidents and Prime Ministers that things would not unfold precisely as they expected in accordance with the realities on the ground. Therefore, there can be no finer man than Senator Mitchell for this process at this moment. However, there is a distinction between Senator Mitchell’s role, which I wish every possible success, and the Northern Ireland analogy to the Middle East that now operates in many quarters. It is with deep regret that I differ somewhat from some of the earlier observations made by noble Lords. That analogy is, I fear, becoming almost an intellectual toxic asset, a giant Ponzi scheme of illusion, and more and more are buying into it, but I am afraid that their disappointment will be equally harsh. It is not true that the Northern Ireland process was unconditional. The quartet’s Middle East envoy, Mr Tony Blair, has reminded us only in the past few days that the Mitchell principles of peace and non-violence, to which Sinn Fein had to sign up, were among many types of condition on which that process was carried. I understand the seductive hope of many noble Lords that somehow or other, over time, the Hamas charter, as a result of engagement, can come to be seen in a similar light to the IRA’s Green Book, which we now regard as an irrelevant and sentimental piece of nostalgic rhetoric. However, it is very important to understand that the Northern Ireland process was characterised by a condition of dialogue. I do not dispute in any way that we always have to keep open the question of whom we have dialogue with, and it is always an open question under examination. I also remind noble Lords that the communal anger and recrimination in the Middle East is far greater than was the case in Northern Ireland. Above all, one of the conditions of the success of the Northern Ireland process was the way in which the British and Irish Governments effectively forswore a selfish strategic interest. However, the Middle East is awash with selfish strategic interest, and in the case of Hamas and the relationship with Iran, in particular, we have a difficult problem. I say with reluctance that the case for dialogue with Hamas is not strengthened by the argument that somehow Hamas is ““not obligated to Iran””, no matter how distinguished the source for such a statement. We may choose to disregard those Fatah women who in spring 2007, according to the London Times, demonstrated outside Hamas’s headquarters shouting ““Shia, Shia”” in order to draw attention to Hamas’s links with Iran. We may choose to disregard those who write in AlJazeera Magazine and talk about the vast sums of money that Hamas has received from Iran, but we cannot deny the evidence before our eyes and disregard what happened this week, when Khalid Mashaal went to Tehran and explicitly thanked the Iranian leadership for ““its big role”” in supporting Hamas. The case for dialogue has to be kept under review. It is very difficult to analyse these movements. The case has not been strengthened by some of the claims that are currently being made for such a dialogue, which clearly cannot be sustained. It is extraordinarily difficult to analyse movements like IRA and Hamas. I taught many of the people who were in the IRA, it was close to me, and they spoke the same language. Although I donated many hours and days to thinking about it, much of the time I was wrong about what they may or may not do. We need a certain humility when we talk about Hamas because these problems of analysis are redoubled in so many respects when we analyse that organisation. We now say that we regard Gerry Adams’s speech at Bodenstown in 1977 and the peace feelers that were sent out to the British Government in 1978 as perhaps the beginning of a new turn in the IRA, which led eventually to the Good Friday agreement. Few saw that at the time, but it has to be acknowledged. It does not follow that the British Government’s refusal of those feelers was wrong; it does not follow that the Callaghan Government made a mistake. They thought about what they were doing and the decision taken by the Callaghan Government may well have been part of a number of steps taken by the British Government which eventually induced war weariness in the IRA, so that eventually, when negotiations began, they began on a realistic basis. The analysis of movements such as Hamas is difficult but the brutal coup in Gaza against Fatah in 2007 changed things. We have seen tensions in the Hamas leadership, even in the past few days, but that coup seemed to tip the balance towards those who are more hardline and more of a pro-Iranian disposition. We have to take that into account. Iran is crucial. As noble Lords will be aware, the position of the Iranian leadership is that Israel should be wiped from the face of the earth. That is a very important question because we have rightly raised the issue of proportionality in this debate and it cannot be evaded, but proportional to what? What challenge does Israel face? We have to take that into account as well. It is not possible for Israel to take the view, which I and other noble Lords might take, that Iran’s threats need to be taken with a pinch of salt. We in this House should acknowledge that Iran is well on its way to being the regional hegemon that it seeks to be and, if we are realistic, it is most unlikely that it will not successfully complete its nuclear programme. None the less, I still believe that it is right to take those claims with a pinch of salt and to view some of these threats as somewhat vainglorious. While I might be able to do that, it is impossible for Israel to do so. We have to take that into account in our discussions on this matter. I have one observation: in the House we have seen how the elites in this country are critical of Israel, in many cases for good reasons. It is certainly disturbing that Mr Lieberman and the forces represented by him may do very well in the forthcoming Israeli elections. However, we should consider where people have been during this conflict, both in Britain and in the United States. The YouGov poll shows that most British people believe, naturally enough, that the two sides are equally to blame, but if asked who is more to blame, they will say 24 per cent Hamas and 18 per cent Israel. In the United States, opinion is even more marked. I make that point because of references that have been made to the Israeli lobby in the United States. The opinion of the ordinary people is 2:1 in favour of Israel. That cannot be achieved by the activities of any kind of lobby and it is important to realise that that is because of public perception of Iran’s role in this conflict. I conclude by wishing Senator Mitchell the best of good fortunes in his endeavours towards bringing about a two-state solution.