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Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Bill

It could be a consequence, but it is not the prime reason behind the Bill. When the Law Commission looked at the laws of succession, it highlighted the anomalous situation involving the children of a deceased minor. That is also covered by my Bill, which addresses the irregular situation in which the children of a minor who is entitled to inherit an interest in the estate of an intestate person, but who dies unmarried and without entering into a civil partnership before reaching 18, are unable to inherit their parent's interest in that estate for no other reason than that the law says so. I think that is unfair and I will elaborate on this issue later. First, let me comment on specific clauses in the Bill. Clause 1 would amend part 4 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925, which sets out how a deceased person's estate is to be distributed in the absence of a will or to the extent that a will is not valid. Clause 1(2) would insert proposed new section 46A into the 1925 Act. Subsection (1) of new section 46A specifies that the new section would apply where a person, X, disclaims an inheritance or is disqualified from inheriting because of the forfeiture rule. Subsection (2) of new section 46A provides that for the purpose of deciding who should inherit X's interest in the deceased's estate in those circumstances, X should be deemed to have"““died immediately before the intestate.””" That overcomes the rule in current intestacy law, under section 47(1) of the 1925 Act, that children cannot inherit if their parents are still alive. That Act, which is still on our statute book after all this time, was drafted and introduced by the first Earl of Birkenhead, who I believe is the subject of one of your forthcoming lectures, Mr Speaker, which I hope to attend. The effect of the reform is that if a person disclaims or is disqualified under the forfeiture rule, the inheritance to which he or she is no longer entitled will go to the next person listed in the order of priority in section 46 of the 1925 Act, even though the person who disclaimed or suffered the forfeiture is still alive. Subsection (3) of new section 46A provides that the new rule would not limit the court's power under section 2 of the Forfeiture Act 1982, under which the court has powers to modify the effect of the forfeiture rule where the offender has not been convicted of murder, for example by allowing the killer to inherit all or part of the estate. The circumstances in which the court would exercise that power would be the examples I gave earlier, in the case, perhaps, of a mercy killing, in which the deceased was the instigator of the act and the loving relative was complying with their wishes. The rule introduced by new section 46A gives way to any order made by the court under section 2 of the Forfeiture Act, which would override it. Clause 1(3) would make a consequential amendment to section 47(1) of the 1925 Act. Section 47(1) defines the statutory trusts for descendants or intestacy, providing that no grandchild or remoter descendant may inherit if his or her parent is still alive when the intestate dies. That is clearly inconsistent with proposed new section 46A, which would treat the offender has having died before the deceased. Clause 1(3) would therefore insert ““(subject to section 46A)”” into section 47(1) to ensure consistency with the new rule. Clause 1(4) makes another consequential amendment, inserting a new subsection, 4A, after section 47(4) of the 1925 Act. New subsection 4A states that subsections (2) and (4) of section 47 are subject to new section 46A. Section 47(2) of the 1925 Act currently provides that where no descendant of the intestate attains a vested interest by reaching the age of 18, marrying or entering into a civil partnership under that age, the estate is to be distributed as if the intestate had died without issue. Section 47(4) applies a similar rule to the statutory trust for siblings or issue of siblings, defined by section 47(3). For the same reasons as apply in relation to the amendment made by clause 1(3), new subsection 4A will ensure that sections 47(2) and 47(4) are consistent with the new rule. Clause 2 deals with disclaimer or forfeiture of a gift under a will, and makes analogous provision to that made by clause 1 in relation to intestate succession. It inserts a new section after section 33 of the Wills Act 1837 and makes one consequential amendment to that section. In both those situations, the will is to be interpreted as if the person disclaiming or the person forfeiting had died immediately before the testator, the effect of this being that the person next entitled to the property will be able to inherit. I would not want, in any proposition I put before the House, to tamper with the express provision of a will, and this Bill would not do that. The general rule I have mentioned gives way to a contrary intention shown in a will. That is consistent with section 33 of the Wills Act, which also gives way to a specific contrary intention in the testator's will. The new rule in clause 2 would, as with clause 1, give way to any order of the court made under section 2 of the Forfeiture Act to give relief to the killer from the effect of the forfeiture rule where the court decided that was appropriate. Clause 3 deals with the death of a single parent aged under 18, in relation to which there is an anomaly in the law of intestacy. Where a child, C, of a deceased who dies intestate is entitled to a benefit but dies under the age of 18 without having married, but leaves a child or children, the law is unfair to that grandchild or grandchildren. Currently, C's benefit does not pass to his or her children because by dying an unmarried minor, C does not attain a vested interest in the intestate's property under the intestacy rules and therefore has no interest to pass on to his or her children. In such cases, the inheritance passes instead to the intestate's other, more distant, blood relatives. That clearly discriminates against the children of single parent minors. Since 1991, illegitimacy has not been not a bar to intestate inheritance, and such children qualify as grandchildren of the intestate. This problem would not arise if the child-mother was married, or if the grandchild or grandchildren were catered for in a will. The law of intestacy discriminates against illegitimate grandchildren: they are penalised because their mother is young and unmarried and because the deceased failed to make a will. Some people—I hope none of them are in the Chamber—may feel that this bizarre rule is good news because it is a clear case of the law encouraging marriage and acting as a disincentive to young, unmarried girls becoming pregnant. I do not accept that argument, because although the present law prevents the children of unmarried teenage mothers—and fathers, come to that—from inheriting any interest that their parent may have had in the estate of the intestate person, they can inherit in other ways and can inherit other property.