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Terrorism Bill

My Lords, the debate about recklessness was in these terms originally. ““Objective recklessness”” is when a person does not give his mind to what is likely to happen, although a reasonable person would realise that some harm would follow from his act. If a person does something which is harmful without giving his mind to the consequences, and a reasonable person would have realised it would cause harm, that is ““objective recklessness””. That was the decision in Caldwell, which the Judicial Committee of this House set aside a year or two ago. ““Subjective recklessness”” is where a person realises the consequence of his act yet goes on to carry out that act, although he may not intend that those consequences should follow. To put it into this context—and it is a very difficult concept that lawyers have had to struggle with over many years—let us suppose that there were a manual for making a bomb. If a person were to pass that manual to a person whom he considered could potentially act upon it and realises that he may be encouraging him to make a bomb, then he would, in one sense, be subjectively reckless, but I am quite sure that he would be held guilty of intending that to happen if he knew that the person had it in mind to act as a terrorist. But let us suppose that it was a book on chemistry. A bookseller, librarian or university lecturer knows that of course it is possible to use a textbook on chemistry to construct a bomb. He has no intention that the person should construct a bomb and certainly does not care whether he constructs a bomb. He obviously would care were that to follow. The clause sets out a criminal offence, punishable by seven years’ imprisonment. It would cover a person who did not actually commit a terrorist act but said something or passed on a terrorist publication such as a book or a pamphlet. Is it right that a person should be guilty of a criminal offence carrying seven years’ imprisonment if he does not intend the consequences that may follow? ““Recklessness”” is a difficult concept, and I cannot see that it is right, as my noble friend has said, for a person to be subjected to a lengthy sentence of imprisonment when he did not intend the consequences that he foresees.