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Intelligence and Security Committee

It would be most unfortunate, although I hope that people would not think that, because they should not. Knowing what I do about our intelligence and security services, and knowing what I do about the Cabinet Office and one or two other Departments, I am 100 per cent. clear where the delay lies, and I assure my hon. Friend that it will not be with the people working in our security and intelligence agencies. Taking those things together, the Government will continue to be suspected—and quite rightly in many quarters—of wishing to suppress difficult issues or to delay their consideration until after a general election. The intelligence services and the country as a whole will suffer from the Government's failure to draw a line under the issue. The whole House agrees that, as the Foreign Secretary quite rightly said, torture and complicity in torture are utterly unacceptable under any circumstances. They are contrary to our international legal obligations and contrary to what Britain stands for. The continued allegation that Britain might have been complicit in torture, even in isolated cases, is used against us by those who serially commit human rights abuses and violations. We have always argued for full investigation of all credible allegations of UK complicity and for action by the Government to draw a line under this episode, but it is much harder when the guidance has not even been published. There is a clear need to find a way to ensure that the problems of recent years have been investigated and addressed—and to do so as expeditiously as possible—and to draw a line, so that the UK intelligence and security agencies can focus on the present and the future, without having to look back to the past all the time. This is a difficult issue, but in that regard we would be inclined to have a judge-led inquiry to ensure that the lessons have been learned and that processes have been changed, where appropriate. The timing of such an inquiry would have to take current criminal proceedings into account and ensure that there is no risk of such proceedings being jeopardised. I know that the Foreign Secretary disagrees with that and is worried about it, but the Government have failed to find any other way of drawing a line, thereby helping the services and agencies to move on and satisfying the public that the issues have been addressed. Let me turn to some of the issues raised in the 2008-09 report. The most significant development since the House last debated the Committee's work is the Court of Appeal's decision in February to order the disclosure of seven paragraphs based on US intelligence information describing aspects of the detention of former Guantanamo Bay detainee Mr. Binyam Mohamed. We have always held that the intelligence co-operation relationship between the US and the UK is unique in the world and of immense value to both countries, and that its disruption would have serious consequences for our national security. As the Foreign Secretary will recall, we have argued in this instance that we could have tried to uphold the principle of control of intelligence while seeking an exception from the United States in the specific case of Mr. Mohamed. We do not know whether that would have succeeded, but it remains our view that it would have been a better course of action than having the matter dragged through the courts, which had the effect of fuelling the accusation that the UK was withholding evidence and exposed our relationship with the US to particular strain. I hope when the Minister winds up that he will comment on whether the Government see the need to take any further action to reassure the House and the United States about upholding the principle of control. Given all that Ministers have said about the importance of the intelligence relationship with the US—sentiments that we endorse—it is all the more extraordinary that some parts of the Government, albeit not Foreign Office Ministers, have shown something of a cavalier attitude to that relationship in recent months. Commenting on the Detroit bomb plot, the Prime Minister's official spokesman said to the press that""there was security information about this individual's activities…that was shared with the US authorities."" That was interpreted as implying that Britain had shared information that could have averted the attack, breaching the principle that we do not comment on intelligence matters and eliciting an embarrassing dispute about whether information was passed or not. That is not the way to co-operate with the United States, and nor was the bungling of the Downing street statement of 2 January, in which it was claimed that the Prime Minister had agreed with President Obama to launch a new initiative to tackle al-Qaeda in Yemen. However, the next day, after a senior Obama official said that he was""unaware of any new joint effort,"" the Prime Minister admitted that the proposal was not new, that""the truth is we've been doing this for some time,"" and that he had "not directly" spoken to Obama since the failed bombings. In our view the relationship with our closest ally needs to be handled in a competent way, in Downing street, as well as the Foreign Office and our embassies, yet it has not been handled in that way on those intelligence matters in recent months. On a closely related issue, the report contains significant criticism of the Government's handling of allegations of rendition flights suspected of leading to torture. We have taken the view that rendition flights leading to torture are unacceptable—of course—and held the Government to the repeated assurances provided by the then Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr. Straw) in 2005 and 2006, that""the US had at no time since 9/11 rendered an individual through the UK or through our overseas territories"." However, we accepted in good faith the Government's explanation of events when it was discovered that those assurances had turned out to be false, and that the US had in fact rendered individuals through Diego Garcia twice in 2002. When the Foreign Secretary informed the House of that two years ago, he gave clear assurances that""For the avoidance of doubt,"" a full list of all flights of concern would be compiled and specific assurances sought from the United States that""none of those flights was used for rendition purposes."—[Official Report, 21 February 2008; Vol. 472, c. 548.]" It is therefore extremely concerning that the 2008-09 annual report describes the Foreign Office as""unable to respond adequately to allegations of UK knowledge of, or involvement in, US rendition flights,"" concluding that""there is no guarantee that the information uncovered to date is in fact complete,"" and going on to say:""This situation is clearly unsatisfactory"." The report also reveals that the Foreign Office told the Committee that""records on flights transiting Diego Garcia were only kept for three or five years and are therefore no longer available."" Given that concerns about rendition flights were raised in 2005, that suggests that records relating to flights in and out of the territory may have been destroyed while Parliament and several Select Committees, including the Intelligence and Security Committee, were scrutinising these issues. Surely it would have been right and proper for the Foreign Office to issue an instruction about record keeping and insist on additional scrupulous recording during that period. Do the Government accept the Committee's recommendation that""the UK must be more robust in verifying"" assurances given about the use of Diego Garcia in future, and if so, how will this be done? On funding, the whole House will be concerned by the Committee's finding that particular areas of concern are not sufficiently resourced, in particular counter-espionage, and it will want to heed the Committee's warning that it""would be concerned if the Agencies were to suffer real-term cuts in the short or medium term."" The Minister might wish to say at the conclusion of this debate whether the Government accept that counter-espionage is not getting sufficient attention. The Committee's report describes "painfully slow" progress—what a surprise!—in implementing the national security reforms announced by the Prime Minister two years ago. It says that the Government's national security strategy has had""little direct impact on the focus or nature"" of the work of the intelligence services. The report points out that the national security forum announced by the Prime Minister in March 2008 did not have its members formally appointed until 2010, and questions whether the forum is in fact a necessary part of the national security machinery. Those findings confirm our view that a proper national security council approach is needed, to avoid making decisions and creating committees in such a haphazard way and with such a questionable impact on the overall machinery of government. As for the work of the Committee itself, we note that ""the Committee has requested a change in host Department in order to ensure that there is a clear separation and to safeguard its independence."" That request should not be rejected out of hand. The Foreign Secretary said that he would look at it, but it is a bit late to notice that it needs to be looked at. The Committee has been making the case for some time, and there may be only nine or 10 sitting days left before the Dissolution of the current Parliament. We believe there is a need for greater parliamentary oversight from a strengthened Intelligence and Security Committee. We have presented our own proposals, but there are many variants of those proposals, some of which have been identified by other Members. I think that, after the coming election, any Government will need to take them all into account. The report that we are considering is very important, as is the other report that appeared this morning. There is an urgent need for the publication of all withheld reports, and indeed for the guidance for which I, along with other Members, have asked. It is probably too late in the current Parliament for Ministers to get their act together on the wide range of matters on which they and their Departments have been criticised in today's debate, which probably adds to the case for them to make way for Ministers who will. Even if such Ministers were in place, however, they would still have to get their acts together, because the Government have not handled their relations with the Committee, and their dealings with its reports, with any distinction over the past year.