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Freedom of Information Act 2000

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their contributions, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, and the members of his party for their support for the decision taken. It is absolutely consistent with everything they said during the passage of the Freedom of Information Bill as it then was. The noble Lord made a number of telling points, and he will not be surprised to hear that I agree completely with his analysis of the importance in difficult and serious cases of absolutely maintaining the principle of collective responsibility. Once that is allowed to go, our system of government would have to be altered irrevocably. He is right to make the point, which is precisely what lies behind the decision of my right honourable friend. Having praised the noble Lord, I should just gently chide him for saying that somehow or other the decision should have been taken well before this stage. There is a distinct procedure—some would call it due process—which means that any complainant who chooses to do so under the Act can first go to the commissioner and, after the decision of the commissioner has been made, it can be properly appealed to the tribunal. All this is set out precisely in the legislation. I would argue that the appropriate moment for the Cabinet to consider the position is once the tribunal has reached its view. It has of course done that here following an undertaking we gave when the Bill was passed, and the relevant Cabinet Minister has made the decision. The argument used by the noble Lord about the importance of keeping the confidentiality of Cabinet minutes sacrosanct in this particular case is the answer to the argument put by the noble Baroness. Is she really saying that the risk that would be run to collective Cabinet responsibility if we were to say that these minutes should be published is a risk worth taking? I hope that the majority view in this House would be strongly against such a point of view. The noble Baroness also mentioned the High Court. We could take the case to the High Court, but only on a matter of law. This was not a matter of law. The reasoning was set out both by the majority and the minority of the tribunal, and for that reason we feel that it would have been inappropriate to take the matter to the High Court; it is not a proper matter for law. As the Bill went through its stages in both Houses before it became an Act, this issue was discussed at great length. Indeed, there are noble Lords in the Chamber today who will remember the discussions around it. This provision was put into the legislation after much debate for a purpose, which was that it was felt that it might be necessary to use it in various circumstances. It was also made absolutely clear that this course would not be taken easily or frequently. The statement of Her Majesty's Government’s policy that is attached to the document of my right honourable friend that is in the Library says: "““The exercise of the veto would involve two analytical steps. It must first be considered whether the public interest in withholding information outweighs the public interest in disclosure. Only if this test is satisfied can it then be considered whether the instant case warrants exercise of the veto. The Government will not routinely agree the use of the executive override simply because it considers the public interest in withholding the information outweighs the public interest in disclosure””." The case has to be exceptional. We feel that this case is exceptional and that we have taken the right decision.