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Terrorism Bill

We come back to context. Again and again, we say that one has to look at the issues of context and content. We know that the Northern Ireland issue has a long and intractable history which has been addressed with a degree of sensitivity and care. The noble Baroness knows better than most the difficulties around which resolution of that complex Northern Ireland issue has been approached. The method adopted is one of inclusion, resolution, and a focus on trying to bring about long-lasting peace in that state. I do not believe that those acts in which this Government have participated in trying to achieve that would ““glorify”” in any sense. I do not intend to give way until I have finished the responses that I want to make. I will then do so since the joy of Committee is that we can endlessly discuss these issues. Perhaps I may remind noble Lords that simply condoning terrorism will not be sufficient to constitute a criminal offence. Neither will simply glorifying terrorism. Rather, to be criminal, the glorification must take place in such a way that the person can reasonably infer that the conduct being glorified is done so that such conduct should be emulated in existing circumstances. That ““should”” and ““existing circumstances”” are important; mere glorification of terrorism, reprehensible though we would all regard it, is not enough. The likely effect on the audience also has to come into play. We do not see how there can be real objections to that. A number of your Lordships, not least the noble and learned Lords Lord Mayhew and Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, rightly raised the issue of a jury, with juries being the final arbiters of fact—and quite right too. When this matter comes to be determined, the good sense of a jury would have to be used to decide whether these offences were or were not made out. I also draw the attention of the Committee to Clauses 1(5) and 2(6) which make clear that in answering questions about how a statement is likely to be understood and what the public could reasonably infer, the court must have regard to the contents of the statement or publication as a whole and the circumstances of its publication. The test is not a quantitative one, but a qualitative one. The test is whether the surrounding material and context of the statement indicate that the whole statement does not have the effect that a mere extract, which may be objectionable, would have. So it is the context and the content which are important. I hope, therefore, that I can assuage the concerns of the noble Earl, Lord Onslow. Some of the examples given are simply not merited in terms of suggesting that these issues would be caught. We also reject any suggestion that the provisions on glorification are unnecessary. They serve as a useful guide to the courts on the conduct which Parliament is seeking to cover in this new legislation. Indeed, not only are they a useful guide to the courts, but if they were to be removed at this stage, the courts would be likely to interpret that removal as meaning that such conduct was not intended to be covered, thus significantly narrowing the offence. Very importantly, they also make it clear, including to the courts, that for the purposes of this offence, acts of terrorism that are glorified must be ones that can be emulated in existing circumstances. This form of guidance in legislation is not new. The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 provides an analogy as it contains a description of the conduct involved in harassment. This was included to help clarify what was a new concept to the courts. The subsections relating to glorification in Clauses 1 and 2 are included for the same reason.