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Gulf War: Veterans

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Morris, for maintaining the Government’s alertness to this issue. He has raised it on every possible occasion. He certainly maintains the pressure—particularly on me, since it always seems to come up on my watch. That is a good process, for which we thank him. We thank him also for the tremendous work that he has done on behalf of veterans and the wider disabled community, and for his roles in the Royal British Legion, the Inter-Parliamentary Gulf War Group and as vice-president of the War Widows’ Association. I thank other noble Lords—in one case, a noble and gallant Lord—who have taken an interest in this. We, too, miss the noble Baroness, Lady Park. Many questions have been raised, particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Morris, who was good enough to say that he will give me a series of written questions so that I can complete the spectrum of answers. I shall touch on some of the questions now, and start with the sarin incident which the noble Lord mentioned in his speech. In general, we do not think that it is appropriate to comment on individual cases. However, as he knows, in the case of Terry Walker, the Government have acknowledged the distress that Mr Walker’s next of kin have suffered on the issue of his war pension, and have apologised for it. The Government have taken appropriate corrective action. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, said something that he has said a number of times before—that he craves closure. The implication is that we have somehow failed to provide appropriate closure. I and the Government cannot see that. Any Government must look at how we treat veterans who suffer as a result of serving their country. This Government—and, I believe, all Governments—have sought to make sure that proper schemes are in place to compensate individuals who suffer as a result of their exposure on behalf of the nation. It is not about classifications but about compensating for specific disablement. That is the thread that runs through our system, and that is the thread on which the Gulf War veterans are being considered. It is difficult to see what more the Government can do than meet the standards of that scheme. We believe that we have met those standards. We have acknowledged our poor handling early on—at least two Ministers have apologised to the House for our early mishandling—but we go back to the essence of the scheme. The essence of the scheme is not about its title or its classification; it is about the impact that it has on the individuals. Another question concerned the way in which the Institute of Medicine’s report will involve the RAC report. My noble friend Lady Taylor answered a Question on that subject on 27 July. I cannot do better than cite her reply because it clearly states the Government's position. She stated: "““The RAC report represents a body of work whose key findings are inconsistent with numerous previous studies on this subject by the US IOM. It is for this reason that the Department of Veterans Affairs asked the IOM committee to engage with the RAC and to consider the same scientific literature that the RAC used to come to its conclusions.""The IOM committee is expected to report in February 2010””." We expect the report on 8 April. She continued: "““The IOM is an independent scientific body, and the degree to which it will consider the findings of the RAC report remains uncertain at this stage. The British Government's position is that we will not comment on the RAC report until the IOM issues its own report””.—[Official Report, 21/7/09; col. WA 337.]" The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, said that he had nothing new to add; I thank him for that. He said that the RAC provides the answers. That is not, and consistently has not been, the Government’s view. The noble Lord, Lord Tyler, said that, as a layman, it is self-evident. As a layman, I have read at least the executive summary, and it did not seem at all self-evident to me. It is not the Government’s view that it is self-evident that there is something in the RAC report that should cause us to take a different view. We believe that our view is sound. The noble Lord, Lord Tyler, touched on a number of points. He wanted us to hold a public inquiry. We have said that we have not ruled out the possibility of looking at the matter again. However, in the present circumstances, it is research, not any form of public inquiry, that will best allow us to understand and help the veterans. I think that it was the noble Lord who touched on the issue of brain damage. We announced that, based on advice received from the Medical Research Council, we would not pursue neuroimaging studies. However, it was made clear that the MoD would not close off the possibility of looking at that again once ongoing US studies have reported. On organophosphates, in 1996, the MoD carried out a thorough investigation into the use of OP pesticides in the 1990-91 Gulf conflict. The report found that, in the main, OP pesticides were properly used by personnel who had been carefully trained in the safe use of such products, including the wearing of personal protective equipment. On the vaccine interaction research programme, much has been made of the fact that it is not the one vaccine or the other, it is the interaction of the two. We carried out research into that. The vaccine interaction research was an in-depth examination of the potential adverse effects of the combination of medical countermeasures administered to troops in the 1990-91 Gulf conflict. The overwhelming evidence from the programme was that the combination of vaccine and tablets offered to UK forces at the time would not have had an adverse health effect.