---

Identity Cards Bill

My Lords, I have listened with great care and interest to all the comments that have been made. I think it is wonderful when one has four Earls speaking to one amendment. I commend them for that if nothing else. If one looks at the matters that have been spoken to in relation to the amendment, one finds that two issues have been conflated, so let me separate them out. The first issue concerns DNA, and the other concerns the use to which it should be put in relation to ID cards. I hope that I have made it clear throughout our debate that DNA is not included in Schedule 1 and therefore cannot be stored on the register. Nor are there powers to take DNA samples. To put the matter entirely beyond doubt, I am happy to tell your Lordships that the Government intend to bring forward an amendment at Third Reading to limit the registrable facts under Clause 1 to external characteristics, which is something that we debated long and hard when the matter was raised—by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, in particular—in relation to how to differentiate between internal and external characteristics. The issue of a future government was raised by the noble Earl, Lord Northesk—I am constantly being told that I am very benign—as a way to undermine my argument. A future government would be prevented from adding DNA to the information that might be added to Schedule 1 by affirmative order. I hope that we can put the debate on DNA to bed. It will not be part of this Bill. I can tell the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, that it is not right to suggest that the provisions in the 2001 and 2003 Acts have been unmerited in any way. I hope that the noble Earl was present when I said that more than 3,000 cases have been identified as a result of that material, including rapes and murders. One that stands out in my mind is a 20 year-old offence of the rape and murder of a 14 year-old girl, which was discovered as a result of a minor offence being committed some 20 years later. We are not saying that DNA has not some significance, but DNA and ID cards should be separated. Before continuing, I should mention the suggestion that the Secretary of State should issue the guidance. I confess to being a little surprised, given the trenchant criticisms of the Home Office during our debates on the Bill, that noble Lords would want my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, or his successors in title, to be responsible for guidance on information sharing to all public authorities. That is surely the function of the independent Information Commissioner and should be properly dealt with in that way. On the issue of contactless ID cards raised by the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, I should make it clear that it is currently planned that an ID card will be valid for travel within the EEA. As a result it must comply with the standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organisation. Thus, all countries are considering this very same matter. Standards stipulate that a travel document, such as an ID card, will have to have a contactless or proximity chip. It will require the card to use radio frequencies to allow the card to be read at very short distances of approximately 0 to 2 cm from the reader. That is somewhat similar to the oyster card used on London transport. To prevent the information on such chips being read at a greater distance, the card will implement basic access control, which requires that the machine readable zone—the MRZ—printed on the face of the card is scanned and the information then used to unlock the read and request data from the chip. As with e-passports, which the UK Passport Service is beginning to issue from this year, an attempt to read the chip without using the information printed on the MRZ to unlock it will yield no data that can be used to identify an individual. The worry of the noble Earls, Lord Erroll and Lord Northesk, is not merited. The conspiracy theory that the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, seems to be promulgating about the style of tracking will not occur. As for CCTV cameras, I very much take on board the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon. It amplifies how many of the public want to have better protection and want the facility of CCTV cameras. Indeed, we know that they are extremely useful in the detection of crime, not only in relation to terrorists but in identifying recent criminal offenders. None of that bites on this.The noble Earl’s amendment would require the Secretary of State to draw up and disseminate guidance to recipients of information from the register relating to disclosure of that information between and among them. The noble Earl stressed the importance of data protection and we do not disagree with him. However, the amendment, notwithstanding the fact that it is supported by a number of noble Lords, is misguided. It seeks to give the Secretary of State a role which is more appropriately fulfilled by others, as I have already indicated. Guidance on onward disclosure would necessarily relate predominantly to the legal position. The extent to which, and the circumstances in which, onward disclosure of information by a person who would have received it under these clauses would be lawful would depend on the statutory or common law powers of that particular person and the application of various restrictions from the Human Rights Act through the Data Protection Act to common law duties of confidence. The noble Earl was right to remind your Lordships that I made those points when we last discussed this. The police have powers which are different from those of the security agencies, which are in turn different from those of government departments. Recipients of information from the register will no doubt take advice from their respective legal advisers on disclosure of information, wherever that information has derived from. It is not appropriate for the Secretary of State, in exercising his functions under the Bill, to be under an obligation to provide what would amount to detailed and tailor-made legal advice to a wide variety of people, all of whom are already getting that advice from its proper source. Subsection (3) of the amendment provides that the guidance produced by the Secretary of State would in particular have to deal with matters such as the security of information and the period of retention. Those are exactly the kind of matters which are governed by the Data Protection Act. In so far as the noble Earl is proposing that guidance should be given in complying with the obligations which derive from the Act, I gently remind him of the primary duties of the Information Commissioner, which are set out in Section 51 of that Act. The first two subsections provide:"““(1)   It shall be the duty of the Commissioner to promote the following of good practice by data controllers and, in particular, so to perform his functions under this Act as to promote the observance of the requirements of this Act by data controllers.""(2)   The Commissioner shall arrange for the dissemination in such form and manner as he considers appropriate of such information as it may appear to him expedient to give to the public about the operation of this Act, about good practice, and about other matters within the scope of his functions under this Act, and may give advice to any person as to any of those matters””." Those are the commissioner’s proper functions. I take this opportunity to remind the House of some of the safeguards for which the Bill makes provision in relation to those to whom information may be provided from the register. Clause 24(2) requires the National Identity Scheme Commissioner to keep under review the arrangements made by those who can be provided with information from the register for obtaining, recording and using the information. Furthermore, as a result of government amendments, accreditation for organisations provided with information under Clauses 19 to 22, which are not specified in the Bill, will be compulsory. Finally, under Clause 26(2), the Intelligence Services Commissioner is empowered to keep under review the acquisition, storage and use by the intelligence services of information recorded in the national identity register as well as the provision of that information to any member of those services. I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, and other noble Earls who have spoken, together with the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, that to include this further obligation on my right honourable friend or his successors in title is not necessary. Advice on the circumstances in which disclosure would be lawful is that it really is not an appropriate matter for the Secretary of State. It would be tailor-made to each recipient, having regard to the statutory and common law regime surrounding the recipient. It is quite clear that it is better for the commissioners to do this job—they are better placed to do it independently and thoroughly, with the appropriate rigour and vigour—than it would be to ask my right honourable friend the Home Secretary simply to duplicate all that work. For those reasons, I hope that the noble Earl will withdraw his amendment.