Proceeding contribution from Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat) in the House of Lords on Wednesday, 3 March 2010. It occurred during Debates on delegated legislation on Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Continuance in Force of Sections 1 to 9) Order 2010.
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Continuance in Force of Sections 1 to 9) Order 2010
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing the order. The temporary arrangements of 2005 lead us to find ourselves in what has become an annual ritual. I acknowledge that there are now some differences. We now have the concept of lighter-touch control orders, although they may not feel lighter-touch to those affected. I shall return to those. We also have the admirable report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which concludes that the current control order regime is "no longer sustainable". One thing that has not changed is the opposition of these Benches to control orders. I had expected to find that the Government’s justification for control orders would in part be that it was too dangerous to disclose evidence even to the special advocates. However, in the debate in the Commons on Monday, the Minister talked of not having sufficient evidence. He said: ""If there were sufficient evidence, we would prosecute. On occasion, sadly, we hold information but cannot obtain sufficient evidence to prosecute, although we know that the individuals concerned pose a potential threat. We have had to make a judgment, which the House may or may not support tonight, on whether that threat remains real and serious, and whether this power should be introduced".—[Official Report, Commons, 1/3/10; col. 723.]" Making that judgment is the very thing that we cannot do. I have said before in this Chamber how difficult it is for those of us who are not part of the Executive to respond when essentially the Executive’s message is, "If you knew what we know". Therefore, the Executive need to be very convincing indeed when they tell Parliament that they know rather than have evidence and when they ask Parliament to support a regime described by the Eminent Jurists Panel on terrorism, counterterrorism and human rights as potentially giving rise over the longer term to "a parallel legal system" and undermining the rule of law. Will the Minister explain the extent to which Ministers—it may be only the Home Secretary—personally consider the detail of each case? Of course they must take advice from the agencies, but do they themselves assess the facts? Have the Government ever considered sharing the basis for decisions with the Opposition on a Privy Council basis? I make it quite clear that I have no doubt at all about the Minister’s integrity. He has himself made it clear that he very much dislikes control orders and, in his words, is very hard on people when they try to come up with one. There are those who wish to instigate their own full review of the regime. It would be helpful to hear from the Conservatives whether, if they were to find themselves in office later this year, such a review would start immediately and how long they anticipate it would take. As I understand it, they argue that they need to see the detail of the cases. I would ask whether it was not better to consider the principle before being carried along by the detail. Those who support control orders rely on the reports of the independent reviewer. Of course I do not suggest that he is not reliable, but his statutory role is to review the operation of Act and not, or not directly, the underlying policy. His role is also—perhaps this is the same point—essentially backward-looking. Interviewed following his most recent report, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, acknowledged that, in concluding that the system remained necessary for a small number of cases, he had to hold his nose. The numbers are indeed small but the impact on controlees, their families and communities is great. The JCHR reports its extreme concern that, ""the degree of control over the minutiae of controlees’ daily lives, together with the length of time spent living under such restrictions, and their apparently indefinite duration, have combined to exact a heavy price on mental health"." It comments on the "collateral impact" of the effect on female partners and children, including on their basic economic and social rights as well as their right to family life. It is very depressing to read that children cannot access the internet from home. We know how important technology is in today’s education and we can imagine how other pupils may treat them. This is one of the conditions that may be imposed and seems to have been imposed frequently, if not invariably. Moreover, the legal process is so protracted that, for instance, when a controlee requested the variation of a condition to enable him to attend a college course, the course was finished before his modification request was resolved. I mentioned lighter-touch orders. It seems that relocation conditions are increasingly being used to require a controlled person to move. That has been described as a form of internal exile. British citizens who have grown up in a particular community have to uproot themselves and their families—their wives from jobs and their children from schools—and move to a new location. The JCHR reports evidence that this is having a disproportionate impact on the Muslim community, which the Government say that they are seeking to reassure. Relocation conditions puzzle me. The Minister in the Commons said that sometimes an individual is a threat because of his geographical location. He said: ""If we move them from that geographical location, the threat they pose diminishes".—[Official Report, Commons, 1/3/10; col. 727.]" Surely someone who is such a threat as to justify a control order would have the wit to overcome the hurdle of being moved from, say, Leeds to Chipping Campden. Our concerns are not just about the conditions but about the basic fairness of control orders. The special advocates have, ""profound—and thus far insuperable—difficulties"," in accessing independent expertise that would enable them to challenge the Security Service’s assessments. Also, late disclosure or closed material seriously hampers them. That is a practical issue but, according to the JCHR, it creates the risk of serious miscarriages of justice. A special advocate cannot communicate with the controlled person or his legal representatives after he has received closed material. Clearly, this seriously affects the advocate’s ability to represent the controlee’s interests. The special advocates have asked for the rule to be relaxed to allow communication on matters of pure legal strategy and procedural administration, and to apply to the court for permission to ask questions of the controlee without giving notice to the Home Secretary. Those seem relatively mild requests. It is no wonder that they were "bemused" that the independent reviewer's sympathy led him to suggest improved training and closer co-operation, with no rule changes, when, as he himself said, the problem is "hardwired" into the rules. A lawyer receives "instructions", as they are termed, from his client, and every lawyer is used to urging on his clients the need to give instructions based on the facts of the matter, and to develop both the strategy and tactics of a case with his client and the other lawyers involved. It is no wonder that the special advocates are so frustrated. The committee concluded that, ""the special advocate system has not proved capable of ensuring the substantial measure of procedural justice required"." Following the AF case, the controlled person must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions to the special advocate in relation to those allegations. What changes to the rules will the Government agree so that the judgment is fully implemented? The numbers of orders, as I said, are small; the Minister gave us the figures. Of those, seven have absconded. As one's natural assumption is that it is the most dangerous who abscond, that brings into question the very effectiveness of the orders. What does this cost? It has cost £13 million over three years—including more than £8 million in legal costs, getting on for £3 million in administrative costs, and £32 million to the Legal Services Commission for publicly funded representation. However, it does not include the costs of current cases—nor of compensation, which the Government must face in relation to cases thrown out following the AF judgement. The Government reject the alternative of releasing these large sums and spending them on surveillance instead. Nor do they apply the alternatives of: introducing intercept as evidence, or at any rate not yet; greater use of plea bargaining to encourage those on the periphery to testify against the leaders of plots; or prosecuting more. The conviction rate is notably high, which does suggest scope for more prosecutions. Interestingly, in their recent memorandum to the Home Affairs Committee, with its post-legislative assessment of the 2005 Act, although stating that in many cases only a control order is sufficient in light of the risk and that they are working to minimise costs, the Government said that, ""viable alternatives to control orders that offered similar levels of assurance against risk, such as surveillance, would be considerably more expensive"." I hope that the Minister can quantify that for us tonight. The change forced on the Government by the judiciary, so that a controlee must know the gist of the case against him, is welcome. However, as the evidence is still secret, it is unchallengeable. It does not satisfy our objections or negate our opposition. Rights to freedom and a fully fair trial and the presumption of innocence are fundamental principles. We fight terrorism to ensure physical safety and security but also to defend our values and principles. We oppose the control orders, we oppose this order, and I beg to move.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 717 c1522-5
- Session
- 2009-10
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- House of Lords chamber
- Subjects
- Disclosure of information Criminal proceedings Crime prevention Costs Advocacy Human rights National security Terrorism Surveillance Anti-terrorism control orders Freedom of association
- Legislation
- Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Continuance in Force of Sections 1 to 9) Order 2010
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- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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