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Common Fisheries Policy Report

My Lords, at this stage I am tempted to somewhat curtail the dinner hour debate and say that this is a pretty good report, that the Commission has by and large followed it and that I hope that the Government will support the Commission and our report, and to sit down. However, that might be something of an anticlimax, if ever there can be an anticlimax during the dinner break. Let us go through some of the history. Our report was published in July 2008 and was basically a mid-term review of the reforms introduced in 2002, which, I am afraid, were a complete and utter failure. In April this year, the Commission published its Green Paper on reform of the common fisheries policy, which followed an absolutely devastating report from the Court of Auditors. Perhaps I may quote three elements of that report. The court said, first: ""Catch data are neither complete nor reliable, due mainly to weaknesses in the Member States"." Secondly, it said: ""The inspection systems do not provide assurance that infringements are effectively prevented and detected"." Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it said: ""Overcapacity detracts from the profitability of the industry and incites non-compliance"." That, in a way, is the nub of the problem. I know that there are Members of your Lordships’ House who somewhat decry the activities of your Lordships’ European Union Select Committee and say that it has little or no influence. However, in this area I think we have demonstrated that we have significant influence in that our report predates the Commission’s Green Paper and that Green Paper follows very closely the line of argument that we advanced in our report. I want to begin with two propositions, and the use of the definite and indefinite article is important here. First, "a" common fisheries policy is part of our treaty obligations as a member of the EU, and we cannot maintain that membership without acceptance of such a policy. I am sure that the noble Lord opposite will endorse that position. Even non-membership of the EU would, under international law, require us to put in place something at least closely similar to the common fisheries policy. The second proposition is that "the" common fisheries policy as we know it is broken, busted and an unqualified failure. It has totally failed to deliver the objectives of a sustainable fisheries policy. It is top-down, it rests on regulation upon regulation, and it is a system that alienates the fishermen, the scientists and the processors. It is bound to fail. In line with what we discovered through evidence, there are a number of reasons why we maintain that the dismal reputation of the common fisheries policy, as it is now, is totally justified. Let us look at the outputs. Despite the extensive nature of the regulatory regime for fisheries in EU waters, around 88 per cent of stocks in Community waters are overfished compared with the global average of 25 per cent. At the same time, many segments of the EU fishing fleets achieve poor profitability and, as a result, are vulnerable to increases in operating costs. Experience since reform of the common fisheries policy in 2002 has been characterised by the following: overcapacity in the fishing fleets of the member states, with a balance not being achieved between the number of fish in the sea and the fishing effort put in; poor compliance; uneven enforcement; a legislative process that continues to be stiflingly prescriptive; and ongoing depletion of fish stocks. That is a very severe indictment of the common fisheries policy as it stands today. Why is that? At the kernel we have to recognise that some member states—I emphasise "some"—have been reluctant to bring the size of their fishing fleets into line with available fishing opportunities. We identified this reluctance as the root cause of the poor performance on biological and economic indicators. That mismatch between, on the one hand, the size and effort of the fishing fleets of the member states and, on the other, the actual safe take from the seas is the root cause of the problem. The response has been an overcentralised legislative process that has been doubly flawed: alienating stakeholders and stretching the Commission’s resources to the limit. We were pleased to see that analysis of the failure of the 2002 reforms and the cause of that failure largely echoed in the recent Green Paper from the European Commission. Therefore, there is a degree of commonality between our analysis and that of the Commission. In large part, the steps that we recommended in our report for improving and reforming the common fisheries policy are now being advocated by the Commission itself, and we hope that the Government will be able to come into line behind that in very large measure. I think that that shows the influence of your Lordships’ House. I should like to summarise our recommendations but I also want to make it clear that in our report we explicitly stated that the prospect of withdrawing from the common fisheries policy was not a credible policy option with the restrictions of the EC treaty and European law. We should simply not waste our energies in arguing over options that, frankly, cannot be seriously contemplated. Instead, we should work for a better policy framework and put in place a new and more appropriate common fisheries policy that secures sustainable fisheries for the future. Perhaps I may go into detail on a particular point. It is rightly asked how we can improve matters. There are a number of issues here. One is that we received overwhelming evidence from our witnesses that the compulsory registration of buyers and sellers of first-sale fish had almost eliminated the demand for black fish—a problem that has bedevilled the fishing industry for many years. We therefore urge all member states to ensure that they have transposed the relevant EU legislation and that they are enforcing it rigorously. It is beyond belief that, faced with the challenge of sustainable fisheries, we do not have that degree of enforceability in relation to registered buyers and sellers of first sales. That would bring about a considerable improvement. If you get the balance right between the exploitation of fish numbers and the catching ability of the fleets, you can at last establish a common identity among fishermen that they have a real stake in the future of their fisheries and you can develop a culture of compliance. At the end of the day, if the stakeholders—the primary stakeholders are the fishermen—do not sign up to that culture of compliance, you are left with a process of evasion and avoidance, which has been the problem with the common fisheries policy as it has developed. In that context, I give genuine credit to the Scottish conservation credits scheme, which is a means of providing carrots rather than sanctions, and a means by which fishermen are rewarded by recognising real-time closures and adopting conservation measures, such as more selective fishing gear. In return they receive the same number of days at sea as they received in 2007, 2008 and 2009, thereby avoiding cuts. If there is that sort of genuine interaction between the various elements at the centre and the periphery of the industry—I do not use those terms disparagingly—there is a chance of establishing sustainable fishing. I have two final points. We have a problem in terms of enforcement and compliance in member states. I wish that we could enhance the role of the Community Fisheries Control Agency. It is important that it is the inspector of the inspectors, making sure that the member states do their job in enforcement. There is sufficient evidence showing—I shall use a somewhat diplomatic term—a degree of difference in the rigour with which enforcement is carried out across member states, which must be put right quickly. I know that I have spoken longer than I should, and I shall come to my conclusion. Our review left us in no doubt that the main cause of the 2002 reforms failure has been member states’ reluctance to cut national fishing fleets to match the fishing opportunities available. Some have and some have not. I live in the north-east of Scotland and am aware of what has happened to the Scottish fishing fleet. On a European level, subsidies can assist that process but too often, they have been used to offset rising costs. We need to move towards a much greater degree of decentralised fisheries management. We must use the experience of the regional advisory committees and involve the stakeholders. The big issues of the strategic levels of depletion of stocks should be set centrally at Brussels, and the implementation and management should be a regional question with regional enforcement. Let the fishermen have greater control of their own futures. That is how to head towards a sustainable fisheries policy.