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British Humanist Association: Reports

My Lords, for most of the time that I have been a Member of your Lordships’ House I have been supporting the existence of the humanist group, rather from the sidelines. Like the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, I shall briefly talk about the group itself. At the same time, I congratulate him on his term of office. There were long periods, many, until his death in 2003, under the leading guidance of the late Lord Jack Dormand, who some of us remember, when even he was unable to get official recognition of the group as a proper all-party group. That was mainly because there were never enough members to fill the Conservative quota, despite the noble Baroness, Lady Flather, reminding us today that she was then a Conservative. She was punching above her weight, as she continues to do now as a Cross-Bencher. In those wilderness years, the group was still able to meet but did not have the privileges of an all-party group, for example, in advertising its meetings. For some time now, that has fortunately no longer been the case, and all-party support is assured with many distinguished speakers coming to talk to the group. I am grateful to have my attention drawn by this debate to the two documents before us, which I might otherwise not have read. My remarks will be mainly prompted by the booklet The Case for Secularism, which is highly readable even though it was written by a committee. It appears to have been written by the humanist philosophers’ group which, I am afraid, might give me the licence to go off in a slightly more philosophical direction than is usual or ideal. This booklet argues very well the case for a particular form of secularism, and I am pleased that its preface says that not all humanists will be expected to support its contents. It is offering an invitation to debate those issues. In my opinion, it is really highlighting one level of secularism and inviting those with other beliefs to gather round and agreed to label the discussions and debates that follow as secular; that is, using a secular framework by the consent of all. I would claim that there is another, much deeper level of agreement and disagreement, which might distinguish the various participants in such debates and which, because of its deep and ingrained nature, sets up much greater and more fundamental differences between separate groups. These differences are often simply not addressed, as they are sometimes irreconcilable and difficult to articulate. For the reason that something can be reconciled, the simpler level of disagreement provides examples of what can usefully be discussed and might then lead to a harmonious and agreed outcome. We might read about the discussion on when a religious cross might be allowed to be worn, or what type of burka should be worn, where secular reason is meant to hold the ring to provide an agreed outcome. Concepts such as private or public space are used, and one is aiming for a rational, secular framework and hoping that it causes a peaceful and harmonious outcome. While that particular version of secularism is obviously useful, —and, as some might say, a start—for me it leaves much deeper divisions unanswered and, often, unaddressed. To give a rather facile example, one of the minor skills of civilisation—one which is, in fact, quite complex and which we acquire without too much conscious thought—is to be able to walk down a crowded street without generally bumping into people. That is a useful and almost unconscious skill that makes life more harmonious and bearable, but what is going on inside the bodies and minds of other people that we avoid bumping into is another matter and at a different level. This booklet, then, shows commendably how an agreed secularism might make life more harmonious at a simpler level but, in my opinion, it does not address the more fundamental differences that humanism should also be able to highlight. That is where faith and religious belief come in. I do not think that humanism or secularism should try to compete at the same level as religious belief, especially when such beliefs rely on irrational or non-rational practices or traditions. As a major aim, we secularists must encourage and emphasise a rational and reasoned response to what is presented to us, even though that might not be the easiest or most obvious way. In the long run, I believe that we have to rely on reason and—although I hesitate to say it in this age—science to arm our arguments. I hesitate about science because of the uses that it has recently allowed itself to be put to or pressured into. Having, as I warned earlier, talked in rather general philosophical terms, I realise that we are all living in the real world and that that is what the Minister is having to answer on, and rightly so. I do not criticise those who are trying to solve everyday problems in the real world. Finally, humanism and secularism have a serious and increasing role to play, but there is some way to go before we can claim the fuller coherence of our philosophy, to which we should aspire.