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Terrorism Bill

My Lords, in Committee, the debate on the corresponding section for 90 days was curtailed. I did not therefore have an opportunity to speak. Because of that, and because I think that I can add some new facts for your Lordships’ consideration, I ask for your forbearance in talking, perhaps, a few minutes longer than I would normally expect to do on Report. There were many different, passionate views in Committee as to how the detention provisions of the Bill compared with the infamous 90-day legislation in South Africa. As I practised as a human rights lawyer in South Africa in the 1960s, and as most of my clients had been detained under the 90-day law, I can be of assistance to your Lordships in comparing that law with the detention provisions in this Bill, and in drawing attention to some of the lessons that could be learned from the South African experience. The 90-day legislation in South Africa was introduced at a time when the government feared that the ruling white population was in grave danger from the terrorists, and the police were under increasing pressure to prevent that danger. Broadly speaking, that was not unlike the position in the United Kingdom today. The legislation followed a series of less extreme rules, eroding the human rights of South African citizens with measures such as bannings and house arrest. Again, this is not unlike what has happened here over the past few years, where a series of similar laws—such as control orders, seven days’ detention and then 14 days’ detention—have eroded human rights. What is more, the key features of the South African legislation and the Bill are the same. Both allow for detention without trial. Both allow for the interrogation of the detainee through the period of detention. Both place the detainee in the hands of the police, who are authorised to move them from one location to another as they see fit. In implementing those laws, the South African police, protected by a colluding government and by most members of the judiciary, extracted information and confessions through savage, prolonged and relentless interrogation and denied access to the courts. Some confessed to crimes that they had not committed to be released from solitary detention and interrogation, and testimony from psychiatrists was that some detainees became so disoriented that no reliance could be placed on their statements to the police. I will not touch on the physical torture of detainees in South Africa as I do not believe that such torture is likely to happen here because of the safeguards in the Bill, and the right of access by detainees to lawyers, audio and video recording of interrogations and the requirement for senior judges to authorise the seven-day detention. There is also the Minister’s reassurance that a separate code of practice for detainees will be introduced. While that is a source of comfort, the code will need to be carefully scrutinised because, as is often said, the devil is in the detail. While those safeguards should protect detainees against physical torture, the pressure of isolation and fear will remain. Experience in South Africa and elsewhere makes it clear that there will inevitably be abuse by some police officers, possibly accentuated by racism, which unfortunately exists to some extent in the police force. The greatest potential for abuse that the safeguards cannot effectively prevent will be the initial detention of innocent detainees. With regard to the proposed code of practice, will the Minister say whether the families of detainees will have access to them, whether detainees will be kept in solitary confinement and whether the police, after the 28-day original warrant expires, will be entitle to release and then re-arrest detainees for another 28 days, which was the procedure perfected by the South African police? In addition to the possibility of abuse, another key lesson from the South African experience is demonstrated by the legislation that followed the original 90-day legislation in 1963. In 1965—only two years later—new legislation extended the period of detention from 90 to 180 days. In 1967—only two years later—the law was extended to indefinite detention at the discretion of the commissioner of police. Each time the law was extended, the safeguards, such as they were, were watered down or removed. One is tempted to say that this just could not happen in the United Kingdom—