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Nuclear Disarmament

My Lords, this debate, which was opened so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, is superbly appropriate, not merely because this is globally a time of great danger, as my noble friend Lord King reminded us, but because civil nuclear power is about to expand enormously. There is to be a renaissance, as the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, reminded us, as part of the huge energy transition that lies a few years ahead. We are not there yet, but it is coming. As we know, there is a clear thread, which several noble Lords have observed, between the expansion of civil nuclear power and weaponised nuclear power developments. I shall deal first with the immediate nuclear issues before coming to longer-term prospects and challenges. The prime issue raised in this debate is the Iran problem and its clear implications for Middle East nuclear proliferation and global instability. Time has run out on the Tehran research reactor deal, with the Iranians proposing their own package instead, the International Atomic Energy Agency saying that it is unable to verify the situation any longer and the US Congress getting extremely restive and proposing a new round of tougher and much more targeted sanctions against Iran. Where will this lead? The key is in Russia and China, as the noble Lord, Lord Owen, and my noble friend Lord Patten observed in their extremely acute and penetrating remarks. Until those two countries are willing to join in, Iranian sanctions will always be undermined, as they have been in the past, so the permanent membership of the UN Security Council will be unable to act effectively. Will there be a change on that front? Will they help? As the noble Lord, Lord Owen, observed, Russia is clearly worried by the revelation of an additional enrichment plant over and above the Natanz plant and showed some signs of coming on board, as it were, but China has shown very little sign of halting its sanctions-busting trade and supplies, as my noble friend Lord Patten reminded us. I hope that it does not sound too cynical to say that it could be in the interests of China and Russia—and I have heard this suggested by Russians—to see western concern prolonged, so that Iran looks eastward and north and its huge potential oil and gas supplies go in those directions rather than westwards, thus not undermining Gazprom’s long-term aims for maintaining domination of the European gas supply. We may have a very steep hill to climb in bringing the Russians and Chinese round. Nevertheless, if more targeted and smarter sanctions can be agreed, especially in the finance and energy sectors, where the mullahs are most vulnerable, I ask the Minister when she thinks that they may be forthcoming. I hope that she will be able to tell us. Will they restrict investment in Iranian oil and gas by outside investors more tightly than they have so far? Will they be Europe-wide, or are we waiting for the Americans? It would be helpful to have some views on that. As your Lordships have observed, on American nuclear policy generally President Obama is on an encouragingly positive course, with an ambitious disarmament strategy. He has cancelled, or rather relocated, the eastern Europe-based missile defence plan, he is seeking to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and he says that he wants to replace and update START—indeed, the negotiations with the Russians are now going on, as the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, reminded us. He also wants to push ahead with the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. All that is very good and I hope that the Minister will make it clear that we are supporting those efforts strongly. As for the other rogue proliferator, North Korea, we had assumed that the negotiations were once again at a dead end, but I believe that very recently there have been signs that North Korea might want to return to the six-party talks. It is not much to hope for, but can the Minister tell us whether that is correct? As some of your Lordships said, we remain extremely uneasy and concerned about the India-Pakistan interface. With al-Qaeda increasingly threatening Pakistan, the stability of that country and its good governance become absolutely prime concerns for our own safety. I hope that this is a message that the Government have fully taken on board. Also, we would like more nuclear frankness and openness from Israel, despite the existential threat that it faces in blood-curdling remarks from Iran. Several of your Lordships raised the question of our own nuclear deterrent programme. I believe that the National Security Committee has been asked to report back on whether we need the three or four submarines that the Prime Minister mentioned. Has it yet reported back? Has there been any examination of the alternative and cheaper ways of keeping a fully credible and independent nuclear capability, which we support, such as one based on Astute class submarines, which are already being built, and the use of Cruise missiles, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall? The Government’s view on that is very important. I come to the central issue of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference next May, which the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, rightly concentrated on. I gather that it runs from 3 to 28 May. If a certain election takes place in the middle, there could be a change of personnel at that event, at least at the political level. I make no predictions, but it could happen—we would have shades of Potsdam, but in reverse. It means that on this side of the House we need to prepare an agenda; this is not something that we can walk into overnight. I make it clear to your Lordships that, should the lot fall to my party to be active in government at that time, we shall seek international agreement on the following points: first, mounting a strategic dialogue between Britain, the United States, France, Russia and China on how to achieve further reductions in nuclear stockpiles and reduce further the risk of nuclear confrontation or accidental nuclear war; secondly, an agreement to take steps to close the loopholes in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty itself, including a new Security Council resolution so that any country in breach of the treaty would be referred to the Security Council; and, thirdly, a mechanism to bring the nuclear fuel cycle under international control, whether through international partnerships of the producer states of nuclear fuel at present, or through a network of fuel banks—this idea has been developed and is a very interesting and important prospect. Fourthly, we want to take steps to strengthen the IAEA itself and the international system of safeguards and inspections. Fifthly, we want to take steps to improve urgently the ability to track and block the trade in nuclear weapons technology and the financing of international terrorism. We also want to strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative, which we think is weakly organised at present. Sixthly, we join others in wanting to negotiate the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and push for stronger enforcement of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which President Obama has said that he, too, wants. That will need the support of others as well, and we could—