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A new president and prime minister for Iraq: What challenges face the country in 2026?

In November 2025, Iraq went to the polls to elect a new parliament. The Shia Coordination Framework, which includes groups linked to the Iran-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), remained the largest group of parliamentarians.

In April 2026, five months after the election, Iraq’s parliament selected a new president, Nizar Amedi. President Amedi in turn appointed a prime minister, Ali al-Zaid, who received the backing of the Iraqi parliament in May 2026.

This briefing summarises the 2025 election and the background to the selection of the president and the prime minister. It also summarises some of the challenges facing Iraq, which include:

• tensions with the US over continuing Iranian influence in Iraqi politics
• an Iraqi government aim to disarm the PMF or integrate them into the Iraqi state armed forces. This initially had a deadline of September 2026 but has been moved to June 2027. Attacks by some Iraqi militias led to the first Saudi airstrikes on Iraq in July 2026
• the economic fallout from the 2026 Israel/US–Iran conflict, particularly for Iraqi oil production and government spending, which heavily depends on the oil sector
• divisions among the leaders of the Iraqi Kurdistan region, which has lacked a new government since 2024

How does Iraq’s political system work?

Under Iraq’s 2005 constitution, elections to the country’s single-chamber Parliament, the Council of Representatives, are held every four years. The Council of Representatives contains 329 seats, all of which were up for election in 2025.  

Once the Council of Representatives is elected, it must then select a president (presidents are not directly elected). Once they are selected, the president selects a prime minister, who must, together with their cabinet, win the backing of the council of representatives.

By convention, a Kurd holds the post of president, a Shia Muslim holds the post of prime minister, and a Sunni Muslim holds the post of Parliament Speaker.

Iraq has a large number of political parties. Parties often group themselves together on factors including shared ideology and/or ethnic affiliation.

Further information

Section 2 of the Commons Library briefing Iraq: Introductory country profile provides more information on Iraq’s political system and politics after the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

What happened in the 2025 elections?

In Iraq’s 2025 elections:

• turnout rose
• the Reconstruction and Development Coalition of the then Prime Minister won the single largest number of seats
• women won fewer seats than in 2021, though 25% of seats remain reserved for women. Some seats are also reserved for minorities (as has been the case in other elections since 2003)

Turnout rose

Turnout rose across Iraq in the 2025 election compared with the 2021 election. Turnout doubled in areas populated by minority groups like Kurds and Sunni Muslims (though their share of seats remains the same).

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition won the largest number of seats

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition of parties won the largest single number of seats (46). The coalition was aligned with the previous prime minister, Mohammed al-Sudani (in office 2022 to 2026). Sudani said that the Reconstruction and Development Coalition was an “essential part” of the Shia Coordination Framework, which holds a majority of seats.  

The Coordination Framework is a coalition of parties that was first formed in 2021 and which contains many pro-Iran groups.

Women won fewer seats than in 2021 and some seats were reserved for minorities

Women were elected to around 26% of seats in the Council of Representatives  in the 2025 election. This was a decrease on the 2021 election, when women won roughly 29% of seats.

A small number of seats in the Council of Representatives are reserved for minorities, such as Christians.

Who is Iraq’s new president?

In April 2026, the Council of Representatives chose Nizar Amedi as Iraq’s President. Reflecting convention, he is a Kurdish politician from one of the two leading Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The other leading Kurdish party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) boycotted the vote (see below on Kurdish tensions).

The president’s role is largely ceremonial, although it is the president who appoints a prime minister and a cabinet.

The president’s selection was quicker than after the last election in 2021, when the process took over a year.

Who is Iraq’s prime minister?

Following President Nizar Amedi’s selection, he in turn appointed Ali al-Zaidi the prime minister-designate of Iraq. Mr Zaidi has never previously held political office. He has said that Iraq will be a “balanced country regionally and internationally”.

Mr Zaidi was backed by the Shia Coordination Framework, elements of which have close links to Iran, though both Sunni and Kurdish parties are expected to be in the new cabinet.

Chatham House analysis argues that Iraqi parliamentarians have often favoured “consensus figures” as prime ministers because they “pose little threat to any of them”. This analysis was echoed by the International Crisis Group.

In May 2026, US President Donald Trump said that “we support, very strongly” Mr Amedi and met him at the White House in July. However, US support will likely be conditional on Iraqi action to curtail militia groups (see below).

In May, the Iraqi Parliament approved Mr Zaidi, his ministerial programme, and some of his cabinet. However, as of September, many ministerial posts are unfilled because of disputes within the ruling coalition.  

Former Prime Minister Malaki was also proposed

Mr Zaidi was not the framework’s first candidate for the post; in January 2026, it proposed former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Mr Malaki was in office from 2006 to 2014, resigning in response to the rise of Islamic State/Daesh from 2014. Iraq legalised the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in the same year.

Mr Malaki’s nomination was withdrawn in response to extensive US criticism.  President Trump had warned that the US would “no longer help Iraq” if Mr Malaki was chosen. The US considers Mr Malaki to be too close to Iran.

Mr Maliki had said his candidacy was a matter of Iraqi sovereignty. He had also said he was open to the disarming of the PMF.

What are the US priorities in Iraq?

The US’s priorities in Iraq are disarming Iran-backed groups and reducing US troop numbers.

Disarming Iran-backed groups

At a time when Iran’s regional influence has been greatly weakened, the Trump administration’s primary concern remains eliminating Iranian political and military influence in Iraq, notably through ending the separate PMF.

The US is using several tools to put pressure on Iraq to do this, including further sanctions on the PMF, sanctions on those that allegedly supply oil revenue to the PMF, and a halt on some oil export revenues to Iraq. In April 2026, it also ended a sanctions waiver that allowed Iraq to import Iranian electricity (a waiver for gas, under which Iran provides 40% of Iraqi needs, remains in place). It warned the same month that continuing attacks by Iranian-backed militias “adversely impacts the US-Iraq relationship”.

The US controls Iraqi oil export revenues because the funds are directed through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Other potential ways for the US to apply pressure on Iraq include stopping Iranian gas imports and cutting off Iraqi banks’ access to dollars. In 2023, Iraqi dollar access had been cut for some banks and there was a reported pause in dollar shipments from April to July 2026. Iraqi media suggest the US may implement a further pause if PMF disarmament does not complete in September 2026.

US troop drawdown

The US military drawdown in Iraq was first announced in 2024 and will complete in September 2026. In 2024, the Iraqi and US governments had announced that the Global Coalition against Daesh (Islamic State) would end its military mission in Iraq by September 2025, and that the two countries would move towards a new bilateral security relationship.

As of 2026, the US presence has been restricted to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, though this will end in September. An official from the regional government has suggested cooperation with the US will continue through training, logistics and local capacity building.

Analysts have noted concerns that US withdrawal may leave the Kurdistan Region exposed to external attacks, it having been heavily targeted by Iran during the US/Israel-Iran conflict of 2026.

Expected new US-Iraq defence agreement

The US expects its new agreement with Iraq’s federal government, which is still being negotiated, to retain “long-term security and counterterrorism cooperation” and strengthen Iraqi sovereignty against Iran and non-state armed groups.

In March 2026, a new US-Iraq coordination committee was established, with aims to “to intensify cooperation to prevent terrorist attacks and ensure that Iraqi territory is not used as a launching point for any aggression”.

The Iraqi Government has said any new agreement with the US will retain cooperation on intelligence, information-sharing, and arms programmes. It has rejected extending the 30 September deadline for US troops to leave.

Will Iraq disarm its Iran-backed militias?

Iraq is under international pressure to disarm Iran-backed militias, and the new Prime Minister has said it is one of his priorities. A deadline was set for September, to coincide with US troop withdrawal, but has been extended.

International pressure for the PMF to disarm

The Popular Mobilisation Forces were established in 2014 to combat Islamic State/Daesh, and number around 238,000. The PMF are made up of a range of groups including a series of Iran-backed militias such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. While the Iraqi state legalised the PMF in 2014, they are not part of its armed forces.

The PMF is one of the ways that Iran has been able to wield significant influence in Iraq since the US-led invasion in 2003.

The Trump administration has been calling for Iraq to fully disarm these groups, a position reiterated during the 2026 conflict with Iran, in which the PMF and the US have launched attacks on each other.

Arab Gulf countries have also called for Iraq to do more to control the militias following some Iraqi militia attacks on other states during the conflict. Most recently, in September, Iraqi militia groups were blamed for an attack on a Saudi oil pipeline that is being used to bypass the Iranian blockade on the Strait of Hormuz. An earlier attack had led Saudi Arabia to launch its first direct military strikes on Iraqi militia groups in July 2026.

In September 2026, Saudi Arabia said that it would give the Iraqi government the “opportunity to take the necessary measures to prevent attacks” but would reserve the right to respond in the future.

Iraqi leaders have acknowledged that state control over some militia groups is limited.

An initial deadline of 30 September to disarm was set

In June 2026, the Iraqi Government set a deadline of 30 September for individuals to surrender any weapons outside state control. The Iraqi Government said any armed activity after that date would be treated under the country’s anti-terrorism laws and the organisations and individuals considered “outlaws”.

The president, parliament speaker, and head of judiciary backed the prime minister’s intentions to place all weapons under state control. 

Prime Minister Zaidi said that with the withdrawal of US troops in September, “there will be no justification or need for any resistance in Iraq” and he would not accept “a state within the state”.

New deadline of June 2027

In August 2026, the Iraqi government said that talks will now continue after 30 September, after the final US troop withdrawal. In September, the Prime Minister said the deadline for disarming the groups would now be 30 June 2027. He said that the process would occur in stages. The first stage would involve the armed groups stopping their attacks for a 90-day period. 

What steps has the Iraqi Government taken?

Since June 2026, the Iraqi government has announced the formation of a cabinet committee to oversee the disarming of armed factions and their integration into the Iraqi state military.

It has also presented a bill to the Iraqi Parliament to standardise salaries, pensions and ranks between the armed forces and PMF (a form of this was proposed in 2025 but withdrawn following US and Iraqi opposition) and has instructed MPs to draft a bill to establish a state monopoly on weapons.

The bill for a state monopoly on weapons would not affect the Kurdish Peshmerga, which operate in the Kurdish Region of Iraq (see below).

As part of the disarmament process, the government is to offer up to 35,000 posts in the state armed forces and police for those surrendering their arms. It will continue a “buy back” programme to purchase surrendered weapons.

How have PMF groups responded?

In 2025 and 2026, some support has been expressed in Iraqi political debates for disarming the PMF or absorbing it into the state armed forces.

Following the 2025 elections, some PMF groups had expressed their willingness to disarm, citing their increased parliamentary representation. Among the groups saying they are willing to disengage from the PMF is Asaib Ahl al-Haq (the group is under US sanctions and has parliamentary representation).

Influential Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has also said his Saraya al-Salam militia will come under state control.

Kata’ib Hezbollah was among the major groups that fully rejected disarmament in 2025 and it reiterated this in August 2026. It has also said it is prepared to assist Iran militarily in its conflict with the US. BBC Monitoring analysis in May 2026 noted that several PMF elements, after the US strikes in 2026, now see the struggle with the US as “existential” and “enduring”.

In June, the chair of the PMF, Faleh al-Fayyad, said the PMF has begun to separate from political and other groups and to reorganise units more fully under a centralised PMF command. However, he said the PMF would continue to be a “key component” of the Iraqi state.

What conditions are the PMF reportedly suggesting?

Several conditions have reportedly been considered by PMF groups and members of the Shia Coordination Framework.

In 2025, these included the protection for militia leaders, non-interference with militia leaders’ economic interests, and no fixed timetable for disarmament

Since Zahani took office in May 2026, media reports say other options suggested by PMF groups include:

• “freezing” their weapons, rather than handing them to the government.
• a requirement for both Turkish and US forces to first leave Iraq (some Turkish forces occupy northern border areas).
• setting a disarmament deadline of 2028.

How have analysts assessed disarmament efforts?

Analysts expect steps to disarm the PMF to be slow and contested, and note the potential for planned legislation to further institutionalise Iranian influence in the Iraqi state.

June 2026 analysis for the Chatham House think tank argued that the Israel/US-Iran conflict has “threaten[ed] the gains” that some Iraqi militia leaders “have made from stability” in Iraq in recent years, and this has created a potential opening for their integration into the state.

However, it also notes that “implementation remains extraordinarily difficult” as “the deeper issue is whether command and [long standing] loyalty can also be transferred” from the militia group (or Iran) to the Iraqi state.

Analysis for Foreign Policy magazine similarly argues that in the short term, the Iraqi Government is unlikely to gain control over the PMF’s weapons (which may require direct confrontation). It argues the “most plausible” course is the integration of some PMF elements and acknowledgement they are under the overall command of the state, while retaining their leaders.

Analysis for the Washington Institute think tank warns that “if handled carelessly or not sustained”, the reforms will give Iran “two loyal camps” in both the military and political/economic spheres.

How significant are Kurdish divisions in Iraq?

There have been increased tensions between the main Kurdish groups in Iraq that govern in an autonomous region in the north.

Kurdistan region of Iraq

Kurds constitute an estimated 15% to 20% of Iraq’s population and are its second-largest ethnic group.

Kurdish politics in Iraq has been dominated by the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). They share control of the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (the KRI) and maintain their own security forces, known as the peshmerga. The UK and the US have worked closely with the KRI Government, including to combat Islamic State/Daesh.

As set out in sections 1 to 3 of the Commons Library briefing on the KRI, while the KDP and PUK govern in cooperation, there are increasing tensions between these groups. Recent differences include disagreements over how to achieve KRI independence (the KDP organised an independence referendum in 2017), relations with the federal government (especially over oil), and how to continue power sharing given the relative PUK decline in regional and federal elections.

Electoral performance and tensions over power sharing

In the federal elections of 2025, the KDP won 28 seats and the PUK won 18. In regional elections held in 2024 (which were delayed due to KDP–PUK disagreements over the electoral system), the KDP won 39 out of the 100 available seats and the PUK won 23. At the time of writing, no new regional government has been formed.

Given the PUK’s declining performance in elections, the KDP has sought to revisit the power-sharing agreement under which the two share regional cabinet positions equally. Under the same agreement, the KDP holds the regional presidency while the PUK holds the federal government presidency.

In 2026, the KDP boycotted the presidential vote in the federal parliament, saying it was illegal, and suggested that the president’s selection should be tied to negotiations on a KRI government. The KDP has since resumed sitting in the federal parliament. This followed a request by Prime Minister Zaidi.

Analysis for Chatham House argues that the continuing deadlock within the KRI meant it was “at the mercy of other actors” during the Israel/US–Iran conflict in 2026. The region experienced multiple attacks by both sides, following speculation that Kurdish armed groups in Iraq and Iran could mobilise against the Iranian regime.

The analysis also notes that the impasse has allowed Iraq’s federal government to expand its power over the KRI, such as over the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline and arranging the collection of customs duties. These will likely contribute to future KRI–federal tensions.  

What challenges does Iraq’s economy face?

Iraq’s economy heavily depends on oil. It has consequently suffered following the Israel/US–Iran conflict, which halted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The new Prime Minister has said addressing corruption and economic diversification are priorities for his government.

The Iraqi state depends on oil revenues

Oil is central to Iraq’s economy, constituting around 60% of gross domestic product (GDP) and almost all of its exports, and providing around 90% of all government revenue.

While the Israel/US–Iran conflict of 2026 has pushed up global oil and gas prices, Iraq has not been able to capitalise on this due to the extensive halt on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which between 80% and 90% of Iraqi oil exports flow.

In 2026, Iraqi oil exports have fallen more than any other Gulf state, with oil revenues 75% lower in April than the year before. In August, provisional data suggests oil exports stood at around 2.2-2.3 million barrels per day (bpd), down from 3.4-3.7 million bpd in February (before the conflict began).

Within Iraq, the conflict has also driven a rise in inflation and job losses. In August, the cabinet said there was a “significant gap” between state revenues and spending. There have also been challenges in salary payments.

In April 2026, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that Iraq’s economy will be hit more than Iran in 2026, with a projected GDP decline of 6.8% (versus 6.1% for Iran).

However, if the conflict ends and the Strait of Hormuz reopens, one major Iraqi oil company has said production could quickly resume; in this scenario, the IMF projected over 11% GDP growth for Iraq in 2027.

Corruption is high but a new campaign has been launched

The UK Government describes corruption in Iraq as “pervasive at all levels of Iraqi society, including in state institutions”. The campaign group, Transparency International, currently scores Iraq 28 out of 100 on its corruption perceptions index (which measures factors such as public appointments and diversion of public funds), and observers have estimated the value of lost public funds runs into several billion dollars.

Echoing previous anti-corruption campaigns, Prime Minister Zaidi has said that corruption “can no longer be tolerated” and has launched a new anti-corruption body. Measures taken include the arrest of several politicians in July. Some actions have reportedly targeted elements funding the PMF.

However, analysis for Chatham House argues that greater judicial independence and a willingness by the Iraqi parliament and police to follow up and implement change is required to address the “core problem of impunity”.

Options for addressing Iraqi dependence on oil and Hormuz

Iraq’s primary alternative land route for oil exports, via a pipeline through the Kurdistan region of Iraq to Turkey, was re-opened after US mediation in March 2026, but cannot meet nationwide demand. As noted above, the KRI and federal government have also often been in conflict over the sharing and administration of oil revenue, hindering use of the pipeline (see section 3 of the Commons Library briefing on the Iraqi Kurdistan region).

In the short term, Iraq is compensating for the lost oil revenue by drawing down foreign reserves and increasing borrowing, but the conflict increases pressure on the new government to:

• diversify Iraq’s economy
• reform public sector salaries and subsidies
• agree greater use of the oil pipeline via the KRI
• develop new oil pipelines, such as through Syria (with an agreement to do this reached in July 2026)

However, new oil pipeline routes may draw criticism and opposition from the KRI government by reducing the importance of the KRI pipeline and the leverage it offers over the federal government.

What has the UK Government said in 2026?

In May 2026, the UK Government welcomed the formation of the new Iraqi government as a “significant” development for Iraq. It said it would work with the new government on supporting economic development and strengthening both national and regional stability.

The UK Government has described the influence of armed militias outside state control in Iraq as one of the “most pressing challenges” for the country. It says that a stable Iraqi state “requires a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, exercised in accordance with the rule of law”, and it is seeking to engage diplomatically and through specific programmes to strengthen the capacity of the Iraqi state to restrain militia activities.

Iraq has been a substantial recipient of UK bilateral aid, averaging £48 million per annum from 2010 to 2020 (link opens excel file). However, as aid spending is reduced to 0.3% of gross national income by 2027/28, UK aid from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office to Iraq is due to fall to £5 million a year from 2026/27 to 2028/29. In 2021, it had stood at £51 million.

Further reading

• International Crisis Group, Iraq forms new government amid regional turmoil, May 2026
• Washington Institute, Tempering US expectations about Iraq’s new government, May 2026
• Soufan Center, Iraq’s new government confronts challenges on all fronts, June 2026
• Arab Gulf States Institute, The geopolitical imperative of Iraq-Gulf Cooperation Council relations, June 2026
• Emirates Policy Center, Militias or the state: Al-Zaidi’s most difficult test in Iraq, August 2026
• Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Iraq’s new government between domestic constraints and external pressures, August 2026