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Terrorism Bill

My Lords, like all noble Lords, we are extremely grateful to the noble Baroness for considering this matter again, following the debate in Committee. As one who took part in that debate, I can tell the House that the amendment now before your Lordships is a considerable improvement on the amendment tabled at the earlier stage. As the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, has pointed out, the nature of the obligation on the Attorney-General has been changed. In Committee, it was a condition before consenting to prosecution that the items set out in the amendment were satisfied. Now the Attorney-General is obliged only to have regard to them. I confess, however, that I still have reservations about the expression ““grave breaches of human rights””. The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, knows such reservations well. I believe that it is too vague an expression to find a place in the legislation. The point of the amendment reveals the problem that we face. The reason why the noble Baroness and her colleagues have tabled this amendment is that we do not have a satisfactory definition of terrorism. If we had a satisfactory definition of terrorism, there would be no need for this amendment. It is because this definition of terrorism is so wide, and because people who speak out against genocidal acts of totalitarian governments can be prosecuted in this country under this definition of terrorism, that the noble Baroness has found it mandatory to bring the amendment forward. That is the dilemma. When the Attorney-General exercises his discretion, it is essential that he take these factors, and perhaps others, into account before he takes his decision. The issue is whether these factors should appear on the face of the Bill or whether the Government can give us some other guarantees that are sufficiently satisfactory to allow us to leave this amendment aside. Essentially, in the amendment, the noble Baroness is defining what terrorism is and what it is not—it is no more and no less than that. I would like to ask the Minister how she sees the Attorney-General exercising his discretion when faced with an individual who has spoken out against an evil regime abroad. What guarantees can the Minister give the House that the Attorney-General will abide by rules for exercising his discretion, albeit not on the face of the Bill? I must confess to having hesitations about those criteria being in the Bill. Under this amendment, the Attorney-General is required to have regard to these factors; but what about other factors that may be equally relevant which do not appear in this list? An Attorney-General may take the view that what is on the face of this amendment is the maximum rather than the minimum necessary. We do not know. The Attorney-General’s discretion is too wide. I would be most grateful if the noble Baroness in her reply would be kind enough to address these points.