---

Terrorism Bill

moved Amendment No. 1:"Page 1, line 5, leave out from ““statement”” to ““as”” in line 6 and insert ““which members of the public to whom it is published could reasonably be expected to understand””" The noble and learned Lord said: The amendment is grouped with Amendments Nos. 11, 13, 16, 29, 33, 35 and 38 standing in my name, which are consequential on it. The amendments were suggested by the Law Society of Scotland and are probing. I start from the proposition that clarity in the definition of the offence of encouragement of terrorism created by Clause 1 is essential. In subsection (1), the definition of statement applies to the offence both as to,"““direct and indirect encouragement or other inducement . . . to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences””," so far as that statement is likely to be understood by members of the public to whom it is published. It is to be noted that subsection (5) provides that for the purposes of the clause, two questions may arise that must be assessed in relation to a statement: first, how it is likely to be understood and, secondly,"““what members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer from it””." That second reference appears to be a reference back to a question of what members of the public could reasonably have been expected to infer from a statement in relation to the definition of indirect statements set out in subsection (4)(b); that is, of statements which glorify,"““conduct that should be emulated by””," those members of the public. From that, it would appear that for indirect statement, there is a subjective test which is related to that section of the public and which has to be applied. Albeit that in terms of subsection (6)(b), it is irrelevant,"““whether any person is in fact encouraged . . . by the statement””." On the other hand, for direct encouragement, the single test is whether it is likely to be so understood by members of the public to whom it is published. That suggests an objective test related to the statement itself, rather than to those members who could reasonably be expected to understand it as meaning encouragement. This amendment probes the nature of the tests to be applied by the courts in determining whether a statement will be understood as a direct or as an indirect encouragement of terrorism. It seeks to incorporate a test for both forms of statement which is based on a common and coherent standard; namely, one of reasonable expectation of how the statement would,"““be understood by members of the public to whom it is published””." There are consequential amendments to Clause 1, and to Clause 2 where it refers back to such statements—as, for instance, in subsections (3), (4), (5)(b) and (7). In this case, I suggest that there is a better way of going about providing a coherent and clear test for what a statement is—falling within the terms of this clause—than that which is presently in the Bill. I beg to move.