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Venezuela: What has happened since Maduro’s capture in January 2026?

On 3 January 2026, the United States captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, in a military raid on Caracas. They were taken to New York and charged with narcotics and firearms offences; their trial is scheduled for 1 June 2027. Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez became interim President.

Venezuela continues to face high inflation, weak economic growth and substantial public debt. The International Monetary Fund estimated in January 2026 that inflation was in the “triple digits” and public debt was equivalent to 180% of gross domestic product (GDP).

On 24 June 2026, two earthquakes measuring 7.2 and 7.5 in magnitude struck Venezuela. More than 6,500 people were reported killed, and almost 61,000 attended hospitals. The World Bank estimated direct physical damage at $19.6 billion. The disaster added to already high humanitarian needs: the United Nations estimated that 7.9 million people required assistance before the earthquakes.

The Rodríguez government has released political prisoners and introduced an amnesty law, but human rights organisations report that more than 300 political prisoners remain detained and there remain restrictions on freedom of speech.

Since January 2026, relations between Venezuela and the United States shifted from confrontation to increasing cooperation. The Trump administration recognised interim President Delcy Rodríguez as Venezuela’s head of state, restored diplomatic relations in March 2026 and removed sanctions on Ms Rodríguez and the Central Bank of Venezuela. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described their approach to Venezuela as a three-stage process of stabilisation, economic recovery and political transition.

In August 2026 President Trump announced that the US and Venezuela had reached an agreement giving the US significant influence over a new venture operating Venezuelan oilfields. Analysts have questioned whether the agreement complies with Venezuelan law and whether future governments would continue to support it.

The UK Government announced in September 2026 that it would “upgrade” its relationship with Venezuela, including by appointing a resident ambassador, for the first time since 2019. It said the move did not “signify endorsement of any party”, and would allow the UK to further its interests in Venezuela, including supporting its democratic transition.

Venezuela’s economy and humanitarian situation

High humanitarian needs and an ongoing economic crisis were worsened by two powerful earthquakes in June 2026.

Key economic indicators: Inflation and growth

Venezuela has been struggling with high inflation, sluggish economic growth and growing public debt since 2013. Venezuela’s economy relies heavily on its oil industry and oil exports. A 2014 oil price crash, high public spending and a lack of investment in the publicly owned oil sector, led to a severe economic crisis and a partial default on its debt in 2017.

In 2017 and 2018 President Donald Trump imposed significant economic sanctions on Venezuela, severely restricting the Venezuelan Government and its state energy company’s (Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A, PDVSA’s) access to US financial markets, among other actions. Venezuela’s GDP contracted by more than 75% from 2013 to 2021.

Significant economic issues persist. In January 2026 a spokesperson for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said that since late 2024 “imbalances and vulnerabilities have reemerged” due to lower oil revenues, a widening fiscal deficit and shortages of US dollars. They estimated that inflation was in the “triple digits”, and its public debt was at 180% of GDP with much of it in default, even before taking account of any legal judgments or arbitrations that could increase the government’s liabilities.

Venezuela has many competing creditors, including countries such as China and Russia, and according to Reuters, more than 50 companies have pursued legal claims against Venezuela and PDVSA following expropriations under former President Hugo Chavez. Delcy Rodríguez’s government is preparing to renegotiate the country’s estimated $240 billion debt and creditors are reportedly “entering a fierce competition to secure their claims”.

Economic data and transparency

It has been difficult to assess the full extent of Venezuela’s economic problems because of a lack of official economic data. The Venezuelan government under Nicolás Maduro consistently failed to publish reliable economic data. In June 2025 the government detained at least eight economists who were attempting to collate independent economic data, including Rodrigo Cabezas, who served as finance minister in former President Hugo Chavez’s administration.

However, there has been a change in direction since Nicolás Maduro’s capture, instigated by pressure from the United States and Venezuela’s reestablishment of official dealings with the IMF, which had been suspended since March 2019.

In March 2026, under the new President Delcy Rodríguez, the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) published data for several economic indicators. It had stopped publishing regular statistics around a decade ago. In April 2026, a joint US-Venezuelan government statement said that they had hired external auditors for the BCV. This came shortly after the bank’s President, Laura Guerra – a petroleum engineer and Nicolás Maduro’s former sister‑in‑law – resigned her position. The US also said it was removing sanctions it imposed on the BCV in 2019.

Humanitarian situation and the June 2026 earthquake

On 24 June 2026, two major earthquakes, measuring 7.2 and 7.5 in magnitude, caused widespread damage across several states in Venezuela, including the capital, Caracas. La Guaira, a coastal region in the north of the country, was the worst-affected area.

More than 6,500 people were reported killed, and just under 18,000 left homeless. Nearly 61,000 ⁠people attended hospitals after the earthquake. The World Bank Group estimated that the June earthquakes caused US$19.6 billion in direct physical damage, with 47% of total damage occurring in residential buildings.

Even before the earthquakes, the World Food Programme said food assistance needs in Venezuela were “significant” and that “many families are unable to afford basic groceries despite food being available in markets”. In January 2026 the charity World Vision said it had collected data reporting that “18.2% of children go to bed without eating, 49% of families are forced to reduce portion sizes to prioritize feeding children, and in 11.4% of households, at least one family member has gone a full 24 hours without food”.

Before June 2026, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimated that 7.9 million people needed humanitarian assistance in Venezuela out of a population of 28.5 million. The EU’s directorate general for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations say this figure might be much higher according to grassroots organisations, and that around 56% of the population lives in extreme poverty.

Venezuela’s economic struggles and its authoritarian government (see below) have led to a significant number of people to leaving the country, nearly 7.9 million since 2015.

UK humanitarian response

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the then Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced the UK would provide the following support to Venezuela:

• deploying a 68‑strong search and rescue team, including specialist dogs
• sending an advance group of the UKEmergency Medical Team (UK EMT) to assess urgent health needs and inform further UK medical support
• matching donations from the British public to the Disasters Emergency Committee appeal up to £2 million to support the immediate response and coordination (the appeal reportedly raised over £12 million)

On 2 July, the government announced it was mobilising an additional £3.8 million in emergency funding on top of the £2 million in matched funding. In addition, it said the UK EMT was deploying a fully equipped field hospital in Venezuela with capacity to treat up to 100 patients per day as outpatients alongside a 20-bed ward for short-stay inpatient care.

In 2024, the most recent year for which official figures are available, the UK gave £971,000 in bilateral overseas development assistance to Venezuela (Table B.2, FCDO Annual Report and Accounts).

Venezuelan politics and changes under Delcy Rodríguez

Delcy Rodríguez’s interim government has released hundreds of political prisoners, implemented an amnesty law, and entered into talks with some elements of the Venezuelan political opposition. Human rights organisations say that there are still over 300 political prisoners in jail, and while the most overt human rights violations have been paused, political dissent and freedom of the press are still restricted.

Release of political prisoners and amnesty law

In early January 2026, under pressure from the United States, the Rodríguez government began releasing political prisoners. Those released included prominent opposition figures such as Juan Pablo Guanipa and Freddy Superlano, who are close allies of Venezuelan opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner María Corina Machado. The governments of Presidents Hugo Chavez and Nicolás Maduro previously denied that political prisoners existed in Venezuela.

In February 2026 interim President Rodríguez signed into law an amnesty bill, that granted “a general and full amnesty for crimes or offenses committed” during specific periods since 1999. The amnesty includes “acts of politically motivated violence”, an offence many people were charged with following protests over the 2024 presidential election, which was widely believed to be fraudulent. The law will allow those who left the country to apply for amnesty through their lawyers and be shielded from arrest when they return to Venezuela so they can appear in court for a ruling on their application.

The Venezuelan human rights group Foro Penal said on 24 February 2026 that it had verified the release of 436 prisoners since 8 January, as well as 109 full releases following the entry into force of the amnesty law on 19 February. It said that more than 573 people it classified as political prisoners remain in detention, despite these initiatives.

In March 2026, a UN fact-finding mission to Venezuela by the UN’s Human Rights Council said that it welcomed the “positive step” of prisoner releases by the Venezuelan Government (PDF), but raised several concerns around the amnesty law, including:

• It does not acknowledge state responsibility for human rights violations.
• It does not establish transparent or comprehensive processes, independent investigations, or mechanisms to uncover the truth.
• The scope of the law is too narrow, applying to only criminal offences and not civil, administrative or other types of proceedings.
• It excludes a large number of individuals detained in relation to other incidents, including alleged “armed or forceful actions” against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country – an accusation frequently used by authorities to detain military personnel, ex-military members and civilians.

The mission also said it had found evidence that at least 87 people had been detained for political reasons since the capture of Nicolás Maduro. Among them “were 14 journalists and media workers who were temporarily arrested while covering Delcy Rodríguez’s swearing-in” and “at least 27 individuals who were detained for allegedly celebrating Nicolás Maduro’s detention, including 15 children”.

Most of those released by the government are also reported to have been released with conditions including “precautionary measures and mandatory check‑ins”. Opposition leader Juan Pablo Guanipa was arrested again hours after his release, with the Attorney General’s office saying it had asked the Supreme Court to revoke his release order and replace his conditional freedom with house arrest.

The Venezuelan Government has continued to release prisoners. In August 2026 the Venezuelan Government said it had released a further 131 political prisoners. Foro Penal said 391 political prisoners remained in jail as of 10 August 2026.

Talks between opposition and government

In July 2026 it was announced that negotiations would take place between the Venezuelan Government and some opposition groups. The negotiations, which began on 1 August, are being led for the government by Jorge Rodríguez, current President (speaker) of the National Assembly and brother of interim President Delcy Rodríguez, and by Dinorah Figuera for the opposition. Ms Figuera served as President of the 2015 National Assembly, the only opposition-controlled parliament during the presidencies of Chavez and Maduro. She had fled Venezuela in 2018 but returned in 2026; her return and early talks with Mr Rodríguez were facilitated by the US State Department, according to The Atlantic Council.

Not all opposition leaders support the talks. María Corina Machado and Edmundo González, who ran as the opposition candidate in the 2024 presidential elections, released a joint statement on 26 July saying their faction would not participate in the talks, but nor would they stand in their way.

An analysis by the Chatham House thinktank argues that the US’s role in facilitating the talks will be vital, saying “ultimately the pace, content and outcome of the negotiation between Figuera and Rodríguez will depend on the US’s willingness to use its leverage”.

After the first round of talks ended in mid-August it was reported that the government and opposition had come to agreement on two topics: reforming the judiciary and seeking the release of Venezuela’s gold reserves, held at the Bank of England (and subject to legal disputes), to help fund earthquake recovery efforts.

On 18 September 2026 it was reported that the two sides were close to agreeing a deal on the gold reserves that would result in them being transferred from the Bank of England to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The government might then be allowed to use the gold as an asset to secure borrowing to help with reconstruction efforts, but it would not be able to sell the holdings.

On the same day it was reported that the government had unblocked access to hundreds of websites, including 17 news sites. The action was welcomed by Dinorah Figuera. However, VE Sin Filtro, a digital rights organisation, said that 188 websites including 79 news portals, remained inaccessible.

Assessments by human rights organisations

In September 2026, the human rights organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW), made its first visit to Venezuela since it was removed from the country in 2008, and met with Delcy Rodríguez. HRW deputy executive director, Federico Borello, said the interim President “has overseen a pause to the most overt forms of repression in Venezuela”. But he added that “these gains will only become sustainable with robust institutional reforms and the release of all political prisoners”.

As well as releasing all its political prisoners HRW called for international organisations like the International Red Cross to have access to all prisons to check on inmate conditions, reintroduce an independent judiciary, overhaul the country’s security forces, and allow all Venezuelans to participate in free and fair elections.

In the same month, the UN Human Rights Council’s Venezuela fact-finding mission said there had been “limited improvements in the human rights situation in Venezuela”, and it had observed “a significant decline in long-term detentions and related enforced disappearances” since the capture of Nicolás Maduro. However, it also said that organisations such as the security forces and colectivos (armed civilian groups that support the government), remain in place, as well as “numerous laws used to criminalize dissent”. It said that “journalists and other civil society actors continue to be obstructed in their daily work” and noted that at least 19 officials previously identified by the mission for their involvement in “gross [human rights] violations” remain in, or have been reassigned to, key positions in the government.

Venezuela’s relationship with the United States and new oil agreement

Since it captured Nicolás Maduro, the United States has gradually normalised relations with Venezuela and recognised interim President Delcy Rodríguez's government, while still saying that a transition to democratic elections is needed. In August 2026 the two countries announced a new agreement that will give the US significant control over a large number of Venezuelan oil fields.

Continued normalisation of US-Venezuela relations and key Trump administration statements

Following the 3 January capture of Nicolás Maduro, US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, set out a three-step plan for Venezuela to involve: stabilisation, economic recovery and political reconciliation, and political transition.

President Trump initially warned that if interim President Delcy Rodríguez “doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro”. However, he soon appeared to accommodate her leadership of Venezuela on the basis that she supported the US’s plans for the country.

In March 2026 the US and Venezuela re-established diplomatic relations, with the State Department saying the US’s engagement “is focused on helping the Venezuelan people move forward through a phased process that creates the conditions for a peaceful transition to a democratically elected government”. In the same month the US Government said it acknowledged Ms Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “sole Head of State”, while also saying the US had not recognised Nicolás Maduro as Venezuela’s head of state after 2019 when it recognised Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s “interim president”.

In April, the US lifted sanctions against President Rodríguez, a White House spokesperson told the press that “as President Trump has said, Delcy Rodríguez is doing a great job and is working with the United States very well”.

In June 2026, Mr Rubio told the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that Venezuela was “not where it needs to be, but it is a long ways from where it was five months ago”. He said that as part of the “transition phase”, the third of the three-step process, certain conditions need to be in place for free and fair elections to take place. These include a free and independent press, “space” for the political parties to organise and to mobilise, and a new electoral commission.

President Trump said in both July and September 2026 that Venezuela is “not ready” for elections.

In September Reuters reported that there was “reticence” from the Trump administration about opposition leader Maria Corina Machado returning to Venezuela. An unnamed political analyst told Reuters that the “US worries Machado could disrupt its transition plans if she were to return and rally supporters to push for Maduro-era officials to leave power”. Marco Rubio in the same month said that Ms Machado “has every right to enter her country whenever she wants to return”, but that “we have given her advice” and that “we want her safety to be guaranteed”.

August 2026 oil agreement

On 28 August 2026 President Trump announced that the US had reached an agreement with Venezuela giving the US Government majority control over a new oil venture covering a significant proportion of Venezuela’s oil reserves.

A White House factsheet gave the following details:

• North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), a private Venezuelan company, will receive a 100-year concession over 17 oilfields with proven reserves of approximately 65 billion barrels of oil.
• NABEP has granted the US Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital a 35% equity stake in its corporate parent “at no cost to the American taxpayer”.
• NABEP has granted the US State Department the right to purchase, at production cost, a guaranteed 20% of the output from all current and future fields NABEP will operate.
• NABEP has granted the US State Department the right of first refusal to purchase the remaining 80% of its output.
• The US Government will have a “veto power” over the appointment of any member of the board of directors, and a majority of NABEP’s board of directors must be US citizens.

The factsheet went on to reference the ‘Monroe doctrine’, and the US “expelling foreign adversaries from our hemisphere”. The Monroe doctrine, first developed in 1823 under the then President James Monroe, “designated the western hemisphere as an area of US influence in which the European powers of the time were explicitly warned not to interfere”. For more on the doctrine and President Trump’s update to it see Commons Library briefing Frequently asked questions: Cuba’s humanitarian crisis and US tensions in 2026. The factsheet claimed that “the majority of the incremental oil fields to be operated by NABEP were previously controlled or operated by Russian and Chinese firms, or by corrupt cronies of Maduro and Chavez”.

Commentary on the deal

Interim President Delcy Rodríguez, said in a television address that the agreement was a 25-year bilateral project, “with a production ​target of more than 1.5 million barrels per day”. She said that the agreement could generate about US$209 billion in revenue for the Venezuelan Government (based on a benchmark oil price of $65 per barrel), and that roughly $19 ​from each barrel ⁠would go directly to Venezuela, providing a significant boost to government revenue.

Ms Rodríguez said that the country retained “ownership of and sovereignty” over its natural resources, “while leveraging capital, technology and operational expertise ​to support the recovery of a strategic industry that has been severely affected by ​sanctions”. Both members of the Venezuelan opposition and Chavista groups (supporters of the socialist policies of former President Hugo Chavez) were reported to have opposed the agreement.

Analysts have raised questions over the agreement. Both the Atlantic Council and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) thinktanks questioned whether the agreement complies with Venezuela’s constitution and the reform of the Organic Hydrocarbons Law passed in January 2026, which opened up Venezuela’s oil and gas industry to greater private sector involvement. The organisations also said the agreement lacked political consensus and noted doubts over the longevity of the interim government, and therefore questioned whether future Venezuelan Governments will support the agreement. Both analyses suggested that any significant increases in oil production will take some time, due to a lack of recent investment and infrastructure.

Nicolas Maduro: How is his trial progressing?

On 5 January the US Department of Justice published an indictment (PDF) setting out the charges and the grounds for prosecution against Nicolás Maduro, his wife Cilia Flores, and four other defendants. These were:

• Nicolás Maduro Guerra, the Venezuelan leader’s son
• Diosdado Cabello, then the Minister of the Interior
• Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, former Minister of the Interior
• Hector Guerrero Flores, an alleged leader of the Tren de Aragua criminal gang.

On the same day, during their first court hearing in New York, Mr Maduro and Ms Flores both pleaded not guilty to the charges made against them. Both defendants are charged with conspiracy to import cocaine into the US, possession of machine guns and destructive devices, and conspiracy to possess machine guns and destructive devices. Nicolás Maduro is charged with an additional count of narco-terrorism conspiracy.

In April 2026, the US Government agreed to modify its sanctions regime to allow the Venezuelan Government to pay for the legal defence of both defendants. Mr Maduro’s lawyer, Barry Pollack, has argued that his client is immune from prosecution due to his status as head of state, and has raised questions as to how he was apprehended, calling it a “military abduction”. For more on head of state immunity see Commons Library research briefing, The US capture of Nicolás Maduro.

At a pre-trial hearing on 22 July 2026, the court scheduled the trial to begin on 1 June 2027. On 3 September, Mr Maduro’s lawyers filed a motion to dismiss all drug-trafficking and narco-terrorism charges against him. Federal prosecutors must reply to this submission by 2 October; a hearing is listed for November 2026 according to The Times. Both defendants remain in detention in New York and have not sought bail.

UK–Venezuela relations: What has changed since January 2026?

On 15 September 2026, Chris Elmore, the Minister for the Americas, announced that the UK was upgrading its diplomatic relations with Venezuela, by appointing a resident ambassador to the country. The UK Government downgraded its Caracas mission in 2019, after it recognised opposition leader Juan Guaidó as interim president. Following that decision, the UK’s embassy was headed by chargé d’affaires (less senior diplomatic representatives).

Mr Elmore said that developments in Venezuela since 3 January had “created an important opportunity for the international community to support the restoration of democracy”, and that “the UK considers that this moment calls for pragmatic engagement to help advance a credible transition and to encourage further reforms”. 

As part of this engagement the government will “deepen” its engagement with interim President Delcy Rodríguez and with her government “in pursuit of UK priorities”. The minister said that upgrading relations will allow the UK to:

• strengthen its ability to play a constructive role in support of a democratic transition
• advocate more effectively for the upholding of human rights
• play a role in the recovery and reconstruction of the country following the earthquakes of 24 June 2026
• enhance its capacity to support British nationals and promote UK businesses in Venezuela
• contribute positively to regional stability and the security of the UK’s Overseas Territories in the Caribbean

Mr Elmore emphasised that the decision to upgrade relations with Venezuela did not indicate “any change in the UK’s assessment of recent electoral processes, including those held in 2024, nor does it signify endorsement of any party”.

On 21 September 2026, Chris Elmore met with the Venezuelan Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Félix Plasencia González, at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting. The UK minister said they discussed “progress towards a democratic transition and human rights, as well as recovery and reconstruction following this year’s earthquakes”.

In July 2026 Mr Elmore was asked if the government was considering the return of Venezuelan gold reserves held by the Bank of England to help support Venezuela’s recovery following the June earthquakes. He said the UK Government was not a party to the legal case to determine who should have control of Venezuelan gold held in the Bank of England, and that UK courts and the Bank of England are independent of the government.

The UK Government’s initial reaction to the events of 3 January is set out in Commons Library research briefing: The US capture of Nicolás Maduro.