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European Union (Definition of Treaties) (Association Agreement) (Georgia) Order 2015

My Lords, I shall also speak to the EU definition of treaties association agreement orders for Moldova and Ukraine.

Today we are considering three draft orders that relate to association agreements between the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their member states, and three countries: namely, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. The purpose of these draft orders is to declare the agreements to be EU treaties, as defined under Section 1(3) of the European Communities Act 1972. The draft orders we debate today are a necessary step towards UK ratification of these agreements.

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have all chosen to pursue closer ties with the European Union. These countries have decided of their own free will to sign association agreements in order to support their own reform programmes and to seek closer political association and economic integration with the European Union. We fully support the sovereign choices of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and strongly believe that no third country should have a veto over their decisions.

These association agreements, with their deep and comprehensive free trade areas, are wide ranging. They provide strong mechanisms through which to deliver security, democracy and prosperity. They commit Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to deep and meaningful reforms, to align more closely their legislation to EU norms, focusing on support to core reforms, including economic recovery and growth, good governance, improved respect for rule of law, and human rights. They will allow for the closer integration of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine with the EU and will promote increased prosperity and stability in the European neighbourhood. That is not only in the interests of those three countries, but is clearly in the interest of the EU, including the United Kingdom.

The ratification of these three agreements is not an end in itself. They form part of a process to drive forward continuous reform in all three countries. The European Commission will prepare annual progress reports to reflect each country’s strengths and highlight areas for improvement. The scope and nature of the

agreements are similar. That is why we are considering the draft orders together today. However, we should bear in mind that each country faces different pressures and has its own distinct priorities for its relationship with the EU.

The first order before us today, which I formally moved, relates to Georgia. Georgia has watched closely as events have unfolded in Ukraine. Both the Georgian Government and public have drawn parallels with the 2008 conflict with Russia. The Georgian Government are extremely concerned about the situation in Ukraine and its implications for their country, and have lobbied EU member states actively to ratify Georgia’s association agreement.

We remain clear, however, about the importance of Georgia continuing with reforms and fulfilling its commitments for signature of its agreement. Strengthened respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law are part of the process of moving closer to the EU. While not without setbacks, Georgia’s progress in the areas of democratisation and economic reform over the last 10 years has been impressive. The agreement will further help to encourage Georgia to drive forward with genuine commitment and energy the reforms necessary for the country’s long-term security and prosperity.

The European path has widespread support across Georgian society and the country’s main political parties. Since Georgia’s parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012 and 2013, which witnessed the first peaceful transfer of power in Georgia—a rarity in the former Soviet space—the Georgian coalition Government have remained committed to and have continued on the pro-EU trajectory set by the previous Government.

The wider south Caucasus region is of strategic importance to the UK and the EU. Continued stability in this region is also essential for the UK’s prosperity and energy security goals. It is therefore strongly in our interests that Georgia continues along its EU path. Since the brief Russia-Georgia war in 2008, the EU has played an important role in conflict resolution through the EU special representative for the south Caucasus and EU monitoring mission that provides an effective monitoring presence along the administrative boundary lines between Georgia and its breakaway regions. Closer political association and greater economic integration into the EU is the most effective way to promote reform and modernisation in Georgia, as well as contributing to conflict resolution.

I turn to the order relating to Moldova. Moldova’s parliamentary elections of 30 November 2014 illustrate Moldova’s continued commitment to democracy. A new coalition Government were appointed by the Moldovan Parliament on 18 February. We hope that they will govern in an inclusive and accountable manner and make early progress with the implementation of Moldova’s association agreement. It will be important to maintain, even speed up, the progress that Moldova has made since 2009 in administrative reform, independence of the judiciary, combating discrimination, and ensuring that democratic processes and respect for human rights are more deeply embedded in Moldovan society and more able to resist pressure from destabilising outside forces.

The protracted conflict in Transnistria remains unresolved, largely because of the malign role of Russia. Despite attempts by the European institutions, EU member states and the Government of Moldova, the de facto authorities in Tiraspol refused to engage meaningfully in negotiations over the association agreement. Nevertheless, an increasing share—now more than half—of Transnistrian exports go to the EU. Many businesses in the Transnistria breakaway region have a strong interest in positive relations with Chisinau and the EU, and could provide a positive influence for change.

Before I progress to the order which relates to Ukraine, it may be for the convenience of the Committee if I update it on the latest situation there, before saying more about the Ukraine association agreement. This is not a debate about the situation in Ukraine, but I appreciate that this is a moving picture, and Ministers have a duty to inform the House.

As the Committee will know, an agreement on a ceasefire was reached in Minsk on 12 February. It includes provisions embodied in an original ceasefire agreement also agreed in Minsk in September 2014. These measures include the withdrawal of heavy weapons to agreed distances from the line of contact, and the withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine. The 12 February agreement also envisages fresh elections under Ukrainian law in the breakaway, separatist-held areas and for constitutional reform to bring a more decentralised system of government in Ukraine.

The Minsk agreements were endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2202 on 17 February. This underlines the need for all signatory parties to implement their obligations. This resolution will allow the Security Council to monitor that closely.

There must be a particular focus on ensuring that Russia and the separatists honour their commitments. In the weeks that preceded the Minsk agreement of 12 February, Russia stepped up military support to the separatists. It transferred heavy weaponry and maintains hundreds of regular soldiers, including special forces, in Ukraine. Even after the ceasefire came into effect on 15 February, separatist and Russian forces continued to mount attacks on Ukrainian positions, including in the town of Debaltseve, an important road and rail hub, which finally fell on 18 February.

The consequences of Russia’s actions in Ukraine have been devastating. Since fighting started, we have seen more than 5,000 dead, tens of thousands injured and more than 1.5 million people forced to take refuge elsewhere. It is Russia, through its support for the separatists, which is responsible for this and Russia which must be held to account. As the Prime Minister made clear at the European Council on 12 February, Europe must send a clear message to President Putin that until Russia changes its behaviour, sanctions will remain in place. Russia must recognise that Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity should be respected and that Ukraine should be allowed to make its own sovereign decisions. The association agreement is just such a sovereign decision.

For Ukraine, the association agreement represents a very clear public commitment, by both the EU and Ukraine, to a deep relationship and close co-operation and to the continuation of much needed deep-rooted reforms. Although the provisional application of the deep and comprehensive free trade area has been postponed to 1 January 2016, the provisional application of important areas such as the rule of law and the fight against crime and corruption came into force on 1 November 2014.

The proposal to delay, at the request of President Poroshenko, the provisional application of the deep and comprehensive free trade area of the association agreement until 1 January 2016 was done in the spirit of peacebuilding, giving Ukraine and Russia time to discuss their economic relationship. The proposal offered a pragmatic solution to address Russia’s stated concerns about the deep and comprehensive free trade area, while leaving the text unchanged. In the mean time, the EU will continue the application of autonomous trade measures for the benefit of Ukraine until the end of 2015, granting Ukrainian exporters continued preferential access to EU markets without waiting for the trade provisions under the association agreement to enter into force.

These association agreements will be supported by continuing financial and technical support from the European Union on strengthening the rule of law, advancing judicial reforms, fighting corruption, ensuring respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, and strengthening democratic institutions. The EU provides funding to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova under the European Neighbourhood Instrument. The Commission currently plans to allocate at the minimum €2.1 billion and, depending on the pace of reform, could allocate up to €2.6 billion to support Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine between 2014 and 2020. This is a significant increase on the previous period for all three countries.

In conclusion, we firmly believe that the implementation of the association agreements will bring mutual benefits to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, and to the EU. We should all be clear, however, that this will not happen overnight. It is a complex region—we have all noticed that and debated it. There are no easy solutions to the crisis in Ukraine. Georgia and Moldova both have protracted conflicts and disputed territories within their borders. The association agreements have the potential to have a positive impact in the region and on these conflicts as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine become more economically successful and politically stable. But we, along with the EU and other partners, will need to stay closely involved to ensure that these agreements fulfil that potential and bring maximum benefits to the region, which is in all our interests. I commend the draft orders to the Committee and I beg to move.

2.15 pm