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Draft House of Lords Reform Bill

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for reminding me of the heroic efforts that I, other noble Lords and Members of the other place made in producing that White Paper. However, that was work in progress. We tried to reach consensus. The problem we have is that when Mr Clegg took over responsibility for this matter he convened a joint group of all the parties and when my noble friend raised the issues of powers and a referendum, that group met no more. We now have the benefit of the work of the Select Committee and of the alternative group, which has taken the debate on powers and primacy further than it has ever been taken before. We need to listen to what those reports say. We should remember that very few noble Lords agree with Mr Clegg’s view. There is now an overwhelming consensus that an elected House would affect the balance of power. Whether it affects primacy is another question but it would certainly affect the balance of power between the two Houses. We heard the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown, say yesterday that he would like an elected second Chamber to be able to veto the UK going to war. We heard a statesmanlike speech from the noble Lord, Lord True, but even he, too, talked about Houses that are co-equal. The problem that we have comes back to Clause 2 of the draft Bill, which states: "““Nothing … affects the status of the House of Lords … the primacy of the House of Commons … or the conventions governing the relationships between the two Houses””." The problem, as the Select Committee itself pointed out, is that, ““a major difficulty”” with Clause 2 is that it, "““seeks to establish a series of negative propositions””," in relation to ““key terms””, such as, "““status, primacy, powers, rights, privileges, jurisdiction and conventions””." There is no existing body of statute defining these key terms. The Government have clearly rejected at this point proposals to set out in statute the powers and relationships between the two Houses, and to amend the Parliament Acts. The reason is that a complete statutory codification would lead to tensions as to where the boundary lay between Parliament’s own processes and the courts’ interpretation of statute law. I understand that argument, but my point is this: those tensions will be nothing as to the tension between two elected Houses vying for supremacy—and they will vie. We are clear that Clause 2 will not do. My noble friend Lord Richard tells us that Clause 2 will not do. I hope that the government Minister, when he responds, will not simply say that we can tinker around with Clause 2. The overwhelming argument put to him in this debate is that the Government have to go away and think again about how to define the powers of and relationship between the two Houses. I should like to come back to the Parliament Acts and the preamble to the 1911 Act. It suggested that for a Chamber constituted on a popular basis new proposals would be needed, "““limiting and defining the powers of the new Second Chamber””." Why have the Government not made such proposals for limiting or defining those powers? What does the Minister have to say in response to the evidence of my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the drafters of the 1911 Act did not intend its provisions to apply in the event of a second Chamber being constituted on a popular basis? The Leader of the House, the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, rather ducked that point in his opening speech—but it is a crucial point. It is perhaps the most crucial point of all. Yesterday, my noble and learned friend Lord Morris of Aberavon regretted the absence of the Attorney-General’s advice to the Select Committee on the Parliament Acts. I ask the Minister why that advice was not made available, and will it be put at the disposal of Parliament if a Bill is introduced following the Queen’s Speech? I turn to the conventions. The committee of the noble Lord, Lord Cunningham, said that in a formal sense the Lords has equal status with the Commons as a House of Parliament in initiating Bills and passing them, subject to financial privilege and the Parliament Acts, and equal status in approving delegated legislation. In reality, as that committee said, the formal position has come to be moderated by conventions reflecting the primacy of the Commons, and those conventions are ““flexible and unenforceable””. Indeed, the Joint Select Committee comments that: "““It is paradoxical and self-defeating to refer to conventions in statute””," as the draft Bill does. The report continues, "““once the meaning of a convention had been legally determined, it would no longer be a convention””." The committee’s solution is that the two Houses should, following reform, "““establish a means of defining and agreeing the conventions … by the adoption of a ‘concordat’””." However, by that time it will be too late. What if there were no agreement? In any case, do conventions have anything to offer between two competing elected Chambers, each claiming equal legitimacy? Meg Russell, of the Constitution Unit at UCL, said that, "““elected chambers … feel free to use their powers to the full, in a way that the House of Lords currently does not””." The Joint Committee said that if the Lords, "““chose to use its powers, it would be one of the most powerful second chambers in the world””," and that the reformed second Chamber, "““should have an electoral mandate provided it has commensurate powers””." However, few would want to see both Chambers locked into endless conflict, and the logical outcome of this is that the role, functions and powers of the House should be determined and agreed before any change is made to its composition. On the question of a referendum, surely the British people should have the final say. An elected second Chamber would be a major constitutional change. Surely no one could disagree with that. It is rather more important, I suggest, than decisions on mayors—even on the Mayor of Birmingham—or the minutiae of European legislation. It is as important as voting systems for the House of Commons. On all these matters, the Government have recognised the need for the people to decide through a referendum. The Joint Select Committee has so recommended, yet Mr Clegg dismisses it out of hand. What is the Deputy Prime Minister is so frightened of?