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Terrorism Bill

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, and I are trying to decide, at a distance, which of us is going to now speak. I think by order that it is my turn. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for the thoughtful and careful way in which she responds to amendments of this kind. As a long-standing political hand, I am very conscious that flaws in amendments are always the reasons given for finding them unacceptable. The noble Baroness has put forward the perfectly fair argument that, in her view, the amendment was framed in too broad a way. The trouble is, as noble Lords will appreciate, the Bill itself is framed in far too broad a way. If one reads the list of offences in Clauses 1, 2, 17 and many others, one sees that the range is simply incredible. It is rather frightening as a range of potential offences. So, with no wish to be out of order, my noble friends Lord Goodhart and Lord Thomas and I had to frame the amendment in a way that countered and met the width of the Bill itself. One other point that I would like to make very quickly—it is a point which was forcefully argued by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford and the noble Lord, Lord Judd—relates to what one might describe as the counter-effect of this kind of legislation. If you are someone who passionately believes in democracy and human rights and who wants to bring that to your benighted country, and if it is not obvious to a country like the United Kingdom so that it understands that and is on the side of your effort to establish human rights and democracy, bluntly, where do you look for help? To whom do you look for help? The answer is that there is not anyone to look to for help. A number of noble Lords made forceful, honest and very important remarks about the great difficulty of having no clear definition of ““terrorism””. The right reverend Prelate offered an ingenious definition and there is another wise definition in the High Level Task Force of the United Nations, with which the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, was so closely associated. In other words, there is not a shortage of fine definitions which means that we have to fall back on an area of vagueness. The final point I wish to make—this is why, I am afraid, despite what the noble Baroness has said, I shall be seeking the opinion of the House—is summed up in the Minister’s perfectly reasonable answer to me that my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew QC would be looking into this issue and coming up with a definition in a year’s time. Apart from the fact that that leaves a rather nasty gap of a year—in which, quite possibly, there will be prosecutions for offences conducted outside this country and against governments other than our own—I have another objection. It is not an objection to the evidently brilliant reputation of my noble friend but, frankly, to the thought that an expert and not Parliament itself should have the final voice on this kind of issue, which is about human rights, democracy and justice. I think Parliament should have that right. Parliament should express its opinion; and that opinion should then be brought before experts who are considering what to do. I am sorry that the noble Baroness did not feel able to respond to the enticements of the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland—which appeared to me to be overwhelmingly moderate—namely, that she should agree that the Attorney-General would have to take these matters into account. Given that she did not feel able to go even that far or to say that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, would also have to go that far, I shall have to take the—