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Merchant Shipping (Homosexual Conduct) Bill

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

I am very pleased to bring the Bill to the House because, by repealing sections 146(4) and 147(3) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, it completes the removal of historic provisions that penalised homosexual activity. I am proud to do so because of my commitment to justice and opposition to unjustified discrimination.

When it comes to employment, in the merchant navy or anywhere else, what matters is a person’s ability to do the job—not their gender, age, ethnicity, religion or sexuality. Hon. Members across the House share that commitment. Many will be surprised—astonished, even—to learn that this anomaly still remains on the statute book. There is no place in our society today for employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, through which one provision applies to heterosexual individuals and another to homosexual individuals. The Bill repeals the now defunct provision that authorised the dismissal of a merchant seaman on the grounds of homosexual conduct. It is the last such provision penalising homosexual activity that remains on our statute book, and it should be removed.

The repeal of historic provisions that penalised homosexual activity started with the Wolfenden report in 1957. That landmark report argued for the decriminalisation of homosexual conduct. It was not universally popular at the time, attracting criticism from across the party political divide, but it wisely saw that private, consensual sexual behaviour was not a matter for the law. The internal debates within the Wolfenden committee were mirrored in the wider public debate; the debate between Professor H. L. A. Hart and Patrick Devlin, later Lord Devlin, was studied as a matter of course by law students. That debate is instructive to this Bill as it sets the entire tone for how we think about the law in the area of private sexual behaviour.

Lord Devlin took the view that the enforcement of morals was a proper function—even the primary function—of law. He was right to the extent that the law cannot be divorced from morality; it has an interest in what is good and in identifying wrongs that should be dealt with in society. However, he was wrong to imagine that, essentially, if the majority of people in society thought that something was morally wrong, it should be illegal. H. L. A. Hart took the view that the reality is more complicated than that—that there is a private sphere where the law should not run. The Wolfenden report set out that, as a matter of principle, sexual acts between consenting adults were not, in fact, a matter for the law.

It may sound initially as if Devlin’s view is the more Conservative, but actually Hart saw that there is a distinction between the state and society: they are not the same thing. Governments may protect and create the conditions for a flourishing society, but they do not intervene in every area unless there is a very good reason. The late Mrs Thatcher drew the same distinction in her misunderstood dictum that there is no such thing

as society. There is no such thing as society that is different from the institutions of family, individuals, businesses and other civic organisations.