Proceeding contribution from Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Conservative) in the House of Lords on Thursday, 30 June 2005. It occurred during Question for short debate on Extradition: UK and USA.
Extradition: UK and USA
rose to ask Her Majesty’s Government whether, in the light of experience and the fact that the United Kingdom has ratified the treaty while the United States has not, they will now review the operation of the 2003 extradition treaty with the United States. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I am pleased to have the chance to ask this Unstarred Question. It may have a familiar ring to those who were present at, or who may have read (at col. 711 of Hansard), the debate which followed the Unstarred Question put by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, on 6 December last year,. It is with great pleasure that we shall hear from the noble Lord in this debate—he is, of course, a lawyer of renown. I am not a lawyer, but, from my non-legal point of view, the current US-UK extradition arrangements appear quite extraordinary. In short, recent developments in our extradition arrangements with the United States have caused concern to the public, have raised questions about the role of the Government in protecting our fellow citizens, and have raised questions about the effectiveness of our parliamentary scrutiny. A brief background may perhaps be helpful. On 31 March 2003, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, announced that the Home Secretary and the US Attorney-General were about to sign a new US/UK extradition treaty. He explained that the treaty reflected the best modern practice in extradition, and meant much closer co-operation in fighting against terrorism and other serious crime. There was no parliamentary scrutiny of the treaty and the full text was available only six weeks later. Considering that the treaty makes major changes in our extradition arrangements with the United States, it is remarkable that Parliament was not given an opportunity to debate the treaty fully. The provisions of the new treaty mean that American prosecutors no longer have to provide prima facie evidence in order to extradite a citizen from the United Kingdom. Article 8 of the treaty requires the US to provide a statement of the facts of the offence only. Second—and more surprising—is the lack of reciprocity in the treaty. The treaty contains an asymmetry in the obligations of the parties. As I said, in Article 8 it provides that the United Kingdom’s requirement of prima facie evidence does not apply, but the statutory requirement in the Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution, requiring probable cause, does apply in requests to the United States. As one excitable senior US attorney, Mr Scott Hammond, the deputy assistant attorney-general of the Department of Justice anti-trust division, recently bragged at an anti-trust conference in Las Vegas on 3 and 4 March this year that the US no longer has to make a prima facie case in support of extradition requests, or even provide witness affidavits. He also bragged that hearsay affidavits by the prosecutor are enough and appeal rights have been curtailed. Such an imbalance in US/UK treaty arrangements appears unprecedented. Sometimes I even wonder if the Government understand the meaning of the word ““reciprocal””. Reading the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, on behalf of the Government in response to a Question tabled by my noble friend Lord Marlesford suggests that her understanding of the word is quite different from mine. With regard to extradition requests between the UK and the US, she stated that,"““the practical consequences of what we are doing now are very reciprocal. We make applications to them. They adhere to those and make applications to us””.—[Official Report, 15/6/05; col. 1198]." She seems to me to have forgotten the difference in the underlying application procedures, which form the very essence of whether the arrangement is reciprocal. Simply because both parties adhere to the procedure does not of itself mean that there is reciprocity in the arrangement if the procedures themselves are different. So much for the inherent imbalance in the basic arrangement, but matters are much worse than that because, to date—over two years later—the US has yet to accept even its unequal side of the agreement. On 16 December 2003, the noble Baroness gave an assurance, (Hansard col. 1071) on behalf of the Government that the 2003 treaty would be ratified by the Senate in early 2004. Yet, in a recent Question tabled by my noble friend Lord Marlesford on 15 June, she said:"““I express our genuine disappointment that the United States’ authorities have not found the time or energy to ratify the provision. We are pushing the issue very hard””.—[Official Report, 16/6/05; col. 1198.]" That comment was made 18 months, almost to the day, after she originally stated that the treaty was shortly to be approved by the Senate, and we still await ratification. Professor Bassiouni, a distinguished research professor of law at DePaul University College of Law in Chicago, predicts that US ratification of the treaty is still a long way off and that it is unlikely to be ratified before the end of 2005. He believes this to be the case for two reasons. The first is that the treaty is numbered 108/23 by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, indicating that it was the 23rd treaty to have been received by the Senate in the 108th Congress. The second is that the 2003 treaty has already been the subject of opposition by a number of civil rights organisations, the American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU, being one of them. In addition, a number of Irish-American organisations have also expressed their opposition. A further major worry concerning this treaty is the breadth of its remit. The primary reason originally given for the treaty being signed was for the fast-track extradition of terrorists. As no less a person than the Prime Minister said, the treaty is,"““justified and right in a post-September 11 context””." The Government gave specific assurances that UK citizens would not be liable for extradition to the US for financial crimes. On 15 December 2003, in a debate in the other place, Caroline Flint, speaking for the Government, responded to a Question asked by Mr Menzies Campbell MP. She said:"““We do not have such a range of offences involving financial crime. The cases mentioned by the Financial Times””—" there was an article in the paper on that day—"““—such as prices fixing—would not apply. Dual criminality would have to exist””.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/12/03; col. 26]" Yet, according to recent newspaper reports—for example, in an article headed ““A white-collar Guantanamo””, which appeared in the Times on 20 May 2005—the total number of US extradition applications to date is 45. Half of those relate to white-collar crimes, and not one of the nine extraditions so far agreed to relates to terrorism. The impetus for the new arrangements in the UK and the US was to aid the extradition of terrorists between countries, particularly in the wake of 9/11. However, the reality is that the US can and is now using the simplified procedures to extradite UK executives for financial crimes, even where the conduct that links the crimes to the UK is limited. It is difficult to illustrate this point without giving a specific example. Of course, once one gives an example, Government Ministers hide in an air raid shelter entitled sub judice. Nevertheless, here goes. As many noble Lords may have read, the US is currently undertaking extradition proceedings in an attempt to extradite Mr Ian Norris. In bringing up the case involving Mr Norris, I do not wish to draw the Government into debate on the subject. But it is, nevertheless, a way to demonstrate the absurdity and basic injustice of the current US/UK extradition arrangements. Mr Norris is a 62-year old former chief executive officer of the engineering business Morgan Crucible and he is a UK citizen. He was chief executive of the company between 1998 and 2002. Morgan Crucible had been part of a European cartel in the carbon industry since the 1930s. In 2001, with Mr Norris’s encouragement, Morgan Crucible reported the cartel to the European Commission. In November 2002, Morgan Crucible and its main US subsidiary entered into plea bargaining with the Department of Justice and paid fines in the US totalling $11 million in respect of certain price-fixing activities in the US. By this time Mr Norris had already retired from the company. In September 2003, some time after he retired, Mr Norris was indicted in the US on charges of price-fixing and obstruction of justice. That charge relates to conduct from at least as early as 1989 through to the year 2000. A request for the extradition of Mr Norris was made in December 2004 and proceedings are continuing. Mr Norris’s case is a good example of the US government using the simplified extradition regime in the UK to extradite a UK citizen in circumstances that appear wholly unsatisfactory. The original price-fixing charge would not stand up in English courts, due to the fact that this was made an offence in the UK only with the passage of the Enterprise Act 2002 and the allegations relate to the 1990s. The provisions of the Enterprise Act are not retrospective. The US provided additional information so that the charge could be interpreted as conspiracy to defraud. So, not only is the basis of the charges questionable, butte majority of the conduct complained of occurred in the UK and Europe and not in the US. The only other two countries, France and Ireland, that have the same non-reciprocal arrangements with the US have specific protections built into their treaties for their own citizens, ensuring that extradition can be refused where their own nationals are sought or where the alleged offences took place substantially within their territory. Why did the Government not do the same in the UK? The attitude of the US to the new extradition provisions is exemplified by recent speeches from Members of the US Department of Justice. Scott Hammond, in the March Las Vegas speech from which I have already quoted, went on to say that to have the UK as the first government to bat for and assist the US in seeking extradition was remarkable. His reaction to the British acceptance of Norris’s indictment for conspiracy to defraud, replacing the price-fixing charge, was to say that:"““The UK Government looked at the information that was provided in support of the extradition and said: ‘Do you know what? That looks like conspiracy to defraud to us.’""That is the attitude shift we are talking about. How many countries are there out there that have dual criminality which allow for extradition on anti-trust? A handful. How many have conspiracy to defraud as a crime? A heck of a lot more. If those countries start making the same judgment that the UK has, man that changes everything””." Equally worrying were Hammond’s views on the benefits of cutting down on paperwork. He said:"““We don’t even have to provide witness affidavits. I mean, we may, if we keep doing it, begin to tax the resources of some foreign countries, but from a divisional resource perspective, it is nothing. It is nothing. It is a drop in the bucket compared to the bang for the buck we are getting on this””."
Secondary information
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- Proceeding contribution
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- 673 c399-403
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- 2005-06
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- House of Lords chamber
- Subjects
- Conspiracy Fraud Evidence Extradition Parliamentary scrutiny Treaties Reciprocal arrangements USA Morgan Crucible Price fixing
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- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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