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Welfare Reform Bill

I take that point. All that I was trying to suggest was that, if my noble friend was unwilling to take this proposal on in the current legislation—and I understand his point—he might give himself the reserve power so that he could. I take the noble Lord’s on pilots. My noble friend is relying on the power of sanctions to deliver compliance with work-related activity. All my experience shows that you need sanctions but that you get a further mileage in compliance with an additional premium, when it becomes increasingly cost effective. To find out whether that is the case, you sometimes have to do pilots in which you can compare a group with the premium with a group without. So I take the noble Lord’s point, but that is true for all the piloted new deals involving additional support. Unless you have a control group, you do not know what works. I agree that it is not especially desirable in the sense of any notion of unfairness, but it would at least allow you to establish how effective sanctions are as against, or in addition to, an additional premium. In the name of good public policy, not just this amendment, I urge my noble friend not to rule out an obvious possible future development that a Government might wish to return to down the road, given that it was part of departmental thinking in the Green Paper. If they have permissive powers in regulations, that is fine, but if they do not and have to wait for major legislation, given all the pressures on legislative time my noble friend or his successor could rue the day if that power is not there in reserve. With my noble friend’s assurance that he will take it away to see whether there could be a power by regulation should it be proven appropriate in future—I understand there is no commitment—I am content to withdraw the amendment.