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Terrorism Bill

My Lords, perhaps I may follow that by generalising the case described by the noble Lord, Lord Rees-Mogg. In his case, he had the advantage of knowing who the customer for the autobiography of Trotsky was, which may have made the culpability of the noble Lord greater, as he recognised. The job of a bookseller, generally, is to sell as many books as possible and to make books available to the public. It really is not the task of a bookseller to have to distinguish or discriminate between customers. Yet, the definition of recklessness here appears to make it an offence for the bookseller not to discriminate in that way. How otherwise could the bookseller be sure that customers would not include someone who would either be moved to terrorism or use the book for the purposes of terrorism? I think that, in those circumstances, if I were a bookseller, without the advantage of knowing the identity of my customer, I would be concerned about that. Similarly, the task of a librarian is to make the books in the library available to students or others who want to use them. It should not be, as I think this amendment implies, the task or duty of librarians to have to discriminate between borrowers in order to satisfy themselves that those borrowers do not include people who might be moved to terrorism or use the book for the purposes of terrorism. My concern about these amendments is that, as other noble Lords have said, unless greater clarity can be achieved, they will make people in the perfectly honourable and normal businesses of librarianship or bookselling uncertain about whether they are at risk of breaking the law.