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Terrorism Bill

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, for his explanation of the position of the party opposite. I am equally grateful to him for indicating that he does not support the proposal—or perhaps more grateful to him for the latter than for the former; I record that. I agree with the assessment of my noble friend Lady Symons of Vernham Dean about the likelihood of Plaid Cymru being included in the Bill. It is not included. That is not the way in which the Bill is constructed. I accept, of course, that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, might have mischievously cited Plaid Cymru to excite our attention and our interest—I am grateful to him, as always—but it is fundamentally flawed and unnecessarily causes a deal of misplaced anxiety. As to organisations, I remind the Committee that the definitions in relation to organisations and terrorism are the same as the definitions found in the Terrorism Act 2000. For example, ““organisation”” is defined in Section 121 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which this clause amends, as including,"““any association or combination of persons””." The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Salisbury raised the issue of organisations, as did others. We are simply continuing the definition that is already there, which is well understood and has been used. I very much agree with the analysis of my noble friend Lord Harris. I should say to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord Lloyd of Berwick, that although I understand the difficulties they contend there are in relation to a lack of precision, we believe that the legislation is precise. I shall try to explain why I say that. The Terrorism Act allows for an organisation to be proscribed if it is ““concerned in terrorism””. That is the basis on which proscription under the Act takes place. An organisation is concerned in terrorism if it commits or participates in acts of terrorism; prepares for terrorism; promotes or encourages terrorism; or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. That is the context in which we have to consider Clause 21. Additional organisations can be added to the list of proscribed organisations by order subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Any proscribed organisation can appeal against its proscription to the independent Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission. We have to remember that. It is not a situation where you go on a list and cannot come off, and there is no basis upon which one can protest. One can, people do, and they come off just as they go on. The decision is based on evidence. As my noble friend Lady Symons of Vernham Dean said, proscription is an important weapon in the fight against terrorism. I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, absolutely accepts that, as does the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, in his report on the Bill published on 12 October. I agree with the quotation given by my noble friend in that regard. As noble Lords are aware, for all the reasons set out in our debates on the first day in Committee, the Government believe that the glorification of terrorism should be an offence. It is right to remind the Committee that, as my noble friend Lady Symons said, this proposition was not only a part of the manifesto but was twice endorsed in Divisions in another place. I appreciate that not all noble Lords agree with the proposition and that Members of another place may have to deal with this matter in due course if the Committee comes to a view contrary to the view that they have taken. I am sure that I do not need to repeat all the conditions of intent that apply to the glorification offence and the safeguards and defences that it attracts. We dealt with that on the first day in Committee. If we are outlawing glorification of terrorism by individuals, the same should apply to organisations. The clause allows the proscription of a group if its activities include the unlawful glorification of terrorism or are carried out in a manner that ensures that it is associated with statements containing unlawful glorification of terrorism. That is very important for us to recognise. If it is possible to identify individuals who glorify terrorism, it may be possible to prosecute them if they meet the tests in the legislation. I am conscious that that will cause difficulty. However, the clause is aimed at organisations which glorify terrorism and thereby create a climate in which terrorism can flourish. If an organisation passes at its annual conference a resolution glorifying terrorism, it may not be possible to identify the individuals behind it nor may it be practical to seek to prosecute all the individuals who attended the meeting, but it would be possible to identify that organisation and prosecute it. I cannot believe that Members of the Committee would disagree with me about the propriety of so doing. However, the Government believe that it should be possible to take steps against such a body whose statements might be influential among young people and encourage such people to carry out terrorist threats. We cannot delude ourselves into believing that individuals have not been so influenced. There is fairly cogent evidence, not least highlighted and elucidated in the report of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, which tells us that that is the case. Clearly, this would require something more from the organisation than simply an individual member making a glorifying statement. Rather, the clause is designed to catch those organisations which are closely associated. It is important to stress that the glorification of terrorism is covered only where the audience can reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct which should be emulated in existing circumstances—not in old, historical circumstances, but in existing circumstances. In other words, glorification of terrorism itself is not sufficient grounds for proscription. Organisations that glorify terrorism create a climate which others may emulate. I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, says about the committee’s report and of course we will look at it later. But our initial view is that these provisions are compliant and are capable of being supported. I commend the opportunity we have had for this very vibrant debate, but I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his opposition to Clause 21.