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Equality Bill [HL]

moved Amendment No. 141:"Page 32, line 34, leave out paragraph (f) and insert—" ““(f)   a decision of any of the following kinds taken in accordance with rules under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) (““immigration rules””) or anything done for the purposes of or in pursuance of a decision of any of those kinds— (i)   a decision to refuse entry clearance or leave to enter the United Kingdom on the grounds that the exclusion of the person from the United Kingdom is conducive to the public good, (ii)   a decision to cancel leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom on the grounds that the exclusion of the person from the United Kingdom is conducive to the public good, (iii)   a decision to refuse an application to vary leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom on the grounds that it is undesirable to permit the person to remain in the United Kingdom, (iv)   a decision to vary leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom on the grounds that it is undesirable to permit the person to remain in the United Kingdom; (but this exception does not have effect in relation to harassment), (fa)   a decision in connection with an application for entry clearance or for leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom or anything done for the purposes of or in pursuance of a decision of that kind (whether or not the decision is taken in pursuance of a provision of immigration rules) if the decision is taken on the grounds— (i)   that a person holds an office or position in connection with a religion or belief or provides services in connection with a religion or belief, (ii)   that a religion or belief is not to be treated in the same way as certain other religions or beliefs, or (iii)   that the exclusion from the United Kingdom of a person to whom paragraph (i) applies is conducive to the public good; (but this exception does not have effect in relation to harassment), (fb)   a decision taken, or guidance given, by the Secretary of State in connection with a decision of a kind specified in paragraph (f) or (fa) (but this exception does not have effect in relation to harassment), (fc)   a decision taken in accordance with guidance given by the Secretary of State in connection with a decision of a kind specified in paragraph (f) or (fa) (but this exception does not have effect in relation to harassment),”” The noble Baroness said: My Lords, the amendment standing in the name of my noble and learned friend limits the exception currently provided for the Immigration Service at Clause 54(4)(f), which has rightly been criticised as being too broad. In moving the amendment, I seek to resist Amendment No. 148 in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Dholakia and Lord Lester. The noble Lords questioned the exception currently at Clause 54(4)(f) very strongly on Second Reading, reflecting concerns expressed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Although I was unable to accept their amendment at that time, we have considered what change is possible and have brought this amendment along the lines that I indicated then. I hope that noble Lords will agree that it represents a considerable narrowing of the exception. The most significant change is to remove harassment entirely from the scope of the exception: we accept that there should be no occasion when the immigration service should be able to harass an individual on the grounds of their religion or belief. We believe, however, that there is a need to allow discrimination in limited cases. As I said on Second Reading, exceptions are needed in two areas. First, they are needed to protect our ability to exclude an individual from this country on the grounds that his presence is not conducive to the public good, even where the public expression of religious or other beliefs by that individual is part of the reason for exclusion. I am sure that noble Lords can think of examples where they agree that such exclusion would be justified, and we do not wish to see the provisions of Part 2 threaten that ability. The other area where there is discrimination that we believe should be lawful is in the provision of special schemes by which ministers of religion and other religious workers are allowed entry. In this area it is right to retain the ability to distinguish between groups for whom we will or will not make such a facility available. We have sought also to retain the ability to exclude an individual who has applied for such a scheme on grounds that their presence would not be conducive to the public good. The amendment allows a limited exception, and it balances our commitment to freedom from discrimination and harassment with our commitment to effective immigration controls. I shall now address Amendment No. 148, standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill. I appreciate his concern, and I also appreciate the many contributions that he has made in our debates to help us to get these proposals right. From the concessions that we have made from this Bench, the benefit of his assistance is clear. In this particular instance, on balance, we do not feel it is right to reproduce the arrangements in the Race Relations Act 1976 to which the noble Lord has referred. The exception that we are now providing for immigration in our amendment to Clause 54 is relatively narrow in comparison with that which is provided at Section 19(D) of the RRA 1976. The exception to the RRA potentially affects large numbers of people: it may apply wherever there are objective grounds for believing that it is reasonable to subject people of different nationalities to differential treatment for the purposes of immigration control. Such treatment, where it amounts to direct discrimination, must be authorised by the Secretary of State, and those authorisations are reported on by the IND Race Monitor. There are a dozen or so in force. In this case, a relatively small number of decisions may affect a great many individual cases. The situation in the case of the exception provided in our amendment is different. The discretion to discriminate on grounds of public good is likely to be exercised with regard to individuals rather than groups. I very much understand the noble Lord’s intentions in relation to the amendment; I had the advantage of speaking to him about it today. Notwithstanding what I have said, it may be possible for us to look one last time at what may be done on this matter. I say that perhaps to shorten the debate on it. I beg to move.