Proceeding contribution from John Stanley (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Thursday, 9 July 2009. It occurred during Adjournment debate on Global Security (Iran).
Global Security (Iran)
I congratulate the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the hon. Member for Ilford, South (Mike Gapes), on a fine speech. I strongly echo the sentiments he expressed on human rights and the other issues that he covered. The debate is on a report that we published just over a year ago, but it could not be more timely, so I am glad that the Chairman has taken the opportunity to secure the debate for the House at this time. I begin with the crux of the long-term issue between our country and most of the countries of the world and Iran: Iran's remorseless march, year by year, towards becoming a nuclear weapons state. That march seems to be going down two tracks. It is going down the highly enriched uranium track, and it may also be going down the plutonium track. Alongside its efforts to produce weapons-grade fissile material, Iran is substantially adding to its ballistic missile delivery capabilities. On page 13 of our report, we reproduce a map showing the range of Iran's Shahab 3 Korean technology-based missile. It has a 1,300 km range, making it capable of striking Israel, Saudi Arabia, parts of southern Russia and nearly the whole of Turkey. A few weeks ago, on 20 May, the Iranians successfully launched their indigenous, longer range 2,000 km ballistic missile, the Sajil 2, which uses solid rather than liquid propellant, which dramatically reduces its launch time scale. That missile will be capable of reaching a significant area of western and southern Europe. I noted a comment that was made in Jane's Intelligence Weekly on 1 June:""Western analysts have largely described the Sajil-2 to the media as a technological achievement that represents a leap in Iran's ballistic missile capabilities."" There is no question but that if Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon capability with its expanding ballistic missile delivery range, the consequences would be extremely serious. There would be the regional consequences of an impetus to proliferation, and, of course, the huge, unknown factor of the Israeli response. The Committee visited Israel in March, at the time of the formation of the Netanyahu Government. We asked senior Israeli officials what the Israeli reaction would be if Iran became a nuclear weapons state. The answer we got—that all options are open—was fairly predictable. I believe that that is a correct statement: all options are open as far as Israel's Government are concerned, particularly the Netanyahu Government. That of course means that military pre-emptive action is among the options on the Israelis' list, and the consequences of that are incalculable and potentially extremely serious. That brings us to the effectiveness or otherwise of the policy that is being pursued year by year by our Government, the European Union and the United Nations Security Council—a policy of trying to bring about a halt in Iran's remorseless march towards becoming a nuclear weapons state by peaceful means: pressure, coercion, inducement and enticement. On the evidence to date, that policy has been a complete failure. I regret having to say that, but that is what the factual evidence shows. The policy has been pursued year by year by year, and year by year by year Iran has marched remorselessly towards becoming a nuclear weapons state. My question to the Minister, therefore, is whether he has any serious, significant grounds for believing that the passing of United Nations Security Council resolution 1803 and the greater use of sanctions for which that resolution provides will have any more effect on Iran than previous United Nations Security Council resolutions. Are other peaceful polices open to us that will stop Iran's relentless march? If the answer is no—I become increasingly fearful that it is—we are approaching an immensely dangerous situation in terms of nuclear proliferation, with the risk that the Israelis will feel that they have to do something by way of pre-emption. That is the burning policy question, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response. I will now move away from the possibilities and turn to a profoundly important and immediate issue—the actuality of Iranian involvement in military operations in Afghanistan. I draw hon. Members' attention to paragraph 77 of the Committee's report, which states:""We conclude that the reports that Taliban insurgents are receiving support from Iran is a matter of very serious concern."" The Foreign Office's published response to our conclusion is illuminating. It states:""However, we also have evidence of IRGC"—" Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps—""Qods Force involvement in negative and destabilising activity in Afghanistan, including supplying arms and funding to the Taliban."" The Foreign Office, in that public document, goes on to say:""We will…continue to support ISAF and Afghan security forces operations, with a view to intercepting further arms convoys coming from Iran"." I repeat:""arms convoys coming from Iran."" The document continues:""As for our analysis of the level of Iranian support, we wish to minimise the risks posed to our operations by public disclosure, and the Government will write to the Committee."" The Government did write to the Committee, and I reread last night the paper that they sent, for which we are grateful. Let us confine ourselves, however, to what is in the public domain. The Foreign Office has acknowledged in public that the Iranians are supplying arms to the Taliban; it has referred in public to "arms convoys"; and it has said that the Iranians are also supplying funding to the Taliban. The Taliban are responsible for inflicting grievous loss of life on British service personnel and other allied personnel, as we have been profoundly shocked to see again this week, and they have been doing so for a considerable period. I have a specific request to put to the Government. I trust that they will be relentless in putting into the public domain, in so far as that is compatible with their security obligations, such information as they can about what the Iranians are actually doing in delivering weapons, technology, training and funding to the Taliban. The people of this country and people around the world will then know precisely what the Iranian Government are doing to support those in Afghanistan—the Taliban—who offer nothing to the people of that country except religious tyranny and the total suppression of human rights, including the obliteration of human rights for women and girls.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 495 c328-30WH
- Session
- 2008-09
- Chamber / Committee
- Westminster Hall
- Subjects
- Corruption Democracy Elections Human rights Nuclear power Politics and government Reform Civil disorder Islam Iran Embassies
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- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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