Proceeding contribution from Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale (Labour) in the House of Lords on Tuesday, 13 December 2005. It occurred during Committee of the Whole House (HL) and Debate on bill on Terrorism Bill.
Terrorism Bill
moved Amendment No. 121:"Page 23, line 5, leave out ““28”” and insert ““90””" The noble Baroness said: I thought I should begin my introduction of the amendment by explaining why I and others feel it is right to move it before I argue the precise case for 90 days. I consider it important that parliamentarians in this House should be given the opportunity to demonstrate to the country that they were listening and giving careful thought to the views of experts on counter-terrorism, as expressed by those experts in the Metropolitan Police, ACPO and ACPO Scotland, and confirmed by the considered judgment of the independent reviewer, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. All commended 90 days to the Government. While I recognise, of course, the primacy of the elected House of Commons, it should, in what are unusual circumstances, be given the opportunity—once—to think again. The effect of the amendment would be to reinstate in the Bill 90 days, instead of 28, for pre-charge detention. This would have the effect of allowing a suspect to be held for up to 90 days before charge, with a senior judge reviewing the situation every seven days, and, of course, with a sunset clause. The gravity and nature of the terrorist threat now facing us differs significantly from anything we have had to deal with before. The complexity and difference of the current danger necessitates a complex and different response from previous counter-terrorism measures. We are faced by fanatics aiming to wreck maximum havoc of death and injury without specific warning, and ready to sacrifice themselves in the process. They are often part of a network of complex terrorist organisations, with international links and contacts scattered over many countries. They use advanced new technology, including computers with encryption, and other new tools of the trade in the ever advancing world of IT. The more normal police practice of letting plans for a crime run until evidence accumulates to incriminate the suspects has to be curtailed because no one would dare to risk losing contact and a terrible terrorist event resulting. The international links, whether organisational or individual, mean there is inevitable delay as these are tracked and are usually dependent for speed on foreign liaison services of all kinds, some less efficient than others, some less co-operative than others. Foreign help is often required to establish accurate identity, in some cases even of those in custody, let alone of contacts. The provision of an adequate supply of interpreters and translators to deal with the huge volume of material, as well as to guarantee the civil rights of the suspects by providing adequate interpretation, all slow the process. As Assistant Commissioner Andy Hayman of the Metropolitan Police points out in the impressive and detailed seven-page attachment to his letter of 6 October to the Home Secretary, it is not just a question of resources because the procedures—some of them inevitably consequential—will inevitably take a considerable time. The points made by Assistant Commissioner Hayman are very much echoed in paragraphs 57, 58, 59 and 60 of the report of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I find the arguments very compelling, in contrast to others such as the right honourable David Davies and the honourable Dominic Grieve, who were much quoted a few weeks ago as finding them not compelling. They must give a meaning to that word different from mine. Anyone with professional experience in the field of counter-terrorism would immediately recognise the time-consuming problems recounted by Assistant Commissioner Hayman and would realise how magnified these are in the special circumstances now being faced by our counter-terrorism forces. In paragraph 61 of his report, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said:"““On the basis of my own inquiries and processes as independent reviewer I am satisfied beyond doubt that there have been situations in which significant conspiracies to commit terrorist acts have gone unprosecuted as a result of the time limitations placed on the control authorities following arrest””." He concluded in paragraph 62:"““I share the view that as a maximum three months is probably a practicable and sensible option, all other things being equal. I recommend that the proposal for that maximum should be so regarded””." I agree with that. As I said at Second Reading, I cannot find that up to a maximum of 90 days’—““up to”” a maximum of 90 days’—pre-charge detention, with every seven days a senior judge having to be satisfied that there is justification for holding for a further seven days, and with a sunset clause, would be an unjustified infringement of civil liberties. I also cannot see how when you ask professional experts from the Met, from ACPO and from ACPO Scotland for their opinion—and when they give it—you can override it unless you have overwhelming and compelling reasons. I have heard no such reasons from anyone. On this most serious of issues—our national security—the Government tried to listen to the experts who recommended 90 days. In my opinion, that was correct and 28 days is insufficient and wrong. I beg to move.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 676 c1160-2
- Session
- 2005-06
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Lords chamber
- Subjects
- Disclosure of information Civil liberties Admissibility of evidence Criminal proceedings Codes of practice Appeals Administration of justice Detainees Crimes against property Communication Electronic surveillance Evidence Intelligence services Judges Police Prosecutions Proscribed organisations Police custody Politics and government Scotland Terrorism Remand in custody Time limits Telephone tapping Cryptography Sunset clauses
- Legislation
- Terrorism Bill 2005-06
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
Librarians' tools
- Timestamp
- 2024-04-21 13:54:00 +0100
- URI
- http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_286285
- In Indexing
- http://indexing.parliament.uk/Content/Edit/1?uri=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_286285
- In Solr
- https://search.parliament.uk/claw/solr/?id=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_286285