---

Horn of Africa

I am absolutely not in favour of Iran or anybody else developing nuclear weapons. I understand what the hon. Gentleman says about the economic situation in Iran, its problems with drugs and the human rights problems that exist there. However, I think that we might differ on whether we should engage more not only with the Iranian Government but with a range of people there as a way of promoting engagement rather than promoting isolation. The more one promotes isolation, the more it gives space for those characterised as extremists to gain political power. We might differ on degree, but that is something that should be considered. I have mentioned the role of the west and the matter of the cold war, but there is also a sort of rubric and policy, both in the European Union and the United Nations, that the problem is Africa's and should therefore be left to the African Union to sort out, even though the African Union—as wonderful and as great an institution as it is—lacks the necessary resources to be able to do it. It is easy for the west to say that African peacekeeping forces should go in, but when those forces turn out to be largely from Ethiopia and one considers the previous wars over the Ogaden in which Ethiopia was involved, one has to wonder whether it is such a clever idea to send Ethiopian forces into Somalia when there are previous disputes over territory between those two countries. Might it not have been better to send in some more obviously neutral forces at an earlier stage? I accept that forces have come from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, but the initial very large deployment of Ethiopian forces has not been terribly helpful in building a feeling of reliability among the various elements of government in Somalia. On the question of Somalia, the collapse of the Siad Barre regime and the disputes between Somaliland and Puntland in the southern part of Somalia obviously go to the heart of the problem. The violence is much greater in the south around Mogadishu and in the north around Puntland than it is in Somaliland itself, which is relatively stable—I use my words advisedly and carefully here. The west has put much emphasis on supporting the transitional Government in Somalia, and the Obama Administration appears to be even more supportive than previous US Adminstrations. Although I can see where it is coming from and why it is trying to achieve it, we must ask whether the transitional Government are representative of the people of Somalia. How effective are they and how much land do they control? Are we not in danger of fuelling an even greater war there? Is there not a necessity to revisit the concept of a longer-term peace conference on the issues surrounding Somalia and its instability? The recent Amnesty International document on international military and policing assistance states that the whole policy should be reviewed in respect of Somalia, because it feels that the substantial arming of the transitional Government that is going on is possibly in danger of fuelling an even worse situation, rather than making the situation better. We must consider the issue carefully. If we pour a lot of arms into the area, we must ask what happens to them afterwards. There was an interesting article in The Guardian on 22 January by Murithi Mutiga, entitled "Yemen: lessons from Somalia". In it, he said:""The path to peace in Somalia lies in separating these forces and pursuing a settlement with the more political and realistic members of the Islamist movement. Analysts such as Abdi place the likes of Sheikh Aweys and his Hizb Ul Islam offshoot of Al Shabaab in this bracket."" He went on to say:""If the pragmatists in the Islamist movement are persuaded to join a government of national unity that can craft some sort of peace deal, that would make a bigger difference than any number of millions of aid poured into the country after an international summit."" Essentially, his plea is that Islamist forces in Somalia—perhaps not all of them—should be involved if a longer-term peace is to be found. It is something that may be difficult for some people to comprehend, but it is an issue that cannot be ignored or wished away. As the hon. Member for The Wrekin pointed out, the implications for the region and everyone else of further and worse instability in Somalia are very grave indeed. The last point that I want to mention concerns Eritrea. There is a substantial Eritrean community within my constituency, and I have obviously met and held discussions with many of its members. It is surprising that the UN resolution on arms, travel and banking and financial embargoes against Eritrea received very little publicity in any of the newspapers in the world, because it was a major decision that was taken by the UN Security Council. Might not such a draconian measure against the Eritrean Government be utterly counter-productive in the long run if there is no process of greater engagement? When I intervened on the hon. Member for The Wrekin, I made a point about the border dispute with Ethiopia, which is unfortunate, to put it mildly. It has cost the lives and money of an awful lot of people and ought to be resolved. Indeed, that was the whole point of the Court of Settlement. The lack of a resolution provides a huge propaganda victory for the Eritrean Government because of Ethiopia's apparent refusal—this is why I intervened on the hon. Gentleman—to accept the arbitration agreed by both sides as binding.