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Equality Bill [HL]

I shall supplement what my noble friend has so clearly expressed with one or two additional points. First, the noble Baroness, Lady   Prashar, is very sorry that she cannot be here today, but she wants to take part in these debates at later stages. Secondly, my noble friend referred to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I was not a member of that committee when it produced this report, but the House will note that it was unanimous and that the Lords Members included the noble Lords, Lord Bowness and Lord Campbell of Alloway, the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, the noble Lords, Lord Judd, Lord Plant of Highfield, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stern. In paragraph 29 of that report, the Joint Committee explained that its proposals, which my noble friend summarised,"““translate into the UK context the principle which was constantly impressed upon us in our investigations of equivalent or similar commissions in other countries, namely the fundamental importance of national human rights institutions being independent from Government, both constitutionally and in practice, if they are to operate effectively””." In paragraph 30, the Committee continued,"““we have consistently maintained that it should not be a creature of Parliament, any more than it should be a creature of Government. Nevertheless, we believe that it is right that, in comparison with the Government’s proposals, the Commission’s accountability to Parliament should be strengthened. This would be a logical reflection of the Commission’s constitutional role as an independent watchdog over the executive’s actions in relation to equalities and human rights””." The other background matter is that the Paris principles—which I am sure the Minister in her reply will confirm are founding principles for this part of the Bill—"““relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for protection and promotion of human rights””" themselves emphasise the importance of independence. For example, they explain that a commission of this kind should be able,"““To submit to the government, parliament and any other competent body, on an advisory basis either at the request””—" I emphasise the word ““request””; not ““direction”” but ““request””—"““of the authorities concerned or through the exercise of its power””," various matters that I will not bore the Committee by reciting. Later in the Paris principles we find additionally a reference to the need for financial independence. They say:"““The purpose of . . .  funding should be to enable it to have its own staff and premises, in order to be independent of the government and not  . . . subject to financial control which might affect this independence””." Finally, on the basis of 30 years’ experience especially with the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Commission for Racial Equality, having had the good fortune to advise them occasionally on the exercise of their powers, I think I can say without revealing any official secrets that there have from time to time under successive governments been real problems about ensuring the independence in practice of what happens within the commissions. There are others in this House who also have some experience of that. Whatever the Bill might say and whatever Ministers might believe, I can assure the Committee that there have been very real problems in practice—problems involving staff leaving because they felt that there was too much government influence or control, for example. It is a particular problem because government and central government are often the direct respondents to   the work of these commissions. In other words, very often it is the public sector and especially the government who find themselves on the receiving end of investigations especially into alleged discrimination on grounds of sex or gender. Obviously, to some extent, government would rather not be subjected to strong independent scrutiny of that kind, since everyone, all of us being human beings, believes that power is delightful and absolute power is absolutely delightful and we would rather not have judges and commissions looking over our shoulders. It is the pressure from governments on the commissions not to be robust which gives rise to problems. Therefore it is vital not only that those who are appointed to be commissioners and staff are really independent, but that the structure encourages public confidence in the independence of the new commission. I as one of the architects of the old commissions feel we made a mistake 30 years ago in not finding ways of enhancing the constitutional status of what is really a public watchdog. Therefore, without necessarily, as my noble friend has put it, saying that this is the only way of doing it—of course it is not—we hope that imagination and skill will result in the course of the Bill’s passage in provisions that will enhance the appearance and reality of independence.