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Intelligence and Security Committee

I happily respond to my hon. Friend. Our security services might know that a detainee who continues to be detained had been subjected to torture or cruel or degrading treatment in the past. However, if an opportunity were to arise for one of our security service officials to put questions to that detainee, I do not believe that that should be ruled out simply because of past behaviour by personnel who are citizens of other countries working on behalf of other agencies in other parts of the world. If there is any doubt about whether such treatment is still going on, however, that introduces the question of complicity. That is quite a different matter, and that is where the line needs to be drawn. That brings me to the third and final area that I wish to comment on. It is that, whatever judgment we make on the matters that have been discussed so far, we will always face a huge dilemma about sharing information. As my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire has said—and it is not a matter of dispute—the UK security agencies are a crucial part of the equipment that we have to prevent acts of terrorism in this country. They therefore have to be able to co-operate, and the sharing of information is a crucial part of their armoury. It just so happens that, for those of our agencies that are trying to deal with al-Qaeda or forms of Islamic extremist terrorism, the other intelligence agencies that are most relevant and likely to have information of real value are those of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt—not to mention the US itself. Without doing enormous damage to the objectives that we have asked our security services to carry out on our behalf, we cannot have a blanket ban on co-operation with other intelligence agencies just because it is well known that many of them torture those under their control, or carry out activities of another kind. How do we get the balance right? What do we do to square the circle and reconcile these two conflicting objectives? Baroness Manningham-Buller said that we have to ask for assurances and that she sometimes wishes that more had been asked for. I have no doubt that assurances are important, but I hope that I am not misunderstood when I say that it would be very unwise to rely too much even on assurances. If I were given absolute assurances by the Saudi, Pakistani and Egyptian intelligence agencies that they never tortured their prisoners or a particular detainee, frankly I would not believe it, because it is contrary to the huge amount of evidence that exists that that is precisely what they do in many cases when they think it appropriate. Simply asking for assurances might be thought to cover oneself if they are forthcoming, but the reality is that they are not worth very much. No intelligence agency will say, "Well, seeing as how you ask, yes you are quite right, that is exactly what we have done. We have tortured the prisoners under our control." They will not say it. Why should they, from their perspective? I therefore come back to the approach that is required, and it has two ingredients. First—I will qualify this in a few moments—we have to trust the agencies. Those who work in the Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service are people of the highest quality, and, I believe, overwhelmingly, of the highest integrity and professionalism. When we have people of such calibre, we have to trust them to a very significant degree to carry out their responsibilities in accordance with the rules, requirements and norms of a civilised society. All the evidence we have is that that is overwhelmingly what happens. Secondly, and perhaps in their own interests—undoubtedly in their own interests—they have to have guidelines. They have to be given by the Government, by the country that they serve, and set the framework within which they need to operate. Not only do they have to receive guidelines, but the guidelines have to be published. They have to be a matter of public knowledge so that the country is aware of what is happening, what might happen and what should not happen. With such a framework, we would be reassured. The right hon. Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East (Mr. Howarth) paid a deserved tribute to his fellow members of the ISC. As I mentioned earlier, I was involved with the then Prime Minister, John Major, in the deliberations that took place when the Committee was first established. While it is indeed the case that we concluded that it was more appropriate to have a Committee separate from the Select Committee system and to go down that alternative route, there was a reason for that, which I do not believe is as persuasive a reason now as it was then. Within only a relatively short period, the very existence of the intelligence and security agencies, MI5 and MI6, had been declared for the first time. For them to be told that they would also be subject to oversight by a Committee of MPs posed a real question as to whether they would feel sufficiently confident that they could open up in a significant and comprehensive way with such a Committee if it was seen as merely part of the Select Committee system that the House had at that time. Therefore, giving it a distinctive identity, making it a Committee of parliamentarians that was not answerable to the House in the same way as other Committees, and having its membership essentially appointed by the Prime Minister, with all the other safeguards that were introduced, created the reassurance at that time, 16 years ago, that this was an innovation worth introducing that did not pose a threat to the security agencies. We now have the benefit of the experience of those 16 years. I am second to none in paying tribute to the independence of the members of the ISC, including its current membership, who, for reasons that have been mentioned by others, have demonstrated by their own actions, as have their predecessors, their independence and determination to carry out their responsibilities in a way that everyone would give them credit for. However, there is an additional objective and that is that the Committee must be seen by the British public and by all with a legitimate interest in these matters as an independent Committee. I think that it is, but I can understand why some question that and why some perceive the matter to be unresolved. I do not think that the intelligence agencies would be unduly concerned if the Committee, which has evolved in a significant way already over the past 16 years, was to continue to evolve in a way that recognised the point I made a few moments ago. I do not think that anyone would dispute that the members of the Committee, for example, should have to continue to sign the Official Secrets Act. They should have been chosen in such a way that ensures that, as individuals, they have a reputation for integrity and independence that will be a reassurance to the Prime Minister, the Government and the agencies. The rules under which they operate should mean that in the vast majority of cases it is right and proper that their evidence is taken in private. That does not necessarily mean that they cannot make up a Select Committee with ultimate responsibility to this House. We have it within our power when we create a Select Committee to agree the constraints under which it should operate. If a particular committee needs all the safeguards that the ISC has but, instead of it being a Committee outside the structure of this House, it is ultimately answerable, albeit with the constraints to which I have referred, I would not see it as a threat to the security agencies or as an impediment to their full co-operation with the Committee. It gives that little bit of significant extra reassurance to the outside world—by which I mean the citizens of this country—that these matters are being dealt with. At a time when Parliament is spending more time than ever before seeking to reassert the importance of Parliament against the Executive and to win back some of the powers that have been lost to the Executive over the years, I see no obvious reason why, with the qualifications that I have enthusiastically accepted, the Intelligence and Security Committee should not be part of that reform process. I hope that those who have expressed a different view will not have closed minds on this subject and will at least be willing to explore how this could be done in a way that would meet the real and legitimate concerns that they expressed in their remarks.