Skip to main content

Proceeding contribution from Lord Kingsland (Conservative) in the House of Lords on Monday, 5 December 2005. It occurred during Committee of the Whole House (HL) and Debate on bill on Terrorism Bill.


Terrorism Bill

moved Amendment No. *8:"Page 1, line 14, at end insert ““in the circumstances known to, or foreseen by, him””" The noble Lord said: The content of this group of amendments, which has been much foreshadowed in today’s debates in Committee on the Bill, concerns the objective test of recklessness. The noble Baroness said in our first debate this afternoon that the Government no longer intend to persist with the notion of objective recklessness. She expressed some reluctance in making that statement; and it was clear later on that it had been pressure, not only from this side of your Lordships’ House but to some extent from the other side, that led the Government to make that reluctant concession. I reassure the noble Baroness that she has done the right thing. The noble Baroness drew our attention to a case of R v G. The leading judgment in that case, as your Lordships know, was made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bingham. On the question of the merits or otherwise of the objective test, in paragraph 33 of the judgment, the noble and learned Lord said:"““It is neither moral nor just to convict a defendant . . . on the strength of what someone else would have apprehended if the defendant himself had no such apprehension””." We on these Benches respectfully associate ourselves with that statement and believe that it says everything that needs to be said about the issue of objective recklessness. The noble Baroness has indicated that she will support Amendment No. 9 when it is put to the vote. I note that the noble Baroness said nothing about Amendment No. 8 except—intriguingly, if I understood her rightly—that the Government intend to table their own amendment to Clause 1(2)(b) on Report. Am I right in interpreting the noble Baroness in that way? I see that she is nodding, so I am right. I am much obliged. It follows that the noble Baroness must have some doubts about the way in which we have formulated Amendment No. 8. To help the noble Baroness in her cerebrations between Committee and Report stages, I draw her attention to paragraph 41 of the judgment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bingham, in which he sets out his definition of recklessness. The noble and learned Lord states:"““A person acts recklessly within the meaning of Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 with respect to""             (i)   a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist;""            (ii)   a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take the risk””." Amendment No. 8 is intended—to use that frequently employed word in our deliberations today—to do no more or less than reflect exactly the definition that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bingham, used in R v G. I shall be intrigued to see what the noble Baroness makes of the definition of subjective recklessness on Report.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
676 c462 
Session
2005-06
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Subjects
Disclosure of information Common law Evidence Incitement Libraries Internet Prosecutions Publications Terrorism Research Speeches Academic freedom Encouragement of terrorism
Legislation
Terrorism Bill 2005-06
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk