---

Terrorism Bill

I strongly support my noble friend Lord Goodhart in this amendment, to which I have added my name because of the wider considerations raised in part by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Judd, and others. The Association of University Teachers, in making representations on the Bill, wisely referred to the ““chilling effect””. The chilling effect of legislation that can bite on freedom of speech and inquiry can be wide and go beyond what may be intended by the Government. Having lived for some two years in the United States during the period of McCarthyism, I am well aware of what is meant by a chilling effect. It is that people are frightened of what may be the consequences and the wide interpretation of what they do and they then avoid doing it even though their obligation as a journalist, university teacher or librarian might otherwise oblige them to do it. The danger of a vague definition of what is meant by ““encouragement””—the word ““indirect”” turns it from being specific to vague—is that the chilling effect becomes very widespread. In the particular case of Clause 2, where we are looking at the role of people in libraries and universities—no doubt we shall debate the matter at greater length—the fact that the Minister was not able to say immediately whether the defence might be extended to dissemination troubled me deeply. The phrase ““indirect encouragement”” in the hands of someone in a responsible position—an academic or a librarian—could mean the careful avoiding of anything which could be considered to encourage terrorism. Let me give an extreme example. Supposing that I applaud a speech favouring terrorism given by some proselytiser in a public setting, could my applause be regarded as indirect encouragement to terrorism? Could it be that if I give my class in literature William Butler Yeats’s ““Easter Rising”” to read, that might be interpreted as an encouragement of terrorism? Historically in a sense it was—certainly the glorification of terrorism is rung in the verses of that great poem. If we are ably to protect the limit, given the legitimate issues in trying to protect ourselves against terrorism, we need a much clearer definition of ““encouragement”” than is in the Bill. By leaving out the word ““indirect”” we leave it to the courts to determine whether there has been encouragement. Leaving the word in tends to make the interpretation considerably wider. On Second Reading, I said that the First Amendment has made it impossible for legislation of this kind containing these sorts of words to be used. I believe that it is extremely important in our much looser and unconstitutional—that is, without having a written constitution—setting that we should consider how we define what is meant by ““encouragement of terrorism”” in such a way that will limit to the greatest conceivable extent the impact that it could have on freedom of discussion, debate and scholarship within our country.