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Nuclear Disarmament

My Lords, an appreciation that just one nuclear detonation could wreak even greater devastation than that we have seen so tragically in Haiti emphasises the crucial importance of this debate, and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and the Cross Benches in securing it. It is a near miracle that the world has been spared nuclear conflict these past 60 years. The thawing of the Cold War—with the West and the Warsaw Pact coming so close to hostilities—has partially lifted a significant threat, but the risk of nuclear catastrophe is ever present. As the co-chairs of the report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, point out in the preface to Eliminating Nuclear Threats: ""There remains no simpler or more compelling articulation of the case for action than that first put by the Canberra Commission over a decade ago: so long as any state has nuclear weapons, others will want them; so long as any such weapons remain, it defies credibility that they will not one day be used, by accident or miscalculation or design; and any such use would be catastrophic for our world as we know it"." Sadly, many traditional attitudes and suspicions remain. During a recent visit to the naval port of Vladivostok, Vladimir Putin is quoted as saying: ""To preserve the balance, we must develop offensive weapon systems, not missile defence systems as the United States is doing"." Somewhat more encouragingly, he went on: ""Let the Americans hand over all their information on missile defence and we are ready to hand over all the information on offensive weapons"." In more recent years, the nuclear threat has unquestionably broadened. Not only have we seen a spread in nuclear technology—witness Iran—and a rising terrorist threat, but we are witnessing a substantial growth in UAVs, with weapon systems activated from thousands of miles away. In addition, the increasing vulnerability of command and control systems to cyberattack is rapidly being recognised—witness a recent Google experience in China. Indeed, in November 2008, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which reports annually to Congress, declared that as many as 250 hacking groups were tolerated or encouraged by the Chinese Government. It said that the country’s sustained effort could give it, ""capability enabling it to prevail in the conflict with US forces"." Earlier this week, there were reports of serious Chinese cyberactivity against Indian government offices. While it remains a Herculean task to achieve a world totally free of nuclear weapons, we can most certainly bring about a significant reduction in nuclear stockpiles—a process which, thankfully, has already started towards zero, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said earlier. In the short term, we have two reviews under way or in prospect: the NATO nuclear posture review and the US nuclear prospect review, helping to create an atmosphere which we hope will enable real progress to be made in May at the NPT review conference. There are some encouraging omens. There have been significant reductions in nuclear stockpiles, as the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, said earlier. The UK, in conjunction with Norway, has made good progress in developing verification systems. An increasing number of nations are refusing to have tactical nuclear weapons based on their soil: Greece has banned them and Germany is pushing for their removal, although it must be said that Turkey takes the opposite view. And all US nuclear weapons have gone from the UK. Here, there is an increasing questioning of the replacing and upgrading of Trident, both on military and financial grounds. I would like to put a number of questions to the Minister. What progress has been made on former Defence Secretary Des Browne’s suggestion of a meeting of sophisticated nuclear powers’ laboratories, which would have been seen as a trust builder? What plans do Her Majesty’s Government have to strengthen the NPT? As I think the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said, could we make it more expensive and unattractive for countries to exit the NPT? In other words, could future support, both for military and even civilian nuclear development, be withdrawn, as recommended by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament? I understand that the co-chairman, Gareth Evans, will be addressing the high-level group here next month. At this juncture, perhaps I may offer the sincere apologies of my right honourable colleague and friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, who deeply regrets not being with us today as she is attending a family wedding in India. As clearly the IAEA needs much greater resource, are Her Majesty’s Government prepared to increase funding? Could we offer to take the lead in training future inspectors, given our experience in this area? Finally, am I correct in suggesting that on a Spanish base there is a substantial EU facility for satellite imagery? Could any spare capacity be offered to the IAEA by the EU, obviously with Spanish agreement? In conclusion, there is clearly a relationship between nuclear and conventional forces when we talk about reductions and disarmament. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union and the splintering of the Warsaw Pact, Russia no longer has conventional superiority. Thus, it is not unreasonable for it to argue for a parallel reduction in conventional armouries alongside any reduction in nuclear capability.