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Equality Bill [HL]

My Lords, it is a matter for the House. If noble Lords want to take that course, I would in any event answer the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, and deal with the point made by the noble Lord subsequently. If it is convenient to the noble Lord, Lord Lester, for me to answer the noble Baroness, the noble Lord can then incorporate those points on his amendment that he feels I have not addressed adequately, when we move on to deal with it. Perhaps I can answer the noble Baroness first and the noble Lord can reserve his comments and ire for when he comes to speak. I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, and the right reverend Prelate know that the Government understand the anxiety expressed by them on these issues. As my right honourable friend the Prime Minister made clear, we very much welcome and are grateful to the religious and nonreligious bodies for joining with us in a more holistic and caring way to meet the needs of those in need. We want to explore and enhance those opportunities for partnership. We are very sensitive to the issues to which the noble Baroness has properly alluded. Therefore, the question for us is: do these provisions that we have set out give the comfort that we all want to see? The noble Baroness will know that much time and effort has gone into considering the provisions to see whether they reassure us. We shall consider the issues raised by the noble Baroness and the issues that the noble Lord, Lord Lester, will raise before we come to a final conclusion. However, we believe that these provisions are satisfactory and I would like to explain why. We are very sympathetic to the thrust and purpose behind the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, but it may be worth remembering that harassment will apply only in the areas of public functions, education and the management and disposal of premises. It will not apply to the provision of goods, facilities and services by private individuals or commercial or non-commercial organisations. Even within those areas, where the concept of harassment applies, an action should not normally constitute harassment when something is done solely on the grounds of A’s own religion or belief—not the person who complains about it. If an action is to be regarded as harassment under Clause 47, there must be a reason for doing it that relates to the religion or belief—including the lack of religion or belief—of B or someone else. The Bill already makes this clear in Clause 47(2)(a), so it will not be enough that a person simply finds an environment offensive or intimidating. Therefore, we feel that the right to express one’s own religion or belief is already protected by the provisions of the Bill. This does not mean that religious objects will never be covered by the harassment provisions. Posters which are clearly aimed at converting others to a particular faith, rather than celebrating a faith, could be considered harassment if they were deliberately brought or put in a situation to deal with B’s religion. For harassment to be established, a poster would have to be shown to have violated B’s dignity or to have created an intimidating environment for B. That would be on the basis that it should reasonably be regarded as having done so on B’s perception and all the other circumstances. On balance, we believe it is right that people attending public functions should be able to do so free from fear of unwelcome proselytisation. The amendment that the noble Baroness has put forward is tempting in that it would rule out absolutely the possibility of a case of harassment arising from the display of religious objects, which has been the subject of much debate in the House. But we remain convinced that symbols that are present because of the religion or belief of the person or organisation that has put them there, will not give cause for a claim of harassment because they are there on grounds of A’s religion or belief, not B’s or anyone else’s. Furthermore, the noble Baroness’s amendment would result in a claimant who felt he or she had been exposed to unwelcome material deliberately aimed at his or her religion or belief while receiving a public service having to demonstrate the intent on the part of the provider to cause harassment. We believe that that would be an inappropriate extra hurdle to overcome in the context of the kinds of service we are dealing with here. I recognise that, once this Bill leaves this place, we will have no ability to control the interpretation that is put on it. That is the point made by the noble Baroness. I can certainly assure the House that we do not intend to sit back if we find that we are wrong about that and the Bill’s provisions are impacting adversely on faith groups’ ability to provide public services—which we value highly because they are effective. We shall retain through Clause 65, as we propose to amend it today, a power using the affirmative resolution procedure to create an exception in Clause 54 or to vary an exception in Part 2 which would enable us to step in if, for example, drug rehabilitation projects were found to be running into difficulties because of these provisions. We greatly value the contributions that a wide variety of faith and other community groups make to public service in this country. We shall seek to protect that through appropriate exceptions, rather than introduce inequalities in the definitions used to identify harassment. For those reasons, and with that assurance, I resist these amendments at this stage.