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Proceeding contribution from Lord Grayling (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Thursday, 7 May 2009. It occurred during Debate on Intelligence and Security Committee.


Intelligence and Security Committee

I accept my right hon. and learned Friend's word in these matters. However, I am sure that he and his colleagues on the Committee will continue to make every effort to bring into the public domain matters that can be brought into it. We know that a considerable amount of investment is taking place in IT across the security services, for reasons such as the increased use of the internet to which I have just referred. We also know that the Government have, on occasions, got things spectacularly wrong in IT across all different aspects of the public sector. The report quite rightly raises serious questions about the SCOPE project, which has clearly been another example of an unsuccessful major IT project. It is clear that that is a situation in which it is helpful for the House to hear as much as possible about how the Committee ensures that money is spent wisely and that we genuinely secure value for the investment, as well as what we do when things go badly wrong. I await with the interest the report that the right hon. Member for Pontypridd talked about putting together later in the year. Therein lies the rub. I hear what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) says, but people standing at this Dispatch Box—including him and my predecessor, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve)—have argued that there is more scope to provide information to support the value for money issues, that not all the information needs to be classified and that we could demonstrate to the House and to taxpayers how we are securing a proper return for the taxpayer in what is inevitably now proving to be a fast-increasing investment for the taxpayer. There is a balance to be struck. If we publish breakdowns that are too detailed, it gives those who are hostile to this nation information about where and when budgets are squeezed and about the areas in which we are investing and those in which we are not. Yes, there is a risk that we might give an indication of where the soft underbelly lies. Clearly, we do not want to do that, but I still suspect that more information could be provided without exposing us in that way. Of course, if we understand where there are pressures in the system and where there are financial issues, it makes it easier for right hon. and hon. Members to apply pressure and to that soft underbellies do not appear to the extent that they might otherwise. Let me now turn to some of the other detail of the report, which seems to confirm what my colleagues and I have said all along: the Government's national security strategy is in danger of simply being a descriptive laundry list and the Prime Minister's National Security Committee and National Security Forum are in danger of just being talking shops. The Committee's report makes it clear that the Government have not taken the recommendations of the Butler report seriously, which could negatively affect the functioning of the central intelligence machinery and our analytical capability. It worryingly calls into question the Government's ability to find a way to allow intercept evidence to be used in terrorist trials—we have argued for that in order to reduce our reliance on the control orders regime. The report also highlights the costly failure of the SCOPE project, as I mentioned earlier, and reinforces our calls for a full, evidence-based review of the Prevent strategy. Let me deal with some of the criticisms in turn. First, the Committee placed a question mark over the value of the national security strategy, saying:""We have questioned whether the strategy will achieve any benefits in real terms or whether it is simply a paper exercise...The National Security Strategy does not create new areas of responsibility for the Agencies or the wider intelligence community. The Heads of the Agencies have indicated that they were consulted about the strategy and are broadly supportive of it, but that they do not envisage that it will result in any significant change in direction for them."" Then there is the National Security Forum. The Committee is clearly ambivalent about its role. It states:""How the role of the National Security Forum will develop, and what value it will add, remain to be seen."" Then there is the issue of the Joint Intelligence Committee. The ISC welcomed the separation of the roles of JIC Chairman and Government adviser on intelligence and security matters. However, it said that it was""disappointed that the grade of both posts was now lower than it had been when they were combined and effectively the position has reverted to its pre-2005 grade"." The Committee criticised the decision to subsume the role of the head of professional intelligence analysis within the role of JIC Chairman. It said that, given the importance of that role,""we are very concerned by the plan to subsume it within the Joint Intelligence Committee Chairman's post as this may actually lessen the priority given to this crucial role.""


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
492 c401-2 
Session
2008-09
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
ICT Accountability Intelligence services Internet Intelligence and Security Committee National security Parliamentary scrutiny al Qaeda Espionage Joint Intelligence Committee Terrorism
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk