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Defence in the United Kingdom

A future risk assessment was carried out in March 2003 to consider our changing circumstances, but unfortunately it was not taken up politically. We are in a different world. The Government have to show us what enemy, real or potential, Trident would be aimed at, and how that fits in with the emphasis on asymmetrical warfare that was mentioned in the future risk assessment. The stuff that Kitson predicted many years ago about the sort of warfare that would be endemic—I would argue, throughout the 21st century—has come to pass. We should consider that through a great national debate, not, as the current Secretary of State suggested, simply on a successor to Trident but on what our policy objectives should be. We must not be pre-emptive in our discussions. Nothing should be excluded and nothing should necessarily be included. We should have a full and open debate analogous to that for which Ian Blair called for the police. Why do we not hold such a debate on the future role of our defence forces? That does not in any way minimise their current importance or disposition—we will all have arguments about that—but we need to look to the future with an open mind, not a closed one. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, not the military, should lead such a review. If we accept another old adage, that warfare is diplomacy by other means, we should establish our diplomatic priorities first and everything else should fit around that. The only way to avoid the accusation that big boys’ toys win out is to hold a serious, wide-ranging and open debate on what we face in the 21st century. Apart from the arguments about the reasons for the Iraq war, Denis Healey concluded our commitments east of Suez 39 years ago, but now we find that we are drifting further east. We have a commitment in Iraq, and that in Afghanistan is about to be expanded. We can only fear the speculation that suggests that our commitments may spill over into Iran or Syria. Long before today, we placed what we were capable of doing against what we aspired to do. We need to examine closely the matrix of foreign policy and diplomatic objectives and defence objectives. I am conscious that we have only a short time, and I do not have a great deal more to say. I support a complete and open debate, before we are committed to a successor to Trident, to take account of the same circumstances that are drilled into us at every opportunity by Government spokesmen and women. There was an interchange between the right hon. and learned Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) and the Secretary of State about the moral courage or otherwise of Chiefs of the Defence Staff. I would not particularise or make an accusation for the sake of it—for what it is worth, I do not believe that one was made—but nobody is beyond criticism, whether they are Chiefs of the Defence Staff or ordinary squaddies. Everybody has a part to play in any military enterprise. They know their responsibilities and they should face up to them. It is fatuous to assume that, simply because somebody carries the great title of CDS or CGS, they should be immune from criticism. However, I accept that, as the Secretary of State said, a case has to be made. Let us make another case. Perhaps we would not be facing some of the dangers that confront us today if we had listened to the then Chief of the Defence Staff at the outset of the Iraq war. Lord Boyce questioned the legality, discussed the appropriateness of the kit and whether it was fit for use and, critically, looked for an exit strategy, which was not there. It ill behoves us to criticise people when they get it right. In that instance, if we had listened a little more to the military at the top, our soldiers and our interests would not be facing some of the dangers that confront us today.